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 hings
seem to be going very well for the United States and its allies
in Afghanistan. The Taliban pretty much have been eliminated and
there are indications that Osama bin Laden and the remnant of the
hardcore al Qaeda have been located. Americans have every right
to feel satisfaction.
Of course,
there are the usual skeptics. They argue that the mighty United
States military has prevailed against little more than a rag-tag
militia that, in many respects, is still living in the 19th century.
Of course we are winning, they say. How could we lose?
But this wasn't
what the punditry was arguing only a few weeks ago. We were entering
into a "quagmire," they opined. The hardened Afghan fighter
would do to the Americans what their fathers had done to the Soviets
and their forefathers had done to the British. We would have to
fight the war they wanted, not the one we wanted. It would not be
pretty.
It is interesting
to note that some well-known military "experts" were saying
many of the same sorts of things before the Gulf War in 1991. Our
high-tech weapons wouldn't work in the desert. Our soldiers would
be at a disadvantage compared to the hardened Iraqis. We would probably
prevail, but casualties would be high. They were wrong then and
they are wrong now.
So let's put
things in perspective. In a matter of weeks, the United States was
able to project power half way around the world into one of the
most inaccessible places on the globe. It not only has sustained
this force but also increased it. It rained down death and destruction
on the enemy. The greatest threat to U.S. forces is not the enemy
but our own weapons when they malfunction.
The physical
accomplishments in Afghanistan are indeed impressive. No one can
gainsay this, but in the long run, the campaign in Afghanistan may
be more most important for the message it is sending to others outside
of Afghanistan.
In this respect,
the current campaign resembles the Grenada operation of 1983. Critics
then also dismissed it as the United States beating up on a small,
weak opponent. But like Afghanistan today, Grenada was more important
for what it conveyed to others than what occurred on the island
itself.
The 70s had
been a decade of Soviet advance and American retreat. The Soviets,
being "scientific Marxists," believed that the "correlation
of forces" favored them in the dynamic of history. The Brezhnev
doctrine was in effect. This held that only the non-Communist world
was "in play." The advances of socialism on the other
hand were irreversible.
But Grenada
indicated that the Soviet view of the world was wrong. Under President
Reagan, the advances of Communism would be halted, and then rolled
back, first in Grenada, then Nicaragua, and finally in Afghanistan.
Grenada was a small military operation by modern standards, but
one of critical political importance. It turned out to be the first
small step in relegating the Soviet Union to the dustbin of history.
The current
campaign in Afghanistan sends the same kind of signal. The United
States has warned the world what will happen to terrorists and the
countries that provide them haven. It says to them that if you commit
acts of terror, we will hunt you down like the rabid dogs you are.
You may pray to Allah, but he will not answer your entreaties. You
may seek martyrdom, but you will not achieve it. Instead you will
suffer sudden death when you are least prepared for it. Your last
pathetic sensation may be of flames incinerating your flesh or pieces
of jagged metal ripping your body apart. Or maybe you'll just starve
to death, die of thirst, or suffocate in a sealed-off cave.
In international
relations, signals are important. And the signal we are sending
now is that Americans have come around to the Machiavellian recognition
that it is better to be feared than to be loved.
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