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 ince
the September 11th bombings, a persistent question that belabors
Americans is why do they hate us so much? From the president to
media outlets a chorus of voices has been at pains delineating between
Osama bin Laden and Islam. The former is vengeful and pre-modern,
the latter peaceful and tolerant. Such demarcations miss the point.
Bin Laden and his cohort form a specific subculture of Islam that
has been evolving in the murky terrain of Southwest Asia. This species
of Islam views violence and terror as legitimate tools against the
infidel West. As such, bin Laden is not an exceptional case but
representative of a genre and a new radical religious movement.
While much
of the international community's terrorism concerns have focused
on the Arab world, Southwest Asia has eclipsed the Middle East as
the epicenter of terrorism. During the past two decades, a pernicious
subculture of religious radicalism has been permeating Pakistan's
theological schools (madrassahs) that act as the country's primary
system of education. Such schools feature fiery clerics exhorting
the virtues of martyrdom, encouraging the exegesis of theological
texts pledging celestial rewards for suicide bombings, and promising
ample financial support coming from Saudi millionaires. The messages
of militant Islam and the lure of scholarships made such schools
attractive to the region's impoverished young seeking a sense of
mission and a means of subsistence. Moreover, the student body was
not limited to young Pakistanis but Afghans, Chechens, Chinese,
Mongolians, and Central Asians. In turn, Pakistani-trained clerics
and missionaries went forth into the former Soviet bloc and Eastern
Europe to begin work among the Muslim populations. An international
jihad movement was gestating beyond the glare of the international
community that would soon be puzzled by the intensity and scope
of the new claimants of radicalism.
Among the most illustrious graduates of these centers were the Taliban.
Young men from the Afghan refugee camps schooled in Pakistan (the
very term "Taliban" refers to their student origins) were
infused with religious fervor and captivated by a leadership shrouded
in mysticism who preached an ideal utopia that could be created
in Afghanistan under the rule of righteousness. The disciplined
cadres that were produced undertook a relentless and successful
invasion of Afghanistan, ending up in control of some 90% of the
country.
The victory
of the Taliban in Afghanistan marked the first major triumph of
this new form of "international jihad," combining the
foot soldiers provided by displaced Afghan refugees, the combat
and organizational experience of Middle Eastern Islamist fighters,
logistical support from Pakistan's intelligence services, and funding
from the wealthy members of the Gulf Arab princely class. Whatever
their shortcomings, the Taliban and their Arab compatriots soon
became the purveyors of a new model of revolutionary Islam whose
ferocity would soon be eerily felt.
Into this inflamed
arena stepped in the Saudi-born master terrorist Osama bin Laden
and his terror network, al Qaeda. In a sense, bin Laden was part
of a larger movement of Islamic radicals defeated and expelled from
the Middle East, seeking a new venue for demonstrating their distaste
for the United States and the moderate Arab regimes. However, bin
Laden's wealth and charisma gave the movement of refugee radicals
shape and content. The nexus between al Qaeda and Taliban is easily
decipherable, as the two share an ideology and a sense of commitment.
The more murky set of connections is the one between bin Laden and
Pakistan's intelligence operatives who appreciated his assistance
to their cause in Kashmir while the retired generals made ample
money selling arms to bin Laden. A diverse and complex network based
on ideological amity, strategic convenience, and profit motive was
born and became the backbone of the most destructive if ill-understood
subcultures of hate.
As such, America's
enemies are not just the rulers of a strife-torn Afghanistan or
a master terrorist, but a specific culture. In the coming weeks,
the United States may militarily succeed in dislodging the Taliban
from power and even assassinating bin Laden, but so long as the
international jihad movement is alive, Americans are at risk. To
combat this type of culturally based terrorism, the United States
has to compel its allies, particularly, Pakistan, to close down
the radical madrassahs and eliminate the financial network that
sustains them. But the U.S. also has to move beyond dealing with
generals and princes and compel the region's clergy that have long
winked at their radical brethren who have used religion to legitimize
suicide bombings and demonization of the West to move to the forefront
of the antiterrorism struggle. Only the region's clergy can negate
the theological arguments of the messengers of hate. If Islam is
the sublime faith that Peter Jennings insists on, then this will
be an easy task for the Muslim world's clerics.
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