Beware the Gerrymander
Racial gerrymandering balkanizes Americans

Mr. Clegg is general counsel of the Center for Equal Opportunity.
May 1, 2001 9:45 a.m.

 

n April 18th, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Hunt v. Cromartie, a lawsuit alleging that North Carolina's

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12th Congressional District had been racially gerrymandered. Commentators can be forgiven for pouncing on every word in this opinion, since it is an important card just dealt in a very high-stakes game: redistricting after the 2000 census.

In its 5-4 opinion, a majority of the Court concluded that race had not been the "predominant factor" in drawing the district. The four dissenting justices disagreed, finding that the trial panel's conclusion that race was in fact the predominant factor "was permissible, even if not compelled by the record."

Many news stories and the commentators quoted in them have quickly suggested that the majority opinion has given a green light to racial gerrymandering as the redistricting process begins. But this is not true, and reflects the wishful thinking of those who have supported all along the use of race in drawing districts.

The majority opinion did not, and did not claim to, change existing law. Indeed, it would have been quite surprising if it had, since Justice O'Connor, who voted with the majority this time, has voted in many earlier cases against racial gerrymandering.

Nor, for that matter, had the dissenting justices always voted to affirm lower-court findings of racial gerrymandering. Indeed, in this same litigation, the four dissenters — joined by Justice O'Connor — voted in 1999 to overturn a lower-court conclusion that the 12th district had been unlawfully drawn. It is amusing that this case has found its way to the Supreme Court four times over the past decade, and every time the trial court's findings were overturned, whether it ruled for or against the plaintiffs. And you thought being a federal judge was fun.

The Supreme Court's most recent decision reflected a difference in opinion among the justices about whether there was sufficient evidence to find that race had been the predominant factor in drawing the district's boundaries. A majority found that, all in all, that was not a fair conclusion; four other justices found that, all in all, the lower court's decision was defensible.

Thus, state and local officials remain on notice that racial gerrymandering is illegal and that, if they rely on race in deciding how to draw districts, they risk having those districts struck down as unconstitutional. This is as it should be. Racial gerrymandering balkanizes Americans and removes an important incentive for interracial coalition building.

On the other hand, this is not to say that the most recent tea leaf in the Hunt litigation isn't colored and shaped a little differently from its predecessors.

As Justice Thomas's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, points out: "[T]he District Court was assigned the task of determining whether, not why, race predominated" (his emphasis) since, after all, "racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution whether the motivation is malicious or benign." Thus, "It is not a defense that the legislature may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that blacks are reliable Democratic voters."

Or, as the American Civil Rights Institute's Ed Blum points out, what if the shoe were on the other foot and black voters' likely politics were being used to gerrymander against their controlling a majority in any district?

The majority's contrary notion that it is all right to take race into account so long as it is being used only as a proxy for something else is something that ought to give everyone pause. This used to be called stereotyping.

Suppose a policeman says that, yes, he targets black drivers, but not because he has anything against blacks per se — he's just playing the odds and using race as a proxy for greater likelihood of criminality. Not something that the ACLU will like. Or suppose a college says that, yes, it targets African Americans for admissions, even when they have lower academic credentials, but only because it thinks that African Americans are more likely to add to the campus's "diversity." Not something that a non-ACLUers would like. The majority's reasoning is unlikely to carry beyond the redistricting area, where racial and ethnic line-drawing are so historically entrenched that Justice O'Connor despairs of insisting that such considerations be banished from the political backrooms.

At the very end of its opinion, the majority warns that even if plaintiffs can show that their political objectives could be achieved without considering race, they also have to show that the nonracial approach "would have brought about significantly greater racial balance." Talk about just not getting it. The critics of racial gerrymandering are not trying to achieve or avoid any particular degree of racial balance — to the contrary, they don't want race to be a consideration at all.

A recurrent dispute in civil-rights law is between a plaintiff who asserts, "You discriminated against me because I'm X," and the defendant who answers, "It's not that you're X, it's that you're Y," and then the court has to resolve the question of whether X and Y are so intertwined that the defense should be rejected. Usually the liberal wing is inclined to reject the defense if X and Y are at all close; in Hunt, ironically, it buys the defense even though the defendant admits that it is using X (race) as a proxy for Y (voting behavior). It is as if an employer admitted not only that he had a hiring criterion that had a disparate impact on the basis of race, but that he used race directly to decide whether that criterion was met!

A final irony in Hunt is that it is a liberal majority insisting that, just because there are racial disproportions, doesn't prove that there has been discrimination. Very true, but this is generally a conservative theme.

So beware the gerrymander, all you pols out there. The Center for Equal Opportunity, the American Civil Rights Institute, and a variety of other litigating and non-litigating organizations have been mailing letters and legal opinions over the past year warning you not to engage in race-based redistricting. The Supreme Court's recent case doesn't change the law and, to the extent it adds some nuance, it isn't persuasive. Even if the Court may allow you to gerrymander in some cases, that doesn't mean you should.

 
 

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