 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
Simon won the March primary by accident. As I wrote during the primary: a) Secretary of State Bill Jones lacked a viable campaign, and b) former L.A. Mayor Dick Riordan self-destructed, allowing (c) Democrat Governor Gray Davis to destroy Riordan with attack ads. That left (d) novice candidate Bill Simon still standing.
Upon winning the primary, Simon should have announced this: "I am here partly because the failing incumbent governor assassinated the character of my fellow Republican, Dick Riordan. Davis will try to do the same to me. He cannot defend his indefensible record. So, he just cuts people up. I will tell you why Davis should not be reelected. Davis will attack me, try to bloody me. Tune him out. Don't believe a word he says." Instead, Simon and his team lost time gloating, respectively, over his apparent win and its alleged brilliance. There was no plan for the general election. Immediately, they should have collected big checks from the nation's wealthiest conservatives. Within days, they should have launched a direct-mail blitz to raise millions in small donations. While waiting for the money, they could have systematically exploited California's media markets. You roll up your shirtsleeves and you create visual stories. You set the agenda for your campaign. Don't wait for Davis to do it. Instead, they complained about no money for TV. It was a campaign of (far more than the usual number of) blunders, big and small. You know about the big ones, and it would take forever to write about the small ones. Know this: Simon systematically deleted the premises of his candidacy. Simon's campaign a) boldly said he was a business success but would not talk about it; b) properly challenged the scandalous Davis fundraising but would not release Simon's tax returns; c) wisely charged Davis with gross mismanagement, but was itself a fiasco. That last one is important. You cannot run a lousy campaign against a screwed-up incumbent. Pretty soon, people conclude you cannot the manage the state. Simon was ill-served by an ever-growing team of seniors and formers. Senior strategists, consultants, media advisers, conflicted and leaking to the press. And there were former Bill Jones campaigners, Republican-party chairmen, Reagan advisers. Senior icon Lyn Nofziger disowned the campaign. He seemed upset at Simon's supposed micro flip-flops on gay issues. But perhaps Nofziger sensed the campaign's macro-instability. Out of which grew Photo-gate. Remember, Davis is target rich. Lots of possible easy-to-prove attacks. Yet, Simon's most-recent senior strategist counseled imprudence. In the one and only debate, Simon attacked — falsely. The evidence — a photograph — was, for all practical purposes, a phony. That incident eroded what was left of Simon's credibility. It handicapped Simon's final assault on the governor's controversial money-raising. All my data showed a stable September-October Davis double-digit lead over Simon, not the close race of suspicious good-news Republican tracks. In the end, the national Republican trend, combined with California Democrats, who went on strike. There was an historic low turnout. The stars were in perfect alignment for Simon. Like a 100-year flood for the Democrats. The worst-case scenario for Democrats. If Simon had really been within five points anytime in October, he would have won, nicely. But when in reality, he was 10-12 points down, he could only end up minus five. — Arnold Steinberg is a political strategist. He has written textbooks on campaigns and media. During the Simon campaign, he refrained from criticism. |
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||
<% dim printurl
printurl = Request.ServerVariables("URL")%>
RO
asked me why Bill Simon lost in the end. What about the beginning?
