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 ccording
to President Bush, the United States is at "war" against
those who perpetrated the September 11 attack on the United States
and those who harbor them. All evidence to date points to Osama
Bin Laden's network of assassins and murderers and to the Taliban,
the Muslim fundamentalists who rule most of Afghanistan. In all
probability, much confusion and unnecessary complication could have
been avoided had the president requested, and the Senate insisted
on, a formal declaration of war on Afghanistan. This would have
kept the focus clear, both on the targets to be destroyed and on
the way to end the conflict. Instead, by globalizing the conflict
and declaring permanent war on terrorism, with its multiplicity
of elusive proponents, and by insisting that governments must be
either with us or against us, the president may have limited rather
than expanded his options and end up fighting inconclusive skirmishes
in order to keep the unwieldy coalition cobbled together in some
semblance of unity. However, his planning and preparations are still
in the initial stages of the campaign, and there will be time enough
later to evaluate the administration's overall strategy.
For the moment,
as we move toward the inevitable military response to September
11 and numerous varieties of pseudo-pacifism and anti-warism increasingly
appear in the media and on campuses, a few commonsense points need
to be kept in mind. First, much is written about Afghanistan's devastated
condition and paucity of targets. True, the Soviet Union's war in
the 1980s against the Afghan "freedom-fighters," followed
by the civil war between Afghan factions vying for power in the
1990-1995 period, left a poor country and its 16 to 18 million people
impoverished. From this, the conclusion is drawn that "revenge"
against the Taliban would be inappropriate.
The logic of
this line of argument is faulty. Afghanistan's vulnerability includes
many clearly defined, strategically coherent, military targets —
bridges, tunnels, and power plants. The infrastructure, linked by
superb all-weather roads, was built by the United States and the
former Soviet Union in the heyday of competitive coexistence in
the 1960s and 1970s. Degrading it will not make "collateral
damage" out of civilians. However, it will separate the Taliban's
forces in a way that will weaken the government's ability to wage
limited war or reinforce the troops that come under attack. By weakening
the infrastructure, U.S. airpower can weaken or cripple — and
help eventually to defeat — the Taliban. Unlike Vietnam, where
bridges could be quickly repaired or alternatives improvised because
of the flat terrain, an Afghanistan bereft of bridges would be divided
into quasi-isolated geographic units, thus making their logistical
resupply or reinforcement nearly impossible. This would enable the
United States to make Taliban deployments difficult or ripe for
a sustained air attack. Moreover, after a quick sweep of Afghanistan's
tiny air force, perhaps 20 to 30 combat aircraft, the U.S Air Force
would be in a position to command the skies above Afghanistan.
Afghanistan
does not have the enormous reserves of missiles and ammunition that
Iraq did in the Gulf War, nor can it depend on the resupply of major
powers such as Vietnam did in the 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet
Union and China funneled in weapons and supplies. Furthermore, thanks
to the courage and farsighted policy of President Pervez Musharraf
of Pakistan, Afghanistan is diplomatically isolated and without
a single effective arms supplier. In this sense, it may not be an
exaggeration to say that Pakistan's partnership in Bush's coalition
is more important than all the Muslim countries of the Middle East
put together, at least in military terms.
The key urban
center to put under strong pressure is Kandahar, headquarters of
Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's dictator. Far to the west of
Kabul, the capital of the country, Kandahar can be virtually cut
off from the center, as suggested earlier. It should be the prime
urban target, not Kabul. The war must be brought home to the Taliban
early, unequivocally, and in sustained fashion. Indeed, once the
United States engages militarily, the Taliban should be made to
understand that it waited too long.
Another major
target should be the blocking of the gigantic Salang Tunnel. Situated
some 35 miles north of Kabul, it effectively divides the north from
the south. During the civil war in Afghanistan in the early 1990s,
the Tunnel was closed on several occasions for short periods of
time. No matter that groups friendly to the United States and opposed
to the Taliban now control it. The Tunnel's blockage for the indefinite
future (no big problem for the air force) would have two consequences
for U.S. interests: first, in the short term, it should help the
beleaguered Northern Alliance — the anti-Taliban coalition
of the mainly Tajik, Uzbek, and Turkomens who lost out to the Taliban
in 1995 — 1996 in the struggle for power — and help entrench
them in the Panjshir Valley and make their reinforcement much easier;
and second, in refashioning a post-Taliban Afghanistan, the non-Pathan
ethnic groups in the northern part of the country might come to
understand that a confederational arrangement for the country is
far more realistic — and feasible — than their lingering
hopes to emerge as the major ethnic coalition in the country where
the Pathans/Pushtuns have long ruled.
A word of caution
is needed, with respect to the Northern Alliance. It is not a coalition
of democrats or reformers. It is they who were ruling in the early
1990s and who were responsible for the bombardment and destruction
of Kabul and its surrounding area. In 1992, after president and
Communist Party leader Najibullah was ousted, it was the partners
in the Northern Alliance who could not agree on how to divide power
and who showed an indifference to reform and the welfare of the
common people; it was they who were instrumental in the sudden rise
to power of the Taliban in 1995-1996.
Still, the
basic approach is sound: "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"
— but only as long as the common enemy exists. After that?
Much must be left to the Afghan people themselves. Based on its
own dismal record of promoting nation-building during the past decade,
the United States is in no position to advise others on how to build
democratic, civil societies.
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