

Floridians for All

Campaign Plan for a November 2004 Minimum Wage Constitutional Amendment Initiative

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Introduction

A Florida constitutional amendment initiative to create a minimum wage of \$6.15 with indexing will help defeat George W. Bush and other Republicans by increasing Democratic turnout in a close election, will deliver wage gains to at least 300,000 Floridians, and will catalyze the construction of permanent progressive political infrastructure that will help redirect Florida politics in a more progressive, Democratic direction.

The 2004 election in Florida is shaping up to be just as close as 2000, which Al Gore won by 537 votes. Although there have been demographic changes and growth throughout Florida when the 2000 total are adjusted for 2004 it is still razor thin. Unofficial NCEC analysis shows that Gore's adjusted margin is 404, combined with the 2004 adjusted Nader voter- 25,138 (assuming 25% stay home, 25% vote for Bush and 50% vote for Gore). The 2004 adjusted margin is 25,542-too close for comfort.

The 2004 projections indicate additional turnout of 370,000 a total of 6.4 million, increasing the vote goal by 200,000 in order to have a winning margin. The other significant change in preliminary analysis is that the electorate will have 10% fewer ticket splitters than 2000. With less persuadable voters, the need to increase base voters and turning out more infrequent voters is critical to reach the vote goal in Florida.

Given that turnout is down when the economy is bad, since our voters are more discouraged, the need for an exciting ballot initiative strategy that works to address the needs of the most economically needy, and also likely Democratic voters, is a fundamental part of a winning strategy in Florida.

Florida ACORN is building a coalition, called Floridians for All, that will unite labor unions, community and civil rights organizations, the faith community, elected officials, sectors of the business community, political organizations, and thousands of grassroots activists behind the proposed strategy. At the same time, we are building the infrastructure to carry out the campaign and ensure the accomplishment of our objectives.

The empirical evidence from other states indicates that initiatives generally increase voter turnout, and that minimum wage initiatives can significantly increase the turnout of supporters without increasing turnout from the opposition. ACORN's own experience running municipal and state minimum wage ballots [Denver, Houston (1996), Missouri (1996), New Orleans (2002)] supports the conclusion that these efforts are highly motivating to low-wage voters. In 2000, 6.1 million voters came to the polls in Florida, a turnout of approximately 70%. A targeted campaign that works to turn out 1% of that electorate, approximately 61,000 voters, would not only make the difference for the Democratic Presidential candidate but also lend significant support to Congressional and local races. As an example, Congressional District 5 was won by conservative Republican Ginny Brown-Waite, by little over 4,000 votes. From the top of the ticket on down, a ballot initiative strategy which mobilizes infrequent voters and energizes

unregistered Democratic constituency will help defeat George W. Bush and allow Floridians to vote themselves a raise.

An estimated 300,000 Florida workers would receive a direct raise from our proposal. Moreover, thousands more would receive residual raises because of their wage level just above the new minimum. Floridians sorely need this proposed raise. In 2001, over 28% of Florida's workers earned less than the poverty line (approximately \$8.70 an hour). A full 20% of those workers earned less than \$7.69 an hour, a result that can be partially explained by the concentration of workers in the lowest wage job sectors – retail and service. A whopping 37.3% of the state's workforce is employed in service sector jobs, with another 19.6% in the low wage retail sector. The additional earnings of minimum wage workers, almost \$700 million in the first year alone, would be directly pumped back into the economy, helping to stimulate the stagnant economy created under the watch of Bush's destructive tax cuts. Not only is this proposal beneficial to Florida's economy, it also helps to seed a mass constituency for future change.

Because we are starting this campaign early, and because we have a plan, the Floridians for All Campaign will challenge the institutional forces for progressive and Democratic change in the state to build permanent political capacity. This is particularly important to rehabilitating the long-term prospects of our side. In a state where Democrats control only 53 of 160 legislative seats, and zero Constitutional offices, the need to rebuild infrastructure and capacity to win, has never been more important. For example, the signature gathering phase of the campaign will lead to the construction of a vast database of hundreds of thousands of economic justice activists and voters in the state. These are the same voters the Democratic Party must court and win to regain a presence in state politics. The campaign will also force organizations like ACORN to build massive field capacity to deliver these necessary signatures and GOTV. A vast network of activists and voters, combined with a sophisticated field campaign will act as a unifying force among Democratic electoral forces. The combined strength of community, labor, and faith organizations committed to mobilizing their members and leaders at the grassroots level, will result in a cohesive strategy to retake the White House in 2004 and rebuild the Florida Democratic Party.

