|
 he debate over whether
to bring about Saddam Hussein's overthrow is over. The only questions
that remain are how, when, and what happens after. Saddam is noteworthy
among Iraqi rulers for his longevity, his brutality, and the extent
to which he has placed Iraq at the center of global politics. He
has been a resourceful adversary, and claims, not without justification,
to have won significant victories in recent years. Nevertheless,
his economy has been weakened by a decade of economic sanctions,
and the changes in global politics wrought by the September 11 attacks
have brought Saddam to the brink of his greatest challenge. He can
be counted on to resist allied efforts to end his rule (if not his
life). This, in turn, compels allied planners to approach their
task free of misconceptions and with full benefit of their recent
experiences in the war on terror.
EDITOR'S
NOTE: This is the first of a five-part
analysis that scrutinizes Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents,
the international context, and the covert and overt methods that
could be used to bring about its downfall.
Step one is
having a clear understanding Saddam Hussein's means of rule and
self-preservation. Iraq has been under authoritarian rule of one
stripe or another since its inception over 80 years ago. In any
authoritarian regime the most dangerous threats come from within,
thus the wise dictator erects a government oriented principally
towards ensuring his physical survival. At the center of the structure
in question is Saddam Hussein, president of Iraq since 1979, a ruthless,
suspicious, narcissistic, politically skilled survivor. He is an
emotionally insecure megalomaniac with a talent for extricating
himself from disasters of his own creation. While many of his diplomatic
moves seem left-footed, it is hard to deny his adroitness at maintaining
power. An essential element of this success is Saddam's use of his
extended family in important positions of authority. Stories about
relations in this circle read like Suetonius's Lives of the Caesars
— rife with rivalries, assassinations, jealousies, intermarriages,
sexual excesses, and all manner of cruelty. To call such a family
"dysfunctional" would be an understatement. But at some
level they are united, if only by their well-founded fear of the
consequences should they turn on each other openly. The family is
not beloved of the Iraqi people, to put it mildly.
The most important
member of the family, and Saddam's probable successor, is his son
Qusayy. Born in 1966, Qusayy holds important posts in the Revolutionary
Command Council, the Regional Command, the Security Council, and
as deputy head of the Baath party's military bureau. He has seen
his star rise over the past several years, in large part due to
the volatile and unpredictable behavior of his older brother, and
Saddam's erstwhile heir apparent, Udayy. Udayy controls the Iraqi
press, sports, and has been, off and on, head of the "Martyrs
of Saddam," a special militia unit trained to control the streets
of Baghdad in case of an uprising. He is also one of Iraq's chief
oil smugglers, and benefits in other important ways from the current
United Nations sanctions regime. Udayy is emotionally erratic and
given to fits of paranoid violence. Fear of Udayy was an important
factor in the 1995 defection of Husayn Kamil and Saddam Kamil, both
married to Saddam's daughters, who occupied important positions
in Iraqi weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. Upon their return
in 1996, at Saddam's urging and with guarantees of their personal
safety, they were forced to divorce Saddam's daughters, then were
killed along with other members of their families. Udayy was severely
wounded in an assassination attempt the same year, and the perpetrators
were never found. Recently (on Libyan radio) Udayy praised the "daring
operations" carried out by Muslin youth on September 11, which
"restored respect for the Arabs and Muslims" — thereby
demonstrating his grasp of his father's subtlety in the fine art
of diplomatic phrasemaking. He is reportedly obsessed with the idea
of succeeding his father — although most observers favor Qusayy
if it came to blows — but neither would be acceptable as a
post-Saddam ruler.
Saddam relies
on the Iraqi tribal structure to administer the country. Saddam
is from al Bu Nasser tribe in the Tikrit district, and his supporters
are chiefly from tribes in the area of Tikrit and nearby Samarra.
Tribal chiefs are given high rank in the ruling Baath party, and
high-ranking Baathists are sometimes made tribal chiefs. They serve
as provincial governors, mayors, and in other important political
and administrative offices. Since tribes in these areas are part
of the Sunni Arab minority (comprising around 20 percent of the
Iraqi population), Saddam has engaged the cooperation of tribal
leaders in the Shiite and Kurdish areas, or relied on transplanted
Arab Sunnis when greater control is necessary.
These ethnic
ties are not always effective — a major revolt by the Dulaimi
tribe was suppressed in 1995. But they form the structure within
which Saddam distributes payments and privileges to keep the country
under control and himself in power. The distribution scheme is fueled
by the Iraqi economy, which Saddam treats as a personal checkbook.
Money, influence, and control flow down through these channels from
Baghdad. Loyalty to Saddam is richly rewarded, and people showing
even hints of disloyalty are brutally punished. Yet, despite the
occasional rogue element, Saddam cannot rule the country without
these men, and he has lately been warning them of the challenges
to come. At a speech to tribal leaders in December he entreated
them to "show courage" in the difficult times ahead, specifying
that he did not mean "in the abstract" but "to carry
weapons to confront the enemy." The Baath party has instituted
a course in urban warfighting for its members, overseen by Qusayy.
Clearly, Saddam expects his cohorts to make the supreme sacrifice
when the time comes.
The army and
air force defend Iraq's borders, but are not the mainstay of Saddam's
personal power. In fact, as the largest armed institution in his
country, the army constitutes his most significant potential threat.
Its members obey him more out of fear than love, respect, or patriotism.
