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 ieutenant
Commander Michael Scott Speicher, U. S. Navy, was shot down over
Iraq in his F/A-18 Hornet fighter from the USS Saratoga on
January 17, 1991, the first night of Desert Storm. He was declared
killed in action and memorialized in Arlington National Cemetery.
Ten years later, in light of abundant evidence belying his death,
an indolent U.S. government reclassified him as missing in action.
Then, as now, many would argue that his status more accurately should
be prisoner of war.
Is there evidence
of his death? On the dark night he was shot down, other pilots on
the same mission noted a bright flash and a fireball in the sky
where he should have been while en route to the targets. When he
did not report in after the mission, his flight leader realized
Speicher had gone down, but not necessarily that he was killed.
Others on the mission assumed that he had safely ejected and was
on the ground evading the enemy, or worse, had been captured. The
possibility that he had been killed in the explosion was certainly
there, but it was remote.
The likelihood
of his survival from the shoot down is related to how he
was shot down. Indeed, the circumstances of the shoot down are the
first of many controversial issues that have surrounded the Speicher
story from the very beginning. Initially the government's position
was that he had been downed by a surface-to-air missile. Granted,
many SAMs were launched in the general vicinity during the time
of the mission. But in the exact area where Speicher was hit, U.S.
intelligence was reporting no missile batteries, particularly of
the type that would have reached up to Speicher's altitude near
30,000 feet. Then why would the government choose to report it as
a SAM kill?
In the minutes
leading up to the shoot down, other pilots in the strike group,
perhaps Speicher himself, obtained radar contact on an Iraqi fighter
closing the group. One American pilot maneuvered for and acquired
a weapons solution on the enemy fighter. In accordance with U. S.
rules of engagement then in effect, this pilot requested clearance
to fire from the AWACS command and control, while the two opposing
fighters were approaching each other at better than Mach 2. At such
speeds and with the particular geometry of this intercept, the weapons-launch
window was open for only seconds. The clearance to fire was never
given, the launch window closed, and the Iraqi fighter got away.
Those most familiar with the engagement are convinced that this
Iraqi fighter went from hunted to hunter, and moments later downed
Speicher's aircraft with an air-to-air missile.
Could Speicher
have survived a missile kill on his aircraft? The warhead on an
air-to-air missile is generally smaller than that on a SAM, especially
a large, longer range SAM. So an air-to-air kill is generally more
survivable for the pilot. Further, the F/A-18 is equipped with an
excellent ejection seat with an 85 to 90 percent survival rate overall.
Could it be
that in the confusion of the first night's battle, with Speicher's
fate unclear, someone in the chain of command was embarrassed by
the failure of U.S. command and control in this engagement? Was
it more convenient to declare this a SAM kill to avoid the scrutiny
of the failure of airborne command and control? Were the rules of
engagement inadequate? Was there an inter-service problem with the
Air Force AWACS failing to give a Navy fighter clearance to fire?
If those questions
are uncomfortable to ponder, consider this: In the hours following
the battle, was it more convenient to declare Speicher KIA rather
than deal with the embarrassment of having one of our fighter pilots
in Iraqi custody after being on the losing end of an air-to-air
engagement? Why did the secretary of defense and the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff go on national television and pronounce
Speicher killed only hours after the engagement and without any
definitive proof? Maybe it was simply an innocent faux pas rather
than something more sinister, but since it has not been explained,
all these questions cannot be discounted.
Mistakes
Were Made
Extending the logic of the simple-mistake theory, it is relatively
easy to deduce the ineptitude of the decision making that followed.
As we have seen time and time again in bureaucratic Washington,
once you make a mistake, you never admit it. Instead you try to
control subsequent events that will make your error look less unwise.
Central Command, in charge of the Gulf War, never launched a combat
search-and-rescue mission for Speicher despite having a robust combat
search and rescue force in theater, armed and ready. Its primary
mission was to retrieve downed aviators under combat conditions.
One may imagine the discussion at CENTCOM on whether to launch the
combat search and rescue or not: "SECDEF said he was KIA, so
why go look for him? We never got a distress call from the pilot's
survival radio. We don't know the exact location of the wreckage."
These points were probably all considered and led to the decision
not to launch the mission. But they are all problematic.
First, SECDEF
said on national television that Speicher had been killed. But this
actually was not a formal declaration of status. In fact, Speicher
was listed as MIA a few days later. It wasn't until May 1991 that
he was declared killed in action. It is true that Speicher did not
make a radio call and that such radio communication is very important
to the success of a search and rescue mission. Some speculate that
Speicher lost his survival radio in the ejection. Others say that
he was too badly injured to operate the radio, or that the radio
had failed. The point is that radio communication is not absolutely
essential in finding a downed pilot, especially in barren terrain
with good visibility, and especially if the SAR forces know where
to look. There is evidence that Speicher created a visual signal
in the desert for use by search-and-rescue forces, although it is
likely that CENTCOM never assigned any reconnaissance forces or
requested national assets to look for Speicher's wreckage. Which
leads to the last point.
Within 24 hours
of the shoot down, pilots on the Saratoga calculated exactly
where they had seen Speicher's fireball by comparing notes and reviewing
data from aircraft and voice recorders. This information was relayed
up the chain of command. Years later, when the wreckage was actually
located, it was in the precise spot they had identified.