Campaign Goals

The goals of this campaign are threefold:

1. To increase voter turnout of working class, mainly Democratic voters without increasing opposition turnout;
2. To increase the power of progressive constituencies by moving a mass agenda, putting together the capacity to get on the ballot and win, and by putting our side on the offensive;
3. To deliver a wage increase to hundreds of thousands of Floridians.

Increasing turnout is crucial to a successful 2004 electoral strategy from the top of the ticket all the way down, through the many key races in Florida that include not only the

Presidency, but also a key Senate race, Congressional seats and also significant turnover in the Florida Legislature. Given these many key races, exciting and mobilizing constituency has never been more important, but in order to do this there must be a compelling issue on the ballot. Though presidential year elections always result in higher turnout, the 2000 elections demonstrate the importance of every vote in Florida, and we do not want to leave turnout to chance. These turnout figures from the most recent Florida elections demonstrate the overall decline in voter participation and the need to refocus efforts on mobilizing and motivating our base.

1992	83%
1994	66%
1996	67%
1998	49%
2000	70%
2002	55%
AVG	64%

General Election Turnout Statistics from the Florida Secretary of State
<http://election.dos.state.fl.us/online/voterpercent.shtml>

Giving our constituency the opportunity to vote themselves a raise is probably the most compelling reason to go the ballot box. Candidates will make many promises, but turning out to vote for a higher minimum wage is a voter's guaranteed chance to affect real change at the ballot box.

The process of building a statewide network of progressive forces can be accelerated greatly through the use of the minimum wage ballot initiative. Though there are many groups that represent and advocate for the needs of social justice, civil liberties, and environmental concerns, the strength of these forces is limited through a lack of coordination amongst these groups. While the groups promote diverse agendas, a coalition of necessity is required in the face of organized and unilateral support amongst opposition groups. This ballot initiative will bring together progressive forces from around the state around a common goal: increasing turnout in the 2004 election in order to support campaigns which represent the interests of all our groups.

Approximately 303,000 workers would be directly affected by a minimum wage increase, putting millions of dollars into the pockets of working families across Florida. In addition to the workers who are directly affected, many more will benefit through the rising tide of wages that results from raising the baseline wage level. Unlike tax cut policies which supposedly put money into peoples pockets, but really just raid state and federal treasuries, a minimum wage increase will put real in the hands of those who need it the most: working families.

Campaign Strategy

We define winning here as accomplishing the three campaign objectives:

1. 1. Driving heightened Democratic turnout;
2. 2. Passing the initiative
3. 3. Building permanent political capacity for future gains.

Our plan to win centers on a series of strategic premises, layed out as follows:

1. First, we will divide the electorate into targeted groups of voters/potential voters, and make a strategic plan vis-à-vis each group. We are in the process of completing this plan, but roughly, the categories/plans are as follows:

*African American voters – According to NCEC, there are 440,000 unregistered VAP (Voting Age Population) African-Americans in Florida. Of the 440,000 unregistered voters statewide, 176,000 of these voters live in the 475 majority African-American precincts in Florida. This campaign will work to register 50,000 of these potential voters through voter registration drives in the following major metropolitan areas:

VAP (from 2000)	Total VAP	White	Latino	Black	County
Miami	283,673	32,116	195,859	49,000	1.7M
M-Dade					
Orlando	144,987	81,100	23,414	32,563	670K
Orange					
Tampa	228,681	126,387	42,711	50,109	746K
Hillsborough					
Fort Lauderdale	122,821	77,807	11,282	28,620	1.2M
Broward					
St. Petersburg	194,796	141,797	7,618	36,752	744K
Pinellas					
Jacksonville	539,278	353,983	20,759	139,700	573,888
Duval					
Tallahassee	124,431	74,942	5,341	39,327	
Leon	188,445				

This potential universe of newly registered voters, and highly motivated activists can be the deciding factor in the 2004 election. Registering 50,000 new African-American voters in these majority precincts can result in a net vote gain of approximately 21,000 votes (assuming 70% turnout of new registrations and 60% approval for the measure).

