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U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, still waiting for some Bush
appointees, recently accused Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad of
violating the rights of its workers by testing their blood for evidence
of genetic predisposition to certain injuries from carpal-tunnel syndrome.
The EEOC's suit says the testing violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act.
The company has denied many of the allegations, but let's suppose for
the sake of argument that what the EEOC says is basically true. Is there
anything illegal or immoral about what the company is accused of doing?
The claim that the Americans with Disabilities Act was violated is weak
(the EEOC also says that employees' privacy rights were violated, but
the facts regarding this are in dispute). The ADA defines "disability"
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of [an] individual." That is a broad definition,
all right, but it is written in the present tense. Accordingly, it is
hard to argue that a genetic predisposition to develop a disability
is the same thing as a disability.
That is also the best reading of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the statute in its 1998 Bragdon v. Abbott decision. In holding
HIV-positivity to be covered by the ADA, a 5-4 Court thoroughly described
the course of the disease and concluded: "In light of the immediacy with
which the virus begins to damage the infected person's white blood cells
and the severity of the disease, we hold it is an impairment from the
moment of infection." This immediate damage to the body distinguishes
it from genetic predispositions.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent (in which he was joined by two other
justices) in the case was consistent with the majority opinion on this
point, and more explicit. It said: "The ADA's definition of disability
is met only if the alleged impairment substantially 'limits' (present
tense) a major life activity" the parenthetical is Rehnquist's.
He goes on to reject any argument to the contrary precisely because, "taken
to its logical extreme, [it] would render every individual with a genetic
marker for some debilitating disease 'disabled' here and now because of
some possible future effects."
Indeed, up until the EEOC's lawsuit, even sympathetic experts thought
that federal regulations and guidance were inconsistent with the position
it is now taking.
But of course Congress has authority to change the law. Should it? That
is, is what Burlington Northern is accused of doing wrong?
Privacy issues aside, it is hard to fault the company for wanting to know
whether certain lines of work might be bad for an employee's health. Indeed,
one can imagine the anticorporate attacks if the company failed
to test: "Ralph Nader, Mother Jones magazine, and 60 Minutes
all accused Burlington Northern today of callously refusing to undertake
the simple precautions necessary to ensure that employees are not given
work that can kill or cripple them," etc.
So the issue must be, What do we want employers to do when they find out
that an employee's genetic predispositions make it hazardous for him to
continue at a particular job?
There are basically three possibilities: (1) fire him, (2) assign him
to another position, or (3) tell the employee and let him decide himself.
Let's consider them in turn.
There is an understandable and strong impulse to resist firing people
for things that are not their fault and are beyond their control. On the
other hand, we do it all the time. If an employee turns out to be incompetent,
we accept the fact that the employer may fire him, even if the employee
is doing his best. Except for some government jobs, dropping dead is a
serious impairment to performance. And it can be expensive to train employees
who unexpectedly must be replaced on short notice. Finally, genetic testing
may be able to tell us not only about an employee's disabilities, but
his abilities as well.
Assigning the employee to another position is certainly the most humane
and satisfying resolution, and one that most employers would likely adopt
voluntarily, assuming they were otherwise happy with the employee and
there was another position available. But suppose there isn't another
job for which the employee is the best qualified person. Creating an entitlement
to that job is unfair not only to the employer but to the employee who
is the best qualified.
There can also be a couple of problems with telling a company that it
must let the employee continue in a hazardous position if that's what
he chooses. It may increase the company's liability down the line
not only to the employee, but to other employees if they are somehow injured
as a result. And some employers may be understandably and humanely reluctant
to place employees in harm's way.
The truth of the matter is that sometimes the first course makes sense,
and other times the second course does, and in yet other instances the
third is the most logical. Under these circumstances, especially when
what is involved is a rapidly changing area of science and technology,
it makes little sense for the federal government to mandate a one-size-fits-all
approach for all situations.
Yet, predictably, that is where we are headed. House and Senate bills
are being introduced this week, sponsored by Sen. Tom Daschle (D., SD)
and others. Yet it seems very unlikely that the EEOC, the courts, or Congress
will be better able to reach a reasonable resolution of the issues raised
by genetic testing than by allowing the private sector to grapple with
them.
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