11/22/00 9:05 a.m.
Enfeebled Presidency?
Reagan’s power became great because he told the Iranians to stuff it.

Michael Ledeen holds the Freedom Chair at the American Enterprise Institute. His latest book is Tocqueville on American Character.

ven in this unlikely election, the usual suspects cloud our minds with the usual nonsense. I cannot remember a recent election in which I did not hear, first thing in the morning, "it's one of the biggest turnouts of all time; I've never seen anything like it" from "reporters" all over America. It never is. And then if, as is usually the case in this remarkably harmonious country, the results are close, we are told that "there isn't much of a mandate," and that the new leaders will be weak, and just have to be bipartisan. This year, there are even suggestions that the new president should form a "national unity" government in order to be able to govern.

The idea that there is a direct correlation between the electoral "mandate" and the strength of a new president is an attractive thought, but it's an intellectual conceit, quite unrelated to the brutal realities of the exercise of power. In our system, political power flows from the institution, not the Electoral College. The armed forces don't check on the election returns when the president gives them an order, nor do senators and congressmen when they have to vote on a president's policies. They are certainly more likely to challenge a president if they think he's weak, but that perception depends almost entirely on what the president does once in office, not on his popular vote.

Reagan's power became great, not because he won an electoral landslide against Jimmy Carter (he didn't), but because he told the Iranians to stuff it with their efforts to get a big payoff for the American hostages, and he grew immeasurably stronger when he fired the striking air controllers. He had proven his toughness under fire by defeating those who challenged his authority, and his opponents from Washington to Tehran and Moscow knew they were in for a real fight if they came after him. Clinton's power dropped initially when his wife's national health-care scheme was shot down, and then grew when he boxed the Republicans' ears on the occasion of the government shut down. From then on, Clinton's opponents were afraid of him, even though they had received an enormous "mandate" in the 1994 elections.

As usual, Machiavelli is the most reliable guide to the workings of political power, and he reminds us that a successful leader — whatever his tactics and methods — is always hailed and obeyed, while a failure is bemoaned and challenged. It's all about winning and losing, and new battles can quickly change the balance of power. Political power comes and goes with astonishing speed. Just ask Newt Gingrich, who was briefly one of the most powerful men in the world, only to be defenestrated by his own former followers. Or ask George Bush the Elder, whose approval ratings broke all records less than a year before his electoral defeat.

Most of the talk about a feeble mandate comes from people who have never exercised real power, but love to theorize about it, or from big-time losers like Bob Dole. The new president should not worry himself overmuch about it; he should set about designing policies that will work, and show himself capable of defeating his enemies. That's what political power is all about.

He should also vigorously reject the silly calls for a bipartisan administration. No number of Cabinet secretaries from the opposition will save him from the other party's vigorous attacks if they think they can win. The upper levels of Reagan's administration were richly stocked with Democrats, especially in foreign policy: Richard Perle and Jeane Kirkpatrick are the most famous names, and there were many others. But the Democratic party showed him no mercy, even in national-security matters. Does anybody believe that Clinton's appointment of William Cohen at the Pentagon earned him bipartisan affection from the Republicans in Congress?

The best example is John Kennedy, who — how shall we say it? — managed a wispy electoral victory in 1960, and thought so little of all the talk about the smallness of his mandate that he turned over the Justice Department to his own brother. JFK became a powerful president because his policies were seen to work, and because he handled himself so well.

As for bipartisanship on policy matters, there are innumerable matters on which most Americans agree, and the next president should be able to claim the consensus for himself. That's smart leadership, not catering to the consequences of a close win.

Winners govern, and losers look for a job. There isn't much more to it than that.