*Non-Cuban Latino voters – There are 800,000 Hispanic voters in Florida, 400,000 of whom are non-Cuban, and 345,000 new potential Hispanic voters of Voting Age Population. The Hispanic population is the fastest growing population in Florida, and presents the Democratic Party with an opportunity to build a new, revitalized constituency within Florida. While non-Cuban Hispanic voters have traditionally voted

Democratic in Florida, the community as a whole has shown significant support for Governor Bush, as evidenced by his substantial win in the 2002 gubernatorial race. In order for Democrats to hold this growing population, they must figure out a way to excite Hispanics in spite of the connection that has been created between Gov. Bush and Hispanic voters. The minimum wage ballot initiative is the very type of economic issue that can drive Hispanic turnout, both away from Gov. Bush, but also from the traditional Republican strongholds in the Cuban community. According to Sergio Bendixen, of the 400,000 Cuban voters in Florida, 250,000 of them are “economic refugees” as opposed to “political refugees” who are hard-line anti-Castro and thus strong Republican supporters. Economic refugees are the product of the Mariel boatlift, according to Bendixen, and are more likely to respond to economic concerns. Based on this assessment, the minimum wage campaign could be the very issue that Democratic candidates need to drive turnout in this key constituency.

Floridians for All will register 1/3 of the potential 2000 Census VAP in Miami (195,859) and Orlando (23,414) which will result in 72,360 new registered voters and a gain of 30,391 new votes (based on 70% turnout and 60% favorability)

*Union members – The AFL-CIO is formulating a very targeted plan for its members in Florida in 2004. Floridians for All is coordinating with labor as to how best use this effort to the fullest advantage. Many union members are not yet registered, and this is a priority in 2003. Union members are registered at approximately a 60% rate in Florida. Because a number of these voters are Republican or swing voters, the AFL-CIO is going to be targeting registrations and mobilization efforts in Democratic leaning precincts in order to best mobilize their members “on the right issues”. Union members have demonstrated that they do not like to be told to vote for a particular candidate. Instead, members respond more favorably to discussions about issues, and where the candidates stand. The minimum wage initiative is an excellent issue for unions to use as a mobilizing tool because it is an issue that labor has a strong history of supporting.

2. Throughout the entire course of this campaign, we will ultimately register 100,000 new poor and working class voters. We will database these voters and integrate them centrally into our strategy. In ACORN’s past work, we find that *80% of new registrants vote if a phone number is obtained and used*. The petition gathering process is the opportunity to build a statewide database of working families and activists numbering in the hundreds of thousands. In addition to utilizing phone numbers acquired through petition gathering, we will also develop an extensive email database and the capacity to mass-mail to these voters. The petition give voters the option to provide both phone numbers and email addresses, which we are enthusiastically encouraging.

In early signature gathering efforts we have found that **20%** of respondents are providing email addresses; a response rate that would result in an email database of at least 100,000 voters. This database could turn out to be one of the most powerful components of the entire campaign as we build a statewide operation for Election Day 2004. The ability to

mass-email constituents on upcoming events, releases of new studies, and just generally reach out to supporters in a extremely cost efficient manner is a very powerful tool.

3. We will build the field capacity to directly and personally reach those poor and working class, Democratic voters who will not be reached by labor or other committed forces. These are the voters who we register during the petition gathering process who we will be able to reach through phonebanking, mail, and most important precinct walking and Election Day turnout strategies. We have already started to build this field capacity through the development of a field canvas program. The canvas works to reach both constituents and other voters through direct contact at the doors. An individual canvasser is able to reach approximately **60 voters per night and have conversations with XX voters. Currently we have a canvas staff of 10 people in Orlando and Tallahassee resulting in direct and indirect contact with over 600 voters per night. A field canvas of 45 people in several locations across the state will ultimately be able to reach over 13,000 voters** per week resulting in both signatures, phone numbers, emails and donations. Overall, in the course of the campaign, we will reach these voters at least 7 times, through doorknocking, direct mail, phone calls and email where available. The opportunity to utilize email and the web is extensive particularly in neighborhoods we are targeting through our canvass. Our website at www.floridiansforall.org will allow for updates, a download of the petition and also secure online donations.

