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September
20, 2002, 9:00 a.m.
Revenge
and Competition
Why the Palestinians
keep terrorizing.
By Gerald M.
Steinberg
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ISRAEL
Israeli analysts and officials knew that the six weeks of relative
quiet between bombings was never more than a temporary lull. Although
the security operations have severely curtailed the Palestinian capability
to launch terror operations, explosives stockpiles imported in the past
decade have not all been uncovered, and suicide bombers remain at large.
A combination of very detailed intelligence and good luck prevented a
number of attacks, including mega-bombings on their way towards Israeli
cities. However, to mark the anniversary of the beginning of the campaign
of terror two years ago, a wave of suicide/homicide attacks was expected.
At the same time,
an increasing number of Palestinians finally recognize that Arafat's campaign
of violence has been entirely counterproductive. Instead of enjoying the
end to 50 years of violence based on a negotiated compromise, the decision
to pursue terrorism destroyed the Oslo process and Palestinian credibility.
Around the world,
sympathy for Palestinian victimization is slowly evaporating. As the details
of the history of hatred and violence are reexamined, the grand myths
blaming the violence on "occupation" and "settlements"
are unraveling. The Palestinian political and diplomatic position has
been set back by at least 20 years, and the primary association with terrorism
and hatred has returned. Following the American lead (albeit reluctantly,
as always) the international emphasis is now on regime change and replacing
Arafat, and the pressure on Israel has been reduced.
The foundations of
economic cooperation have also been destroyed, and as a result, the Palestinians
are poorer than ever and isolated in their cities and villages. Without
any hope for a serious negotiated settlement, Israelis are turning their
energies towards the construction of a barrier to separate the populations
and reduce their vulnerability further. Contrary to expectations, the
Israeli public did not buckle under the wave of attacks, and has emerged
as strong and determined as ever. As in the U.S. after September 11, the
brutality of these murders has reinforced the sense of national purpose
and resolve. As a result, Palestinians who examine their situation realistically
have started to recognize that regardless of the level of terrorism that
Israel might face, the outcome will not change. This realization led members
of the Palestinian legislature to challenge Arafat's leadership, marking
a major departure in the Palestinian Authority and in the wider Arab world.
In addition, some leaders in the Fatah and Tanzim groups also understand
that their situation will only grow worse with more terror attacks. However,
unless they are willing to take the risks necessary to control not only
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but their own former supporters, the agreement
between them to end attacks in Israeli cities will have little impact.
In this atmosphere,
the main sources of continuing terror attacks are emotional and irrational
demands for revenge and competition for leadership and power. The vengeance
resulting from deep hatred and anger cannot be eliminated through negotiated
agreements, but requires intensive security measures to destroy the explosives
and unravel all of the terror networks. Arafat has never moved in this
direction, and the competition between Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other
militias is likely to grow until all these groups are dismantled by Israeli
security.
The ritual speeches
and formal statements issued by Arafat and other PA officials after each
terror attack reflect the continuing double game. Discussions of a temporary
ceasefire are only designed to legitimize continuing attacks against "military
targets" (in the Palestinian code, meaning all Israelis), while providing
immunity to the terrorists.
As a result of all
these factors, the Israeli security forces will intensify measures to
destroy the remaining elements of the terrorist networks, including those
portions that are located within the Israeli Arab cities and villages.
In addition, the process of disengagement from the Palestinian population
will be accelerated through the construction of barriers and other mechanisms.
Rational Palestinians leaders who understand the futility of terrorism
are likely to become more active, if for no other reason that the welfare
of their own people. The anger and demands for revenge will remain until
a generation of Palestinians are educated without deep hatred and incitement.
Gerald Steinberg teaches politics and heads the Program on Conflict Management
and Diplomacy at Bar Ilan University in Israel.
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