May
22, 2003, 8:45 a.m.
A Dying Snake
Al Qaeda is
not resurgent, despite recent attacks.
By Peter J.
Wallison
he
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco have set off another round of hand-wringing
by people who seemingly can't stand the thought that the U.S. might be
winning the war against al Qaeda. What is not clearly understood, even
by some supporters of the Bush administration's efforts, is that the most
recent bombings — like the bombing in Bali several months ago —
are signs of al Qaeda's weakness, not its strength.
Before the Bali
bombing several months ago, Indonesia — the largest Islamic country
in the world — was aggressively hostile to the idea that al Qaeda,
or any other group of Muslim extremists, was a threat. After Bali, Indonesia
has been aggressive in rounding up Islamic extremists, depriving them of
what had been yet another base for planning and training. Similarly, although
the future actions of Saudi Arabia are still uncertain, it appears at the
moment that the Saudi monarchy is now under unaccustomed internal pressure
to change its policy in support of Wahhabism and other forms of Islamic
extremism, both in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Islamic world.
At first glance,
it appears irrational that al Qaeda should focus its attacks in Indonesia
and Saudi Arabia — in effect fouling its own nest and forfeiting
support in places where it has always had either tacit or active assistance
from the government or substantial portions of the population. But in
fact, these attacks are necessary to the survival of the organization.
It must continue to make news and generate publicity, or it will be perceived
as a defeated force by the Arab youth on whom it relies for recruitment
and cannon fodder. Al Qaeda's leaders know that the ever-credulous Western
press will treat each bombing as a renewal of its vigor, when in fact
these bombings signal just the opposite.
If we look at the
targets chosen in each of these cases, what they have in common is both
their defenselessness — their "softness" in the current
jargon — and their failure to damage the power or image of the United
States. If al Qaeda were truly resurgent, and had both the leadership
and resourcefulness evidenced by its initial attacks on U.S. embassies,
warships, and the World Trade Center, there is no doubt the organization
would be attacking targets of this quality. But the fact is that these
targets are now largely out of reach — in part because the United
States and the rest of the civilized world have increased the quality
their defenses but also because, as President Bush has said, the organization
is on the run.
One theory is that
these attacks were undertaken by freelancers-al Qaeda cells that are acting
without central direction or without any overriding strategy. That would
certainly account for their apparent self-destructiveness by choosing
targets in countries where they have bases or at least government tolerance.
But if this is true, it only further emphasizes that the organization's
leadership is unable to exert overall strategic control, or perhaps even
communicate with its operatives.
Today, the United
States is again on high alert for a terrorist strike. There may well be
one, but the likelihood is that it will be one of the millions of soft
targets that could not be adequately defended against a terrorist act.
Thus, when we turn on our television sets in the months to come, and find
that al Qaeda has attacked a school in Afghanistan, a church in Spain,
or even a shopping mall in the United States, we should not see this as
some kind of spectacular resurgence of the al Qaeda threat but as the
final throes of a dying snake.
<% dim printurl
printurl = Request.ServerVariables("URL")%>
he
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Morocco have set off another round of hand-wringing
by people who seemingly can't stand the thought that the U.S. might be
winning the war against al Qaeda. What is not clearly understood, even
by some supporters of the Bush administration's efforts, is that the most
recent bombings — like the bombing in Bali several months ago —
are signs of al Qaeda's weakness, not its strength.