4. In order to best focus our energies on field and turnout capacity, we will “outsource” those elements of the campaign that are not as critical to directly increasing turnout and building permanent political capacity. This means that paid media and television components of the campaign that are important to persuading the existing “swing” electorate to vote for our issue, while key to winning, will be handled externally so that the campaign can focus on new voters and Democratic constituency turnout. While media will play a crucial role in whether the question is approved by the voters, this element of the electorate is not the focus of our field efforts. The minimum wage initiative is committed to registering and mobilizing new voters from within traditional Democratic strongholds in an effort to drive turnout to the polls. These strategies are detailed in more depth later in this plan.

5. We will put 2,000 volunteers and workers on the doors from April to August, and 3,000 from Labor Day through Election Day. Many of these people will come from organizations that have affiliated with the campaign and through our field captain system that is being created to build the volunteer base statewide. One part of this volunteer network is our March primary program during which we will staff polling sites across the state in order to collect signatures from registered voters going to the polls. The teachers union has shown this strategy to be a very successful one, having gathered **over 400,000 signatures in one day alone!** At even a quarter of this effort, Floridians for All will be able to gather 100,000 signatures, nearly 14% of our 700,000 goal in one day. We are working to develop a network of poll captains around the state who will be responsible for making this massive one-day mobilization possible.

6. We will mobilize a set of organizations and forces in the state and in support of the campaign so as to succeed in mobilizing the grassroots and withstanding the onslaught from the business elites. In the early stages of the campaign we have already received the endorsements of the two largest labor organizations in Florida, the Florida AFL-CIO and the Florida Education Association (a joint NEA and AFT union). This major institutional support is only the beginning of our coalition building around the state which will result in the endorsements of over 500 organizations statewide. We will also create a steering committee of elected officials and key supporters from this list of institutional partners to oversee and give leadership to the effort. We will enlist the support of organizations in targeted sectors: e.g. African American churches, community organizations, local unions, local activist groups, etc. Our coalition is already gathering endorsements from local churches, community organizations and local union affiliates. We will mobilize the legal capacity, led by the Brennan Center, and the policy capacity, led currently by the Economic Policy Institute, and the communications capacity, led by the Center for Community Change, to run an aggressive statewide campaign.

7. We will raise sufficient funds to drive our field and GOTV strategies, pay for campaign necessities, and not compete substantially with other Democratic causes. Through a combination of 501c3 and 501c4 dollars, we will raise the necessary funds to facilitate voter registration and voter mobilization statewide, and educate our voters about the benefits of an increase in the minimum wage.

Traditional Assumptions

GOTV programs not designed to specifically promote a ballot initiative, but designed solely around candidates and political parties sometimes lack the personal handle that excites voters and gets them to the polls. This is not to say that extensive fieldwork through doorknocking, phonebanking, direct mail and large Election Day activities are not a successful means to turnout constituency voters. Traditional GOTV does this very well. The minimum wage ballot campaign is meant to complement that type of GOTV program by appealing to the *non-traditional* voters, those infrequent voters who cannot be counted on to turnout through traditional means, and instead need a more compelling reason to vote. Believing that self-interest and a “what’s in it for me attitude” can have significant bearing on voter turnout, we are putting minimum wage on the ballot in order to court those voters. Potential voters who see minimum wage as having a direct impact on their lives, are much more likely to be core Democratic constituency voters, including low-income and minority voters as opposed to Republicans resulting in an increased turnout for Democratic constituencies without the backlash of augmented opposition turnout.

Even though 2004 is a presidential year, and will result in higher turnout than the 2002 midterm election, the need to energize and mobilize core Democratic voters and new voters is of the utmost importance. Low-income workers who are affected by an increase in the minimum wage are more likely to vote, based solely on personal, material returns, rather than the more abstract view of voting for the sake of participation. 2002 was seen

as an opportunity to reinvigorate a Democratic base still recovering from the 2000 Presidential election, but turnout results show that a candidate detached from the needs of working families neither excites Democrats, nor wins. Potential new Democratic voters in working class neighborhoods are also likely to stay home without a direct incentive. Raising the minimum wage is that incentive and can draw out new and core Democratic voters who want the Democratic Party to return to its base. It is an issue that affects lower-wage, working Americans where it matters most, in their pockets and for their families.

