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is nothing like government failures to enhance the power of the
government. The Sept. 11 terrorist attacks confirm that. For example,
financial transactions in the United States have been monitored
for years to combat crime. But that monitoring didn't detect the
nine SunTrust bank accounts used by the terrorists. So what does
law enforcement plan to do? It wants to use banks to do more of
the same thing that didn't work in the past.
Leading U.S.
financial firms and federal police agencies are approaching an agreement
that will give the police extensive powers to trace terrorists'
cash. The idea is to use the computerized national financial system
to continually check up on groups and individuals with suspected
or known connections to terrorist networks. If matches are found,
banks will send their records to the government.
Data-sharing
agreements might sound appealing — we all want to root out
terrorists. But these agreements should be aimed at terrorists rather
than at innocent people.
Behind the
government's hunger for information is the idea that financial privacy
is an obstacle to law enforcement and protects terrorists. Yet that
assumption ignores the fact that law-enforcement officials already
have the right to obtain financial records if there is sufficient
reason to suspect someone of a crime.
From the beginning,
U.S. officials have equated their hunt to track down terrorists'
money to their efforts to combat money laundering. But the reality
is that these laws have not worked. For example, under the current
Bank Secrecy Act, about 85 percent of banks engage in some sort
of customer profiling, filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR)
with agencies like the FBI, the Secret Service, and the Customs
Service. All U.S. attorneys and 59 law-enforcement agencies can
search the SAR database without probable cause. Yet none of them
saw the $100,000 received by Mohamed Atta weeks before Sept. 11,
even though that transaction was in the database and Atta's name
was on the FBI's list of "most wanted" terrorists.
Part of the
problem is that money-laundering laws create an ocean of data that
law enforcement cannot hope to navigate. The chief economic adviser
to the president, Larry Lindsey, reported that between 1987 and
1995, banks entered 77 million transactions into the SAR database.
Only 3,000 money-laundering investigations were initiated, and they
resulted in only 580 convictions. The government got one conviction
per 133,000 transactions. Those numbers show that law enforcement
is overwhelmed by the size of the data they must examine, and they
don't see what they need to see.
If laws targeting
money laundering are ineffective against the drug trade, they have
no hope of thwarting terrorism. According to the International Monetary
Fund, drug dealers launder gargantuan sums of money — $1.5
trillion per year. In contrast, U.S. officials believe that it cost
terrorists a mere $500,000 to create the terror of Sept. 11. With
$1.2 trillion passing through foreign markets every day, tracking
down $500,000 is unrealistic. In addition, most terrorist groups
reportedly use an underground paperless bank system that will remain
unaffected if an agreement is reached between U.S. banks and law
enforcement.
Finally, this
project carries the risk of destroying what is left of our financial
privacy. What would happen to innocent people with the same name
as suspected terrorists? Will information be destroyed once a person
has been cleared of all charges? Shouldn't we be uneasy about the
fact that law enforcement is trying to circumvent the Supreme Court
by seeking financial records without showing probable cause?
Important constitutional
issues are at stake. In particular, the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution protects our privacy against the power of abusive governments.
Regrettably, history shows that the government does not observe
safeguards intended to prevent the abuse of the power to collect
information.
For example,
during World War II census data were used to identify Japanese Americans
and place them in internment camps. In 1995, over 500 IRS agents
were caught illegally snooping through tax records of thousands
of Americans, including personal friends and celebrities. In 1997,
hundreds of agents were caught prying again. Those examples give
us more reasons to oppose a system giving agencies access to more
information.
Instead of
rushing to adopt agreements copying failed policies, and allowing
law enforcement to get financial information without a warrant,
the government should relieve financial institutions from the burden
of spying on everyone. Intelligence agencies should focus their
attention on infiltrating and undermining terrorist organizations,
and prosecuting terrorists. Destroying our financial privacy through
these new agreements will not stop terrorism.
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