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 ost commentators
have treated the rapid advance of the Northern Alliance from Mazar-e
Sharif, to Kabul, to Kandahar, as a rout of the Taliban. But not
everyone agrees. Osama bin Laden himself has described the abandonment
of Afghanistan's major cities as a new strategy, designed to pull
the Americans into an open-ended guerrilla war that would favor
the Taliban. And at least one American think tank shares this assessment
of the events of the past week.
STRATFOR, a
web-based global intelligence company specializing in regional assessments
and strategic forecasting, argues that the Taliban retreat was the
result of a conscious decision to shift from positional, frontal
warfare to guerrilla warfare, an approach better suited to Taliban
numbers and resources. "Contrary to appearances," reads
a STRATFOR report, "the Taliban... were not routed. They are
stripped to their ethnic and ideological core, intact, with most
of their arms and equipment. They are also back in familiar territory
and reinforced with the bulk of Osama bin Laden's Afghan Arab volunteers.
The Taliban are now prepared to adopt a strategy more amenable to
their tactical strengths and resources."
STRATFOR claims
that neither U.S. air power nor the fighting prowess of the Northern
Alliance can explain the rapid withdrawal of the Taliban. The evidence
adduced by STRATFOR in support of its contention includes the following:
that the withdrawal came almost without a fight; that the retreat
was premeditated and orderly; and that rapid advances are the norm
in Afghanistan, because of low population density and the uninhabitable
nature of much Afghan territory. STRATFOR warns that if the allies
misread the withdrawal as a rout, they are likely to find themselves
mired in a nasty guerrilla war that will not be limited to Afghanistan.
By pulling back to their core areas in southern Afghanistan, the
Taliban have reset the clock on the conflict.
The STRATFOR assessment gives too much credit to the Taliban and
too little to the United States and the Northern Alliance; but it
does help focus attention on a grave danger — complacency.
It was only a week ago that the press was full of gloom and doom.
Now everyone seems to have jumped on the optimism bandwagon.
But today's euphoria is just as wrong as last week's nay-saying.
The war so far has gone well for the United States. The Taliban
have been routed. But now we are entering a protracted and more
dangerous phase of the conflict — rooting out the al Qaeda
network and Osama bin Laden. This will mean serious counter-guerrilla
operations in difficult terrain and harsh conditions, against a
battle-hardened and skillful adversary. But difficult as it may
be, there is still reason for optimism.
The bulk of our counter-guerrilla operations will be carried out
by well-trained special-operations forces (SOF). SOF are tailor-made
for this phase of the war. Delta Force, Rangers, Army Special Forces,
Navy SEALs, and Air Force Special Operations Wings consist of highly
trained and extremely motivated men, specially equipped and psychologically
prepared for the sort of protracted small-scale operations that
will be instrumental in defeating al Qaeda. In addition, General
Franks, commander of Central Command, has expressed interest in
using Marines and possibly paratroopers in conjunction with the
SOF.
As has been the case with others taking a more cautious approach
to the current war, STRATFOR invokes the specter of the Soviet experience
in Afghanistan. According to this view, the Taliban, operating out
of core areas of rugged terrain near the Pakistan border, can interdict
supply routes and harass American and Northern Alliance troops virtually
at will. But as I — and others — have pointed out, the
Soviet analogy may have limited applicability here.
To begin with, the Soviets faced a united front of Afghan factions,
substantially supported by the United States. They then deployed
a force that was much too small to deal with such a threat. And
even these forces were undermanned for the kind of war required
to prevail against unified, motivated Afghan guerrilla fighters.
Additionally, while Spetsnaz (Soviet SOF), airborne, and air-assault
troops were generally well-trained and motivated, the bulk of the
Soviet ground forces were conscripts who were not psychologically
prepared for the war. And, most importantly, the Soviets were slow
to adapt their preferred tactics to the requirements of a guerrilla
war.
The Taliban are isolated, both militarily and diplomatically. This
will make it difficult for their fighters to keep themselves supplied.
The needs of a guerrilla force are less than those of conventional
forces, but they'll still be hard-pressed to acquire even the basics
of food and ammunition.
U.S. forces would have a number of advantages over their Soviet
counterparts. To begin with, U.S. soldiers are volunteers. The quality
of their unit training is high, and U.S. forces possess high-tech
equipment that will enable them to negate many of the guerrilla
tactics the mujahedeen employed against the Soviets (e.g.,
night operations). And finally, many in the SOF community have pointed
out recently that U.S. and British special operators will have the
advantage in winter operations, as a result of training and technology.
STRATFOR has provided a needed reality check. But there is reason
for guarded optimism. Whether they were routed or not, the Taliban
are now surrounded and isolated. Some members of al Quada have been
flushed out, and it is likely that more will be in the near future.
There is evidence that the Taliban and al Qaeda are turning on each
other, and it may very well be the case that someone will finger
Osama bin Laden to save his own skin. This is a good thing.
The war may be far from over, but if the terrorists of al Qaeda
are on the run in a shrinking geographical area, and trying to stay
alive as well-trained soldiers are trying to find and kill them,
it's unlikely that they'll have the leisure to carry out terrorist
attacks.
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