Though both major political parties are actively courting African-American and Latino voters, the reality is that any candidate will ultimately fall short of expectations within constituency communities. Given this, and the lingering resentment from the 2000 election debacle which disenfranchised thousands of voters, the chance that base Democratic voters in minority communities will not participate is a real possibility. In order to overcome this, a minimum wage ballot initiative will encourage voters to turnout based on the opportunity to, in theory, vote themselves a raise.

Florida Voting Patterns

In spite of a supposedly reinvigorated Democratic base in 2002, turnout was a paltry 55% statewide, a significant factor in Jeb Bush's victory over Bill McBride, 56-43. In spite of the fact that the Florida electorate is still 43% Democratic in registration, as opposed to the Republican 39%, recent election results have failed to reflect any sort of Democratic majority. The reasons are many, but the lack of core Democratic issues that voters can identify with, and in turn *want* to vote for, has played a large role in this downturn. Though turnout was 55% in the 2002 General Election, turnout in Democratic strongholds such as Palm Beach, Miami-Dade and Broward Counties was only 53, 52 and 45 respectively. Broward is the most glaring example; in a county where McBride won 59% of the vote, turnout was an abysmal 45%. Low turnout among Democratic constituencies doomed Democrats in 2002, and in order to avoid these results, there must be a way to pull out Democratic voters, already skeptical of the voting process in light of the 2000 election debacle.

Another lesson from the 2002 election is that Florida voters do not follow the party line, but are instead more nuanced voters who respond to issues, but not necessarily the messengers. Amendment 9, Florida's Amendment to Reduce Class Size was approved by voters 52-48, even though the messenger, gubernatorial candidate Bill McBride was soundly defeated. In spite of the best efforts by Republicans to create doomsday predictions about the effects of this amendment, the electorate was able to differentiate between the issue they supported, and the candidate they did not. This demonstrates that a good issue that appeals to Florida voters can succeed regardless of political party affiliation.

Over the past 3 Presidential Election cycles, 1992, 1996 and 2000, voter turnout has average 73%. While this number is relatively high, these voters are not the ones who can make the difference in the 2004 elections. The voters who already turnout, are the ones

that are being courted by more traditional GOTV methods. Floridians for All is working to mobilize those potential voters in core Democratic constituencies by registering new voters and turning them out around a particular issue. That said, our new voters are not those who are currently represented in past election turnout numbers, but are rather the constituency in high density African-American and Latino neighborhoods as described earlier in this campaign plan.

Campaign Elements

Listening Process & Strategic Analysis

Since January, the campaign has conducted a systematic process of listening to key institutional forces – in the Democratic Party and its allies, in labor, in the community, etc. - in Florida. Our goal was to answer two major questions:

1. 1. Is there support for the proposed strategy?
2. 2. Will it be possible to put together the necessary funding and capacity to carry out this effort?

In the end, the answer to both questions is clearly yes. However, there is work to be done, and it is clear that only through decisive, immediate action will the pieces of the puzzle come together. Moreover, in talking to key political strategists across the state, it is clear that too few resources are currently geared towards field and expanding and mobilizing the Democratic electorate. It is clear that without this campaign, Democratic forces in Florida will fail to be mobilized in sufficient numbers to win close races. As was shown in the 2002 cycle in Florida and elsewhere, when the Democratic base isn't engaged, when we don't stand for core issues, and when we don't invest early and heavily in field, we lose.

Research

We are in the process of putting together an extensive collection of research to demonstrate the impact of increasing the minimum wage for Florida's workers. The Economic Policy Institute in Washington, DC has agreed to provide significant technical and research support to our campaign by providing a number of policy pieces that will address the following questions:

- • Looking to examine the history of low-wage workers within the state of Florida, this piece will examine who will benefit from a minimum wage increase, by looking specifically at demographic information. This piece will also examine trends over time in Florida by looking at the history of wage levels and also comparing Florida wage levels to other Southern states and regions of the country. In looking at the impact of a minimum wage increase, we will also look at the impact on social assistance programs and look at some of the other social problems associated with poverty.

- • A second piece will look at the cost of living in Florida and demonstrate what it actually costs to live in Florida today. Incorporating costs of housing, health care, transportation, food, child care and other expenses in several major cities across the state, we will explain the true costs of living for various family sizes in Florida and the impact that a minimum wage increase will have.

We will also have several pieces examining the opposition response to our work. Our analysis will show the fallacies of the doomsday predictions that will be released by business opposition further demonstrate the gains that will be made by workers as a result of our campaign.

