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Editor's
note: The opinions expressed in this article are the author's
and do not necessarily reflect the views of NDU, the Department
of Defense, or the government of the United States.
 enator
Joseph Biden called it a "theological mission" motivated
by an "ideological commitment," resulting in "absolute
lunacy." Osama Bin Laden's attack on the United States? No,
President Bush's nuclear strategy, particularly his plan for missile
defense. Biden made these statements at the National Press Club
September 10, 2001 — the day before The Day Everything Changed.
Critics have
long argued that missile defense would be a waste of money because
weapons of mass destruction can be delivered more effectively with
briefcases and backpacks. Furthermore, because terrorists work in
secret, their state sponsors can remain anonymous and not risk exposure
to a counterstrike. Far better then to spend scarce defense dollars
on countering these threats than on a useless, costly and unworkable
defensive shield. September 11, we are told, proved it.
Of course the
dichotomy between the terror threat and the missile threat is false.
There is no doubt that terrorism is a hazard — and no doubt
missiles are too. Proponents of full-spectrum Homeland Defense have
known this for years. Presumably, people who believe in the dichotomy
would at least welcome stronger antiterrorism measures. But those
who have positioned themselves on this ground are of the same intellectual
stratum that has systematically enfeebled U.S. intelligence assets
over the past three decades, and ritualistically thrown up 4th and
5th Amendment roadblocks to increased internal security measures.
What September 11 really proved was how dire these policies actually
were.
Opponents of
missile defense believe that Cold War-style deterrence can be extended
indefinitely no matter how many states possess weapons of mass destruction.
A rogue state will never have the might to annihilate the United
States, and the U.S. will always have the power to visit wide-scale
destruction in response. Under the game-based, zero-sum, value-neutral,
bipolar, and fairly simplistic assured-destruction deterrence model,
this is enough. Fear of the U.S. second strike will hold everything
in check.
But the very
fact that other countries are pursuing missile and nuclear programs
argues to the contrary. Take North Korea for example, an impoverished,
isolated, starving "loser state" if ever there was one.
The North Koreans are spending huge amounts of their dwindling capital
on a missile program while we feed their people. Why, if they are
deterred? Why, if the logic of missile defense opponents is correct?
Because they aren't, and it isn't.
The North Koreans
— or Iraqis, or fill-in-the-blank — are not developing
these weapons to mount a surprise attack on the United States. The
calculus is much more subtle. Consider this scenario: A state with
missiles that can reach the United States invades its U.S.-aligned
neighbor, and promises a nuclear attack if the U.S. intercedes.
We of course threaten massive retaliation. But would that be a credible
deterrent? If the United States intervened at that point, the president
would be trading New York, Washington, L.A., San Francisco, Seattle,
or a city or cities of the enemy's choice, for the defense of an
ally, e.g. South Korea or Kuwait, which would probably be obliterated
in the process. The end result would be two smoking heaps overseas
and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dead Americans at
home. Is this a reasonable outcome? Would any president take the
risk? Would it make our allies feel more secure? Most importantly,
would aggressors be deterred?
A missile-defense
system would bring deterrence back into the equation by giving the
president options, and by making the ongoing quest of the rogue
states for operational missile systems either prohibitively costly
or a fool's errand. True, our potential foes could step up their
programs to try to outpace our defensive system — but if an
attempted response to SDI bankrupted the Soviet Union, what chance
does North Korea have? Besides, missile defense could only spark
an arms race if the United States were to get off the sidelines.
Ironically,
the September 11 attacks have made the deployment of a missile-defense
system more likely. Last week Senator Carl Levin, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, withdrew suggested legislative
language restricting testing to the parameters of the ABM Treaty,
and a few days later caved on a proposed $1.3 billion missile-defense
spending cut. This was not a change of heart but a shift in tactics;
it was an acknowledgement of political reality. With President Bush
enjoying public approval ratings higher than FDR after Pearl Harbor,
the Democrats want to avoid a bruising floor fight they know they
can't win. Missile defense will be part of an integrated, full-spectrum
Homeland Defense concept, along with critical infrastructure protection
and counterintelligence. It just makes sense. No one suggests reducing
defenses in the face of the terrorist threat — so why continue
to leave the country open to nuclear blackmail?
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