Saddam has worked his troops hard during his reign. He has been
at war of one type or another virtually since consolidating power
in 1979. The army has paid heavily for Saddam's expansionist aspirations,
suffering over a million estimated casualties in the inconclusive
Iran-Iraq war, and additional thousands of casualties (and international
ignominy) in Desert Storm. Its officers are punished harshly for
Saddam's failures as well as their own. The army has been down a
rough road since the heady days when it was described as "fourth
largest in the world." Today its numbers have been reduced
by two-thirds, and morale is shaky. Saddam's level of trust in his
troops is reflected in that fact that for an army unit to move it
must receive redundant orders from its own chain of command, from
the Baath party representative (similar to a Soviet-era commissar)
and the intelligence officer. And while on the move, army units
may not carry ammunition. As an added guarantee, officers know that
their families will be tortured or executed should they desert or
mutiny.
Saddam's most
visible internal defense against his own army is the Republican
Guard (RG), numbering about 50,000, and the more elite Special Republican
Guard (SRG), around 10-20,000 strong, which is charged with the
security of Baghdad. These units are under the command of Qusayy
and Abd-al Hamid Humud, Saddam's chief bodyguard since 1970, a highly
trusted family member. The RG serves an important military function
as the counterassault force, committed to battle after the enemy
has blunted its attacks on the frontline army units. It also helps
motivate army troops to hold their ground — RG units will take
strong action against Iraqi units making unscheduled retreats. Finally,
the RG is always positioned between army forces and Baghdad to secure
the regime from rebellious troops. RG and SRG units are better equipped,
better trained and better paid than their army counterparts, and
are recruited from more trusted segments of the society. Despite
these incentives to loyalty, there have been cases of tribal rebellion
in RG and even SRG units.
The bulwark
of Saddam's security is the internal intelligence apparatus, also
headed by Qusayy and Hummed. It is the ultimate control and protection
mechanism. Closest to Saddam are his few dozen personal bodyguards,
the Companions (al Murafiqin). They are charged with his
physical security at all times, and are the most trusted of the
security personnel. The next ring is the Presidential or Palace
Guard (Himaya) numbering several thousand, whose job is to
oversee security in the Presidential palaces, house, bunkers and
other facilities. Next are the 10,000 or so members of the Special
Security Service (SSS, Al Amn al Khas). This group is the
key pressure point of the regime, the most critical part of the
security apparatus. It was established in 1985, and its members
are drawn from only the most trusted tribes and families. It has
generally eclipsed the power of the older Mukhabarat, or
Department of General Intelligence. The SSS is entrusted with Saddam's
physical security when traveling or whenever he is outside the purview
of the Presidential Guard. The SSS also serves as the security force
for the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction program, a tremendous
responsibility considering that rogue elements in possession of
WMD's could use them on Saddam himself. In addition, perhaps most
importantly for purposes of this analysis, the SSS is the organ
in charge of the regime's counterintelligence (Co-In). The Co-In
section is the internal eyes and ears of Saddam, the coup-prevention
mechanism, the immune system of the regime. Disrupt it and the whole
power structure is in danger.
Saddam's "counterintelligence
state" is markedly similar in its structure and methods to
that of Joseph Stalin, whom Saddam has openly praised. Co-In agents
are distributed throughout Iraqi society, particularly in key power
centers such as the army, the intelligence system, and even within
counterintelligence itself. Their presence in the army is particularly
strong, and greatly feared and resented. Co-In officers answer to
a separate command structure, have much higher pay scales, and even
the lower ranking officers can give orders to Iraqi generals that
must be obeyed. When army units rebel, the Co-In agents are the
first to be done away with.
Iraq is a country
devoid of trust. Saddam has waged a calculated, institutional assault
on the bonds of normal human relationships in order to keep his
regime in power, and Iraqi society is riddled with informers. Co-In
agents "recruit" stool pigeons (frequently through blackmail)
who keep an eye on those around them for manifestations of anti-Saddam
tendencies. The identity of specific informers is not usually known
(for their own safety), but every Iraqi citizen knows they are out
these somewhere. The agents and their informers are not passive
observers — sometimes they will engage in "provocations,"
e.g., they will utter anti-regime or other subversive sentiments
to see who agrees, then report them, or report those who fail to
report that someone was bad-mouthing Saddam. This has a valuable
deterrent effect on potential conspiracies, because there is no
reliable way of knowing whether the person attempting to enlist
one in subversive activity is not actually working for counterintelligence.
Nor would potential conspirators know whom they could approach without
breaching their own security. Furthermore, since practically any
form of grumbling could be construed as anti-regime sentiment, even
simple friendships can become strained by doubt.
A good example
of provocation in action is the case of Hasib Aslan, an architect
who worked on several of Saddam's palaces. Some friends invited
Engineer Hasib to a party where they quizzed him on various details
about the palaces — their lavishness, sophistication, interior
design, and so forth. The architect chatted away — he was among
friends, after all. But they were working for counterintelligence,
and had invited Hasib in order specifically to test his ability
to keep state secrets. Saddam's "palaces" are not merely
homes; they are combination mansions, command and control centers,
hardened bunkers, and WMD storage sites. The statements were reported
to Saddam, who decided immediately to execute the indiscreet architect.
A memo was then issued to others in the engineering department of
the presidential office warning against leaking sensitive information.
Engineer Hasib's
story is one of countless similar tales that illustrate the depth
of paranoia of the Iraqi regime. Or perhaps a better word is caution.
It isn't paranoia when they are out to get you, and as history
and experience have shown, there are many out to get Saddam.
(Tuesday: The
Opposition)
|