Another element that we are looking to examine is the impact on immigrant communities, and how they would directly benefit from our campaign.

The first policy is set to be released October 14, 2003.

Polling

Another part of our research is polling, both at the beginning and later ends of the campaign. We will conduct an early poll that will allow the campaign to ask the critical questions without restrictions. This poll will allow for a strategy that connects registration, signature gathering and mobilization efforts to voters in the base turnout neighborhoods by determining the best localized message. This poll will test both non-voting and infrequent base voters in order to understand not only the motivations of our base voters, but also to drive turnout in under-performing precincts where we focus our registration and mobilization efforts.

We will also conduct polling later in the campaign to determine the effectiveness of our messages and messengers and gauge the responses of the electorate. Using this information, we will be able to better refine our outreach and also our Election Day GOTV efforts.

Building the Coalition

We have begun to build the Floridians for All Coalition at multiple levels. At the “letterhead” level, we are in the process of building a campaign “sponsoring committee” that would consist of leading Democratic elected officials and other key institutional forces at the national and state level. This list currently includes partners such as the Florida AFL-CIO, the Florida Education Association, Alliance for Retired Americans, and others. We are also identifying three elected officials to recruit as campaign co-chairs. This ethnically and geographically diverse trio will serve as public spokespersons for the campaign and will help raise funds.

The coalition itself will be multi-layered. Ultimate decision-making authority will rest with the steering committee. In order to be a member of the steering committee a group will have to meet one of the following requirements: a) either contribute \$50,000 to the

campaign or b) commit 50,000 signatures gathered. By limiting the steering committee to these groups we will assure that only those groups that are firmly committed and invested in our campaign will have management direction.

The day to day operations will be overseen by a campaign director who will come on staff in the late fall of 2003, as the signature gathering phase progresses (see subsection below).

Signature Gathering Phase

In order to gather the 488,000 necessary valid signatures by August 4, 2004 required to be placed on the ballot we anticipate needing to gather approximately 650,000 signatures (75% validity rate). The signatures must come from at least 12 of the existing Congressional Districts prior to the 2002 redistricting. The required geographic diversity requires our signature gathering programs to be based in major cities around the state (Orlando, Tampa, Miami, Jacksonville, St. Petersburg) in order to both build statewide capacity for the campaign as well as achieve the requisite number of signatures. The signatures will be gathered through both internal capacity (canvass and organizational site gathering) and also professional signature gathering firms.

The internal signature gathering phase has begun with our canvass program in Orlando and surroundings. This program contains two key components, one of which is the door-to-door signature gathering. Our door canvas allows us to not only gather valid signatures and new voter registrations, but also solicit funds to offset the costs of signature gathering. We will also be conducting signature gathering and voter registration at high-density sites such as supermarkets and other retail stores. Signatures that are gathered by coalition members will also be counted as part of the internal signature goal.

We believe that internal ACORN led operations in Orlando, Tampa/St. Petersburg and Miami will be able to provide 100,000 of the required signatures. In combination with 200,000 signatures from organizational partners (Jobs with Justice, AFL-CIO and affiliates, FCAN and congregational groups among others) this will require the campaign to purchase 350,000 signatures. As detailed in the attached budget, this would cost approximately \$490,000 (at \$1.40/signature, based on early quotes).

In early 2004 we will begin using professional signature gathering firms to collect the remaining signatures needed for to qualify for the ballot. Currently, we anticipate contracting with the Associates to provide the necessary signatures. Though the cost per signature has not yet been determined, we anticipate cost in the range of \$1 - \$1.30 per signature, based on both the ultimate number required and the geographical scope of the operation

Fundraising

In order to raise not only the \$490,000 for paid signature gatherers, but also the additional funds for materials and the actual campaign, which commences in late summer of 2004 with the Labor Day kickoff, we will hire a fulltime campaign fundraiser. We are currently working with Terri Shuck, former Development Director for PFAW as our fundraising consultant. One of the fundraising director's responsibilities is to organize a major donor plan as well as working to develop funding sources from unions and other institutions including 501c3 foundation money for education and research on this campaign. We are currently in the process of assembling a national fundraising committee, which includes foundation officers, major Democratic fundraisers and other key Progressive allies. This committee will help us raise funds from both the foundation 501c3 world for education and outreach, as well as 501c4 political money for partisan outreach.

