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spate of recent
news reports offers a sobering reminder that the world is a dangerous
place these days and that it may become much more so for
America and her interests in the future.
Consider the following sampler: Last week, the United States put
its forces in Bahrain on Threat Condition Charlie, the second-highest
alert level, in light of intelligence warnings of threats of possible
terrorist attacks on specified targets in the region. On Friday,
Iraq announced that it was going to suspend this week the export
of its oil, the largest consumer of which is the United States.
Meanwhile, Communist China initiated large-scale military exercises
involving amphibious assaults and other operations simulating those
that might be associated with a PRC attack on Taiwan. And, while
transparently trying to dissemble about the implications of Chinese
penetration of the Western hemisphere, the CEO of a company known
as COSCO which is, for all intents and purposes, the People’s
Liberation Army's merchant marine nonetheless underscored
the strategic significance of China's effective control of the Panama
Canal since it is by far the shortest means of getting by sea from
the Eastern U.S. to Asia.
What if these seemingly isolated events were to metastasize in ways
that would not only be ominous in their own right but that, because
of the concurrence of their timing, gave rise to simultaneous and
grave crises in the Persian Gulf and the Taiwan Strait?
What if, for example, the United States found itself facing not
just a repeat of the terrorist attacks in the Middle East that laid
waste in recent years to scores of American military personnel in
the Khobar Towers and U.S.S. Cole incidents? How would this country
respond if the object of some murderous act of terror perpetrated
by unknown actors were more strategic say, blocking maritime
traffic through the narrow Straits of Hormuz, with the aim of denying
the industrialized world not only access to Iraqi oil but, for a
time at least, much of the energy resources of the entire Persian
Gulf?
And what if at the same time that were happening, with immediate
and potentially far-reaching implications for the price of oil and
global economic conditions, China actually goes for it against Taiwan?
This might not take the form of attacks over the beach or missile
strikes on the island. It might, instead, involve electro-magnetic
pulse (EMP) weapons and information-warfare techniques designed
to cripple the latter's electronic and computer infrastructures,
rendering its defensive capabilities largely ineffectual and bringing
Taiwan's economy to a standstill without inflicting tremendous
loss of life.
Then, what if, on top of everything else, the Panama Canal became
unavailable whether because it is rendered physically unusable
or because the threat of that happening serves as a deterrent to
forcing the issue? It may well be that China would be behind such
an action, but able to enjoy "plausible deniability" of any responsibility
for its occurrence. The effect could be that East Coast-based U.S.
Navy ships needed under these circumstances in the Pacific rather
than the Atlantic would take weeks longer to reach their destination,
possibly at a time when delay may spell the difference between the
survival or the loss of a friendly, democratic ally in Asia.
These questions are not idle or academic. The United States could
find itself facing such scenarios or variations on them in the weeks,
months, or years ahead. The most worrisome aspect the convergence
of these kinds of widely dispersed developments is all the
more distinct a possibility insofar as Communist China, which has
much to gain from America being distracted and/or incapacitated
at a moment when it decides finally to act on oft-repeated threats
to reunify Taiwan with the mainland by force, is actively collaborating
with the Persian Gulf regimes that are state sponsors and employers
of terrorism.
Unless we are careful, America’s ability to respond effectively
to one or more of these scenarios could be significantly harmed
if the Bush administration adopts the scaled-back military force
that some are urging, usually in the hope of freeing up resources
urgently needed for modernization and maintenance of the armed services.
The pressure to abandon the so-called "Two War Strategy" (shorthand
for the long-standing requirement to have sufficient forces to fight
two simultaneous or, under the Clinton administration, nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts) may well intensify
if, as is being reported, the tax reductions approved before Memorial
Day will preclude the president from seeking anything like the funding
necessary to "rebuild the military."
The most vexing prospect of all, however, may be this: The very
fact that the United States military is less ready, less flexible,
less forward-deployed, and less capable of prompt power projection
than would be required to deal with two serious international crises
at the same time makes it enticing for someone (or multiple parties,
acting in collusion) to create just such a circumstance. In that
event, we are likely to find ourselves paying a far higher cost
probably in both lives and national treasure than
would have been involved in maintaining the sorts of formidable
deterrent forces that just might have prevented such threatening
behavior from eventuating.
That said, Hollywood’s Pearl Harbor, whatever its myriad
shortcomings, reminds us that surprise attacks are by definition
just that. Even if we are vigilant and prepared, we may not
be able to prevent every instance of terrorism or threats to strategic
sea lines of communication. It may also be that the Chinese will
decide at some point to attack Taiwan, no matter what we do. The
American people expect their government nonetheless to take such
steps as it can to mitigate these and other dangers to our vital
interests. They need to be given the straight truth about the threats
that are emerging, and encouraged to insist that the requisite funding
and energy are applied to minimizing them.
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