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6.01.00 5.31.00 5.31.00 5.29.00 5.29.00 5.25.00 5.25.00 5.25.00 5.24.00 5.24.00 5.24.00 5.23.00 5.23.00 5.23.00 5.23.00 5.23.00
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6/01/00
9:30 a.m. By Paul Saunders, director of The Nixon Center |
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The first and most obvious is that the Russian side has already made quite clear that the top item on the Clinton administration's original agenda, a deal on modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to permit a limited national missile-defense system, is not in the cards. Though Moscow may have been able to get a better deal from Clinton than from his possible successor George W. Bush, Russian leaders clearly realized that the lame-duck American president is unlikely to be able to deliver the Senate and that the matter could end up being resolved by Bush anyway. So, after billing the summit as an arms-control meeting, the administration was forced to backpedal and redefine the session. Tellingly, however, the administration has subsequently had a difficult time justifying the meeting. During a May 25 briefing on the trip, National Security Adviser Sandy Berger explained that this is "an important time" in Russia and said that President Clinton will "urge Russia to seize the opportunity that has been afforded by its current economic recovery to press ahead with reforms." I'm sure Mr. Putin can hardly wait. This relates to the second reason for low expectations, which is that the Russian side does not particularly need the meeting. Russian officials have already indicated that they do not need further assistance from international financial institutions, a topic of frequent discussions in the past. In fact, one knowledgeable Russian source claimed that the idea for the summit came from the Clinton team, who requested a session in Washington which Putin declined. Perhaps still eager for an arms-control deal, the administration reportedly agreed to Moscow as a venue rather than having no meeting at all. At the same time, Russia's improving economy, emerging domestic consensus, and new leadership have resulted in a new sense of confidence in the country. Combined with growing disillusionment about relations with the West and the U.S. in particular, this has contributed to increasingly widespread feelings that only Russia can defend Russian interests and that the country must be strong to do so. These sentiments create a third reason for low expectations: the fact that Putin's domestic audience will want to see their new president be assertive with Clinton rather than accept unwanted American advice. One key adviser to the Russian president has already said that this summit, unlike previous sessions, must be a meeting between equals and that Russia will no longer be a supplicant in its relations with the United States. Putin is pragmatic, of course, and is unlikely to say anything that will seriously damage relations with Washington and limit his country's access to foreign capital. But it takes more than a desire to limit damage to have a successful summit. Finally, the two leaders are unlikely to develop a personal relationship similar to that evident between Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Vladimir Putin knows from his own opinion polls that most Russians do not want to see more bear hugs and backslapping; they are tired of Yeltsin's style and want their leader to be more effective. Moreover, Putin does not particularly need a relationship with Clinton: having just been elected, he has much more job security at the moment than his American counterpart does. Even if he wanted to get to know Clinton, he is scheduled to have three more meetings with the U.S. President this year at multilateral gatherings. In the end, of course, both sides will want to the meeting to be seen as a success but "success" will mean different things to each. Clinton will get his token agreements, and Putin will get a chance to stand up to America. The result is unlikely to contribute to the U.S.-Russian relationship. |
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