Staffing

The largest portion of staff on our campaign will come from field canvassers. Looking only at the cities where ACORN and Floridians for All will provide direct staffing (as opposed to contractual work with paid signature gathering firms) we are conservatively assuming 10 people per each field canvass (Miami, Orlando and St. Petersburg) with a crew director for each site and a general canvass director based in Orlando. This internal field crew will work on a contractual basis with the campaign and be paid on an incentive driven scale as detailed in attachment A.

Aside from the field canvassers, a fundraising director, we will have a full time volunteer coordinator to work with sites around the state, working with the various sites around the site to oversee organizational signature commitments, provide technical assistance and materials to these sites and also handle local press work. We will also have two people on staff doing database and petition verification work. These two people will work exclusively on ensuring that signatures are presented to county election officials, verified and then presented to state officials. Coordinating with 67 election supervisors is a full time job in itself, and that is why we are devoting 2 people to this exclusively.

The campaign director will have complete oversight of the minimum wage initiative. We anticipate bringing this person on in the late fall of 2003, as the signature gathering phase progresses and we move into further into message development with allies. The campaign director will have ultimate responsibilities for the initiative from supervising staff, raising and distributing funds, coordinating the many site directors statewide, qualifying and ultimately the core of our campaign.

Media

Developing a strong message through paid but also earned media will be pivotal to the success of our campaign. We have no illusions of outspending a business industry that will fight this proposition tooth and nail and can invest many millions of dollars into

defeating our campaign. While we will want to be on the same television and radio airwaves to make sure our message is heard in that venue, our success will come through earned media development, through press conferences, editorial boards, letters to the editor, and public events.

Through the early signature gathering phase we will limit the amount of publicity work we do. There will be a press conference announcing our filing and the event will highlight the benefits of a minimum wage increase. As we work to gather signatures and raise resources for the campaign we will begin a more public face in the summer of 2004 when we announce our success in qualifying for the ballot, and the real campaign begins. Once we have, then we will ramp up our entire campaign including working with op-ed boards, letters to the editor and press conferences around the state highlighting the impact of a minimum wage increase for Floridians. Local events with minimum wage earners, testimonials detailing the impact of minimum wage increases, and economists debunking to doomsday predictions of conservative economists will all help spread the word about raising wages for all.

Technology

This campaign is an exciting opportunity to use some of the most innovative database and hand-held technology on the market in an effort to both enhance our voter database and ease data collection, but also as a tool to better educate the electorate on our issue. As mentioned earlier in this plan, email collection and database development will play a crucial role in determining the success of the campaign in reaching our targeted constituency. Our database work will allow for the integration of donor information and specified message development into our email lists.

The rapid development of hand-held technology now allows for not only access to voter databases and electronic walklists, but also the ability to integrate video clips and MP3 into doorknocking raps. Based on voting history and demographics, field canvassers could show a short video clip to a potential voter urging their support of the initiative. We estimate the startup costs of handheld technology to be approximately \$10,500 for a crew of 10 field canvassers, including software and hardware costs.

Using data collected from voter files and field outreach, we can then use predictive dialers to target our constituency with both a recorded message and live opt-out capability. While this technology can be utilized through traditional phonebanks and more technologically savvy call-centers, we can also create localized versions with a few phone lines and a computer. As the costs of hardware and software have both decreased, the ability to cost-effectively reach our audience has risen significantly.

Legal

Paul Sonn and Nathan Newman of the Brennan Center in New York have drafted the ballot initiative language. We have been careful to ensure that the language of the question fulfills the single issue requirement of a Florida ballot initiative so that it will

pass approval by the Supreme Court. We fully expect an unfriendly opinion on this ballot question from the Attorney General office and an astronomical economic impact statement from Tallahassee. Though these opinions will not help us in the court of public judgment, we will be able to generate our own amicus briefs to the court and release our own economic impact statement.

Once we gather the necessary 10% signature requirement to receive a hearing at the Florida Supreme Court, our lawyers will be prepared to demonstrate how this question satisfies the single issue requirement. After passing this legal challenge, we will proceed to collect the remaining signatures and get the certified by county election officials.

