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End
Saddams Reign of Terror Mr.
Gaffney is president of the Center
for Security Policy |
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To be sure, even if Secretary Powell presents such a program to his regional interlocutors, he will encounter some resistance from Iraq's neighbors; they understandably fear reprisals from a vengeful Saddam and have come to feel little confidence in America's will, if not its ability, to come to their aid. They may be particularly skeptical about the Secretary's calls for shoring up the international economic sanctions against Iraq in light of the desire Mr. Powell expressed during his confirmation hearings to Senators Chuck Hagel, Richard Lugar, and others on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to "participate with you in discussing how to get rid of most of [the United States' economic sanctions against other countries]." That said, the best chance of stabilizing and reversing the seriously deteriorating situation vis a vis Saddam i.e., his resuscitated weapons-of-mass-destruction programs, and his regional ambitions is to adopt a dramatically different approach to Bill Clinton's hapless policy of "containing" Saddam Hussein. The new strategy should be explicitly aimed at ending Saddam's misrule and the threat it poses to his own long-suffering people and others beyond his borders. Fortunately, the senior ranks of the incoming Bush-Cheney administration are being increasingly populated by individuals who have, in the past, endorsed such an alternative approach. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State-designate Richard Armitage, Under Secretary of State-designate John Bolton, Under Secretary of Defense-designate Dov Zakheim, and a number of others said to be under consideration for top posts (including Zalmay Khalilzad, Jeffrey Gedmin, and Douglas Feith) were among those who, on February 19, 1998, offered a blueprint for liberating Iraq in an Open Letter to the President. The following were the elements of the "comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime" recommended by these and some 30 other former senior officials and experts: o "Recognize a provisional government of Iraq based on the principles and leaders of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) that is representative of all the peoples of Iraq." o "Restore and enhance the safe haven in northern Iraq to allow the provisional government to extend its authority there and establish a zone in southern Iraq from which Saddam's ground forces would also be excluded." o "Lift sanctions in liberated areas. Sanctions are instruments of war against Saddam's regime, but they should be quickly lifted on those who have freed themselves from it. Also, the oil resources and products of the liberated areas should help fund the provisional government's insurrection and humanitarian relief for the people of liberated Iraq." o "Release frozen Iraqi assets which amount to $1.6 billion in the United States and Britain alone to the control of the provisional government to fund its insurrection. This could be done gradually and so long as the provisional government continues to promote a democratic Iraq." o "Facilitate broadcasts from U.S. transmitters immediately and establish a Radio Free Iraq." o "Help expand liberated areas of Iraq by assisting the provisional government's offensive against Saddam Hussein's regime logistically and through other means." o "Remove any vestiges of Saddam's claim to 'legitimacy' by, among other things, bringing a war crimes indictment against the dictator and his lieutenants and challenging Saddam's credentials to fill the Iraqi seat at the United Nations." o "Launch a systematic air campaign against the pillars of his power the Republican Guard divisions which prop him up and the military infrastructure that sustains him." And: o "Position U.S. ground force equipment in the region so that, as a last resort, we have the capacity to protect and assist the anti-Saddam forces in the northern and southern parts of Iraq." In their open letter to the President Clinton, the incoming members of the Bush-Cheney administration and other signatories made it clear that "It will not be easy and the course of action we favor is not without its problems and perils. But we believe the vital national interests of our country require the United States to [adopt such a strategy]." It is a tragedy for the people of Iraq, and a potential nightmare for the rest of us, that Mr. Clinton failed to act on this sound advice. We can only hope that Mr. Bush and his team will do so without any further delay. |