Sending Signals
The meaning of Afghanistan beyond Afghanistan.

hings seem to be going very well for the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. The Taliban pretty much have been eliminated and there are indications that Osama bin Laden and the remnant of the hardcore al Qaeda have been located. Americans have every right to feel satisfaction.

Of course, there are the usual skeptics. They argue that the mighty United States military has prevailed against little more than a rag-tag militia that, in many respects, is still living in the 19th century. Of course we are winning, they say. How could we lose?

But this wasn't what the punditry was arguing only a few weeks ago. We were entering into a "quagmire," they opined. The hardened Afghan fighter would do to the Americans what their fathers had done to the Soviets and their forefathers had done to the British. We would have to fight the war they wanted, not the one we wanted. It would not be pretty.

It is interesting to note that some well-known military "experts" were saying many of the same sorts of things before the Gulf War in 1991. Our high-tech weapons wouldn't work in the desert. Our soldiers would be at a disadvantage compared to the hardened Iraqis. We would probably prevail, but casualties would be high. They were wrong then and they are wrong now.

So let's put things in perspective. In a matter of weeks, the United States was able to project power half way around the world into one of the most inaccessible places on the globe. It not only has sustained this force but also increased it. It rained down death and destruction on the enemy. The greatest threat to U.S. forces is not the enemy but our own weapons when they malfunction.

The physical accomplishments in Afghanistan are indeed impressive. No one can gainsay this, but in the long run, the campaign in Afghanistan may be more most important for the message it is sending to others outside of Afghanistan.

In this respect, the current campaign resembles the Grenada operation of 1983. Critics then also dismissed it as the United States beating up on a small, weak opponent. But like Afghanistan today, Grenada was more important for what it conveyed to others than what occurred on the island itself.

The 70s had been a decade of Soviet advance and American retreat. The Soviets, being "scientific Marxists," believed that the "correlation of forces" favored them in the dynamic of history. The Brezhnev doctrine was in effect. This held that only the non-Communist world was "in play." The advances of socialism on the other hand were irreversible.

But Grenada indicated that the Soviet view of the world was wrong. Under President Reagan, the advances of Communism would be halted, and then rolled back, first in Grenada, then Nicaragua, and finally in Afghanistan. Grenada was a small military operation by modern standards, but one of critical political importance. It turned out to be the first small step in relegating the Soviet Union to the dustbin of history.

The current campaign in Afghanistan sends the same kind of signal. The United States has warned the world what will happen to terrorists and the countries that provide them haven. It says to them that if you commit acts of terror, we will hunt you down like the rabid dogs you are. You may pray to Allah, but he will not answer your entreaties. You may seek martyrdom, but you will not achieve it. Instead you will suffer sudden death when you are least prepared for it. Your last pathetic sensation may be of flames incinerating your flesh or pieces of jagged metal ripping your body apart. Or maybe you'll just starve to death, die of thirst, or suffocate in a sealed-off cave.

In international relations, signals are important. And the signal we are sending now is that Americans have come around to the Machiavellian recognition that it is better to be feared than to be loved.