Recent ballot initiatives in Ohio and Oregon have resulted in significant legal challenges on the local level. As Republicans are working to perfect this strategy, Democratic campaigns are also working to prepare their own legal responses. We are currently in the process of contacting Florida and national legal firms about their assistance in these potential challenges.

Building the Campaign Infrastructure

In order to develop the capacity required to implement and win a successful initiative campaign we will need to build our internal staff structure (as detailed above) and also create a larger statewide progressive network. Realizing that no one organization is large enough to run a ballot campaign alone, our coalition will rely on mobilizing our membership and coordinating our message in order to win. Each organization that is a partner in the minimum wage campaign will need to designate someone to act as a liason to the campaign. That person will be responsible for coordinating the internal signature gathering and organizational media with the larger coalition.

As the signature gathering phase progresses, those partners that committed 50,000 signatures to have a place on the steering committee, will need to develop internal organizational programs to collect these signatures. Signatures will then be turned over to the initiative campaign staff, who will handle verification and submission. Each participating organization will also be expected to host 1-2 large press events in which they target their message to their constituency.

Television

Because Florida is such a large state, the television viewership is broken down into 12 major media markets. This means that in order to run an effective television campaign we would need to hit all of these targets, with varying degrees of density. The cost of such a television campaign will be extremely prohibitive so the we will have to target our media buys to areas we believe will most reach our base Democratic constituency, primarily South Florida and Tampa Bay. The South Florida region is broken down into the Miami-

Ft. Lauderdale (Broward, Miami-Dade and Monroe) and West Palm Beach- Ft. Pierce (Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, Palm Beach and St. Lucie) markets. Tampa Bay consists of a single Tampa-St. Petersburg market which includes 10 counties (Citrus, Hardee, Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk and Sarasota)

Opposition Research, Division, & Cooptation

In response to our campaign, there will be significant opposition policy research from the usual suspects, including the Employment Policies Institute, an industry sponsored DC think tank that will release data about the negative impact of a minimum wage increase in Florida. There will be numbers citing increased unemployment and the strain on small businesses to pay workers this new minimum wage. It is also likely that David MacPherson, a professor at FSU who has released several studies for the Employment Policies Institute on the supposed negative effects of wage increases, will be commissioned to do similar work on this campaign. While all substantially untrue, we will have our own body of evidence to counteract the effects and media impact of these policy briefs. In addition to the resources of the ACORN Living Wage Center, we are also working closely with the Economic Policy Institute to release our own policy work.

Aside from the think tank level of opposition, we need to ensure that our coalition remains strong and that partners do not split over internal organizational priorities or other electoral strategies that will be in play in the 2004 election. In order for this campaign to succeed we will need partners to deliver on committed signatures and make sure that our message stays on target. Because raising the minimum wage will have impact on so many sectors, coalition partners will be able to market the campaign to their constituency in different ways while still staying on the key message, increasing the minimum wage and demonstrating power at the ballot box.

The Campaign Climax (Labor Day 2004 through 11/2/04)

While gathering the signatures, building the coalition and qualifying for the ballot are large undertakings by themselves, the actual campaign doesn't really begin until Labor Day when voters return from the summer lull and turn their attention to the Presidential election. With the enormous amount of press that will be focused on the Florida election in general, it is important to be able to reach our members and constituency on the importance of turning out to vote for a minimum wage increase. On Labor Day, we will hold a large press conference with allies from across the state as a re-introduction of the campaign to the voters. In late September we will release the results of a statewide poll showing support for the initiative and complement that with personal stories from workers benefiting from this minimum wage increase.

In October we will begin our volunteer phonebanks. Similar to the phone banking operations run as part of the Small Class Size Initiative, we will turn out members and constituents to call petition signers and other targeted voters to come out and vote themselves a raise. Callers will tell personal stories about the impact this raise will have

for them and urge voters to come out specifically around this issue. Instead of typical GOTV which targets voters to turnout solely for the sake of turning out, the minimum wage campaign gives voters a very clear reason to vote and shows tangible results in the communities.

Leading up to the election, we will coordinate door-to-door efforts with other GOTV efforts including an extensive, yet to be developed, Election Day plan. The popularity of early voting in the 2002 election means that there will be more early voting poll sites and a higher percentage of voters who cast their votes in the weeks leading up to Election Day, instead of only on November 2. Aware of this fact, our phonebanks will highlight the opportunities for early voting and coordinate with voters to provide rides to the polls.