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 oday, a blue-ribbon
commission established to consider the troubled V-22 tiltrotor program
will be taking public
testimony
from a number of outside witnesses. Some of them will be critics
of this revolutionary aircraft known as the Osprey — capable
of taking off and landing vertically like a helicopter but converting
in flight to operate like a conventional turboprop. Others will
be family members and their lawyers representing men who have perished
in several crashes that have tragically occurred during the development
of the V-22. A few will be, like me, unalloyed supporters of the
Osprey. Here's what I will tell the commission:
My area of expertise is policy, not technology. I cannot speak with
first-hand authority about the technical questions concerning the
Osprey with which you are wrestling. You have ample inputs on this
score from those with the necessary credentials. For what it's worth,
I will say only that this layman's view of the technical challenges
involved in completing the remaining work needed to validate the
V-22 appear to be eminently manageable.
This is not to say that every aspect of the Osprey is working perfectly
or that improvements cannot be made to enhance the aircraft further.
It is to say, however, that we have certainly done harder things
than perfecting the tiltrotor technology, given its advanced state
of development and impressive, if unfortunately not unblemished,
track record.
We may have forgotten how hard some of the previous feats were,
or how dear the cost of accomplishing them proved to be — in
both lives and national treasures. But where the benefit to the
nation has warranted the effort and, yes, the sacrifices entailed,
we have in the past risen to the challenge, time and time again.
That experience argues that the decision whether to continue to
acquire the V-22 should take into account considerations beyond
the narrow question of the maturity and reliability of tiltrotor
technology. In particular, I urge this commission to address two
points that I respectfully suggest should bear directly on whether
you should recommend proceeding with the completion of development
and full-scale production of the V-22. Each of these individually
argues for doing so; taken together, I am convinced that the case
for going forward with the Osprey is utterly compelling and, indeed,
dispositive.
The first consideration is that no other technology available today
or in prospect holds out the promise of meeting the military's modern
requirements for rapid, medium-lift transport. There is much talk
these days about the "revolution in military affairs" and "skipping
a generation" of weapon systems so as to enable more capable technologies
to be brought to bear to increase mission performance and save American
lives.
I believe there are few better examples of the near-term application
of these notions than the V-22. As you know, successive Cost and
Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEAs) have conclusively shown
that the tiltrotor is superior to helicopter alternatives on both
financial and combat-performance grounds. Thanks to the survivability
features built into the Osprey, the use of this revolutionary technology
— representing at least a "generation"
| “We
owe it to the men who have lost their lives, due to factors
that appear not to have been attributable to the Osprey's
tiltrotor design, to ensure that they did not die in vain.” |
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enhancement
over any helicopter in existence or on the drawing boards today
— means not only that missions will be undertaken with a significantly
higher probability of success. It also means that there will be
dramatic savings in the currency we hold most dear: the lives of
Marines (and, in due course, personnel from other services) who
will be given the tools to enable them to perform their assignments
and to get home safely.
The second consideration is that much more is riding on the choice
of whether to build or terminate the V-22 than just the ability
of the U.S. Marine Corps — and, in the future, its sister services
— to execute their missions successfully.
In point of fact, the V-22 is a national asset. In the process
of meeting a validated military requirement, the Defense Department
is doing what it has done time and again in the past: It is perfecting
technology that will redound enormously to both the civilian
sector and the uniformed services.
It is not always easy to see this multiplier effect. I remember
vividly in 1981, when I was a professional staff member on the Senate
Armed Services Committee, a joint House-Senate conference very nearly
resulted in the termination of another very expensive program that
was right where the V-22 is today — about to move from the
R&D phase into full-scale production. Military officers and other
so-called "experts" argued that the program was unnecessary, that
there were other, less costly ways to do the job, and that billions
could be saved by canceling this program outright. If civilians
were interested in the technology, it was said, let them pay to
develop and field it.
Fortunately, wiser heads — and the Senate position — prevailed.
As a result, the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system became
a reality. Today, in addition to being a driving force behind the
Revolution in Military Affairs, GPS applications constitute a $10-billion-a-year
boon to the U.S. economy.
There is no way to estimate exactly what the dollar benefit of the
V-22 and its derivatives will be for the nation — any more
than it was possible to say 20 years ago what the economic repercussions
of the GPS technology would be for the commercial sector. What is
clear, however, is that the fruits of what promises to be a huge
civilian return on the military's investment will not be
realized unless the armed forces completes the job of proving the
effectiveness and safety of this technology. No private entity will
be willing or able to afford the expense and risk that the Marines
justify as a military necessity, any more than any company would
have taken on the perfecting and deployment of the GPS constellation.
It now appears that the choice as to whether the American military
and the nation as a whole have the opportunity to realize the combat
and economic potential of the V-22 rests to an extraordinary degree
with you. This is an awesome responsibility. I respectfully suggest
that it can only be exercised properly by taking into account considerations
that transcend the narrow technical questions with which you have,
of necessity, been principally concerned. If you factor these other
considerations into your deliberations, I am confident that you
will agree with me that — far from being unable to afford to
make the V-22 work and to purchase it in quantity — the
United States cannot afford to forego the Osprey and to foreclose
these opportunities.
We owe it to the men who have lost their lives, due to factors that
appear not to have been attributable to the Osprey's tiltrotor design,
to ensure that they did not die in vain. I urge you in the strongest
possible terms to recommend continued development and production
of the V-22. By so doing, you will permit their sacrifice to translate
into an enduring legacy for both their beloved Marine Corps and
for the nation as a whole.
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