Speicher’s
Status
At the conclusion of hostilities, after a spectacular American victory,
the U. S. conducted a prisoner exchange with Iraq. Was Speicher's
name not on the list of those to be returned? If he was missing
in action, might not there be a possibility he was captured? Even
if he were suspected dead, what would have been the downside of
demanding him back, just in case we were wrong? Perhaps the U.S.
was reluctant to be forceful in its demand for Speicher's release
because it was confused regarding his status, and well aware that
Saddam, too, saw SECDEF's declaration on television. Americans aren't
the only ones who watch CNN. Further, there was no motivation for
Saddam to release Speicher, given the weakness of U.S. demands.
In 1994, the
U. S. government again had the opportunity to send in a covert mission,
this time to examine the wreckage of Speicher's aircraft found by
a friendly Arab military officer. Again, the military leadership
determined it was too risky, in the words of then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili, to retrieve "old bones."
Was Shali, a highly decorated and respected soldier, getting marching
orders from someone higher in the administration? Surely this decision
to not launch a covert mission was inconsistent with his military
background. Did he really consider it too risky? In remote territory
in the middle of Iraq under airspace controlled by the U. S. led
coalition? Instead the U. S. opted to utilize diplomatic channels,
tipping its hand to the Iraqis and effectively destroying the opportunity
to evaluate an undisturbed crash site. Still, there was enough evidence
conclusively to determine that Speicher indeed ejected from his
stricken aircraft and probably survived.
After examining
the physical evidence, nothing indicated that Speicher was dead.
The findings were exposed in a 1995 New York Times article,
which in turn spawned the interest of CBS News. The ensuing 60
Minutes II piece, first run in May 2000, finally gave Speicher's
fate national attention. Inside the Pentagon, lower-ranking officers
and former officers continued to ask difficult questions, effectively
keeping the issue alive, in spite of the leadership's seeming preference
to have it just go away. Credible reports of eyewitnesses to Speicher's
incarceration in Baghdad were coming to light. A few members of
Congress, led by Senator Pat Roberts of Kansas, began to exert pressure
on the administration. Finally, on the tenth anniversary of Speicher's
shoot down, the government relented and changed his status back
to MIA. It is unfortunate that this action was initiated by the
media and Speicher's contemporaries and not by the military leadership.
In fact, it is probably fair to say that without these external
stimuli, Speicher would still be KIA. As would the issue.
Thinking
Like a Madman
Today, the issue again is on the front burner, thanks this time
to several newspaper articles. In January 2002 the Virginian
Pilot ran a six-part series. These were followed by articles
just last week in the Washington Times and the Chicago
Tribune that report credible eyewitness accounts of Speicher
being alive as recently as September 2001 when he was reportedly
moved to a military facility following the 9/11 attacks. These eyewitness
accounts were reported as being corroborated by British and Dutch
intelligence sources. Still, many are convinced that all the growing
evidence lacks veracity, that if Speicher somehow had survived,
Saddam would have done away with him by now. But from Saddam's perspective,
why kill him?
Saddam might
think: Is he not worth more alive than dead? He is my trophy. An
American pilot even more valuable than my Kuwaiti, Iranian, and
Israeli trophies that I have been keeping from wars much longer
ago than the "mother of all wars." I will keep him alive
until I find the best use for him. If I can make him break, he will
be worth even more.
For Americans,
it is difficult to think like an Iraqi, much less a clever madman
like Saddam. But it is clear that Saddam strategizes in terms of
centuries. Some Iraq experts are convinced that Saddam fancies himself
a modern-day Nebuchadnezzar reliving the glory days of ancient Babylon.
A mere eleven years is nothing in that context.
From January
1991 until early last year, U. S. leadership consistently let Scott
Speicher down. In fact they broke their contract with Speicher and
with every American war fighter who may fall into enemy hands in
any future conflict. In the minds of those who fight our nation's
battles and who live and die by the Code of Conduct, who in fact
are required to uphold the Code of Conduct, those decisions broke
a sacred trust. The incredible success of the American armed forces
throughout our history has been due in large measure to the quality
and character of its individual soldiers and their fervent belief
in leadership. A most important aspect of that trust is that they
will not be left behind, an essential element of the Code of Conduct.
We have left
Scott Speicher behind. Many who now wear or once wore the uniform
are ashamed that he may have been abandoned in an Iraqi prison for
eleven years. Alone. With no indication that his country was doing
anything to get him back. Under such conditions, it is difficult
to imagine anyone being able to maintain his physical and mental
health. Fortunately, those who know Scott Speicher best know that
if anybody could do it, it would be he. When he left the ship on
January 16, 1991, he was strong, fit, and vigorous. He was smart
and knew his job, in the airplane, as well as in survival, evasion
and POW situations. Most importantly, he had strong faith —
in his comrades, in his family, in God. And faith in the United
States of America.
It is time
to renew our obligation to Scott Speicher and all our armed forces.
September 11 and the war on terrorism may have provided the impetus
and the opportunity. While the administration formulates its Iraq
policy in the context of this global war, Speicher's return should
be an integral part of it. If Scott himself could be a part of that
strategy session he, in his humility, would probably say, don't
risk the bigger objective for just me. But Scott Speicher in many
ways represents that objective — the U. S. government's contract
with its soldiers, and its citizens.
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