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In
Harm’s Way Mr.
Gaffney is also president of the Center
for Security Policy. |
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Consider the following sampler: Last week, the United States put its forces in Bahrain on Threat Condition Charlie, the second-highest alert level, in light of intelligence warnings of threats of possible terrorist attacks on specified targets in the region. On Friday, Iraq announced that it was going to suspend this week the export of its oil, the largest consumer of which is the United States. Meanwhile, Communist China initiated large-scale military exercises involving amphibious assaults and other operations simulating those that might be associated with a PRC attack on Taiwan. And, while transparently trying to dissemble about the implications of Chinese penetration of the Western hemisphere, the CEO of a company known as COSCO which is, for all intents and purposes, the People’s Liberation Army's merchant marine nonetheless underscored the strategic significance of China's effective control of the Panama Canal since it is by far the shortest means of getting by sea from the Eastern U.S. to Asia. What if these seemingly isolated events were to metastasize in ways that would not only be ominous in their own right but that, because of the concurrence of their timing, gave rise to simultaneous and grave crises in the Persian Gulf and the Taiwan Strait? What if, for example, the United States found itself facing not just a repeat of the terrorist attacks in the Middle East that laid waste in recent years to scores of American military personnel in the Khobar Towers and U.S.S. Cole incidents? How would this country respond if the object of some murderous act of terror perpetrated by unknown actors were more strategic say, blocking maritime traffic through the narrow Straits of Hormuz, with the aim of denying the industrialized world not only access to Iraqi oil but, for a time at least, much of the energy resources of the entire Persian Gulf? And what if at the same time that were happening, with immediate and potentially far-reaching implications for the price of oil and global economic conditions, China actually goes for it against Taiwan? This might not take the form of attacks over the beach or missile strikes on the island. It might, instead, involve electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons and information-warfare techniques designed to cripple the latter's electronic and computer infrastructures, rendering its defensive capabilities largely ineffectual and bringing Taiwan's economy to a standstill without inflicting tremendous loss of life. Then, what if, on top of everything else, the Panama Canal became unavailable whether because it is rendered physically unusable or because the threat of that happening serves as a deterrent to forcing the issue? It may well be that China would be behind such an action, but able to enjoy "plausible deniability" of any responsibility for its occurrence. The effect could be that East Coast-based U.S. Navy ships needed under these circumstances in the Pacific rather than the Atlantic would take weeks longer to reach their destination, possibly at a time when delay may spell the difference between the survival or the loss of a friendly, democratic ally in Asia. These questions are not idle or academic. The United States could find itself facing such scenarios or variations on them in the weeks, months, or years ahead. The most worrisome aspect the convergence of these kinds of widely dispersed developments is all the more distinct a possibility insofar as Communist China, which has much to gain from America being distracted and/or incapacitated at a moment when it decides finally to act on oft-repeated threats to reunify Taiwan with the mainland by force, is actively collaborating with the Persian Gulf regimes that are state sponsors and employers of terrorism. Unless we are careful, America’s ability to respond effectively to one or more of these scenarios could be significantly harmed if the Bush administration adopts the scaled-back military force that some are urging, usually in the hope of freeing up resources urgently needed for modernization and maintenance of the armed services. The pressure to abandon the so-called "Two War Strategy" (shorthand for the long-standing requirement to have sufficient forces to fight two simultaneous or, under the Clinton administration, nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts) may well intensify if, as is being reported, the tax reductions approved before Memorial Day will preclude the president from seeking anything like the funding necessary to "rebuild the military." The most vexing prospect of all, however, may be this: The very fact that the United States military is less ready, less flexible, less forward-deployed, and less capable of prompt power projection than would be required to deal with two serious international crises at the same time makes it enticing for someone (or multiple parties, acting in collusion) to create just such a circumstance. In that event, we are likely to find ourselves paying a far higher cost probably in both lives and national treasure than would have been involved in maintaining the sorts of formidable deterrent forces that just might have prevented such threatening behavior from eventuating. That said, Hollywood’s Pearl Harbor, whatever its myriad shortcomings, reminds us that surprise attacks are by definition just that. Even if we are vigilant and prepared, we may not be able to prevent every instance of terrorism or threats to strategic sea lines of communication. It may also be that the Chinese will decide at some point to attack Taiwan, no matter what we do. The American people expect their government nonetheless to take such steps as it can to mitigate these and other dangers to our vital interests. They need to be given the straight truth about the threats that are emerging, and encouraged to insist that the requisite funding and energy are applied to minimizing them. |