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June
11, 2002, 8:50 a.m.
The
Case for a Coup
President Bush’s
strategic dilemma.
By Bryan Preston
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aking on Saddam
Hussein is the next great challenge in the war on terror, and will probably
test President Bush's mettle like no other decision he'll make. Most of
our allies oppose it, regional states condemn it, and even the Pentagon
is reportedly skeptical. The problem is not just diplomatic but also strategic:
How should America prevent Saddam from obtaining weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)?
The president has
three alternatives: Do nothing; invade, with or without allied support;
or remove Saddam by other means.
The first alternative
is probably not under consideration. The president has made too much of
a case for destroying the Iraqi regime to leave it alone now. Doing nothing
gives Saddam time to continue his WMD programs, while sending the message
to other rogue states that possessing WMD keeps America at bay. Domestically,
if Saddam is still in power by 2004, it will probably become Bush's greatest
political liability, perhaps costing him a second term.
The second alternative
gets the headlines. An invasion is surely possible, notwithstanding press
reports that the Pentagon has serious concerns about it — ranging
from an overextended military to the possibility of bloody street-fighting
in Baghdad. An invasion with allied support is ideal, but an invasion
without it might free the administration's hand to plan and conduct operations.
Such an invasion would, however, have unintended consequences.
Consider the following
scenario: The allies, including Britain, sit the invasion out. Saddam's
nuclear program is further along than intelligence suggests, and he has
one or more warheads. As signs of an invasion develop, Saddam threatens
a nuclear strike on Tel Aviv. What should the president do? How will we
know if he's bluffing? If he isn't, and we invade and he strikes Israel,
Israel will respond — in all likelihood triggering a regional
war with its Arab neighbors. Europe and the rest of the world may blame
the United States, since Saddam had warned us how he would respond. We
might get the blame even if one or more allies join us, as U.S. troops
will be the core force, and Mr. Bush the supreme decision-maker.
Alternatively, the
Pentagon is worried that Saddam will launch a nuclear strike against massed
American forces. The rationale is simple: Unlike the Gulf War, which was
fought under a limited U.N. mandate, the upcoming invasion will threaten
Saddam's regime and his life. He will be cornered, and will use everything
he has if it means a chance at survival. In this scenario, Saddam would
launch a WMD attack against incoming American and allied ground troops,
causing thousands of casualties and guaranteeing a crushing U.S. response.
He cannot realistically hope to survive such an exchange, but then Saddam
Hussein has never been known for rational thinking. Additionally, a well-aimed
nuclear strike against massed American troops could destroy an entire
division — a horror that opens the world to a multitude of threats.
An invasion without
local allies also hamstrings the operation's logistics. The battlefield
is thousands of miles from U.S. territory, and would necessitate the use
of local airfields, ports, and land for barracks. Where and how should
the administration insert the 100,000 to 300,000 troops and materiel the
mission requires? Our military is capable of precision-bombing any spot
on earth while evading enemy radar, and of dropping troops and supplies
into just about any environment — but not on such a massive scale.
Then there is the
question of how regional states will respond to an invasion they oppose.
Though our military is vastly superior to any Arab state's forces, the
fact that Iraq is surrounded by potential supporters should give us pause.
Taking Baghdad in this setting would probably turn out to be just the
first of many objectives in a regional campaign — a campaign that
could result in casualty tolls not seen since the Second World War. The
end of such a campaign would almost surely be an American victory and
a politically transformed Middle East: both desirable goals, but at a
cost that should not be underestimated.
The third alternative
gets the least attention, but is probably at least equal to invasion in
plans currently under consideration. Removing Saddam from power via covert
means has several advantages over an all-out invasion. Saddam would be
the target of any operation, and removing him removes the problem. Building
a suitable replacement government should prove easier in Iraq than it
has in Afghanistan, but forces loyal to him will cause trouble for months
or years. Removing him without invasion lessens the need for allied support,
and minimizes the nuclear threat. Removing him covertly also keeps the
enemy guessing, as a massive airlift of troops and materiel into the region
(which could tip our hand as to timing) would not be necessary. Removing
Saddam via special ops will not be easy, but it's an option that should
be given serious consideration.
—
Bryan Preston is a writer and television producer. He is also the author
of JunkYardBlog,
and lives with his wife and son in Towson, Md.
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