From a legal standpoint, of course, Putin cannot nominate a prime minister or form a government until he is officially inaugurated as president. Since the inauguration will not take place until early May, Putin apparently sees no reason to give his opponents an extra month in which to criticize his decision or canvass for parliamentary support for alternative candidates. This is precisely the approach Putin took to his policy program, which he refused to release before the election because, he said, it would simply become a target for attacks.

From a political perspective, this strategy is quite sensible in Russia; it certainly worked well in the presidential campaign, in which Putin served as a blank slate on which Russians could write anything they chose. Moreover, the fact that it continues to work tells us a lot about what Russian democracy is and is not. It seems very unlikely that a major Western politician could survive for three months in a similar election campaign — let alone win — without making any specific proposals. He or she would rapidly be dismissed as a lightweight.

Still, Putin cannot avoid these decisions indefinitely. Policies can be deferred until after the formation of the cabinet — but the cabinet has to be put in place quickly after the inauguration if Putin is to avoid losing momentum.

While Putin has not mentioned specific names, we can make a few guesses about his choice for prime minister. First, it is widely believed that Putin will select a "technocrat" rather than a politician for the post. Like his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Putin seems reluctant to create any doubt about who is in charge in Moscow. Second, because Putin has put so much effort into reassuring the U.S. and the West about his reform orientation, it seems likely that he will select a prime minister with the same general approach. Such a choice would be essential if Putin hopes to continue to pry money out of the International Monetary Fund. As a result of these two factors, many have speculated that current First Deputy Prime Minister Kasayanov, mentioned above, will be tapped for the top job. This choice would be relatively encouraging, particularly for foreign investors.

Fortunately for Putin, his relationship with the State Duma — which must confirm his choice for prime minister — is fundamentally different from Yeltsin’s, which was poisoned by years of conflict. In addition, Putin will enjoy the support of the Duma’s second-largest faction, Unity, which Yeltsin never had. The fact that Unity was willing to compromise with the Communists to allow the re-election of Communist Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznov suggests that Putin can count on some cooperation from the Communists, who constitute the largest faction, as well. (Putin was also deferential to the Communists in a press conference just before his election was officially announced: He noted that as president he would have to take into account the fact that 30% of Russians voted for Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov.] Barring the nomination of a political hot potato like Anatoly Chubais, Putin should be able to count on the confirmation of his chosen candidate.

Needless to say, Putin could easily defy these expectations. After all, since his election campaign was based on being all things to all people, it is inevitable that some will be disappointed once he begins to make decisions. From this perspective, we would do well to remember the distribution of the Russian electorate in Sunday’s election: Over 30% was to the left of Putin (supporters of Communist Gennady Zyuganov and various socialist and nationalist candidates) and well under 10% was to his right (Yabloko leader Grigory Yavlinsky and others).