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EDITOR'S
NOTE: This is the second of a five-part
analysis that scrutinizes Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents,
the international context, and the covert and overt methods that
could be used to bring about its downfall.
 addam Hussein has
never rested easily on his throne. He has survived assassination
bids, coup attempts, troop mutinies, and other conspiracies. He
has skillfully avoided the usual means of succession in Iraqi, the
bullet in the back of the head. But the fact that he has survived
is not as important as the fact that conspirators keep trying, and
Saddam has erected an elaborate internal security structure to see
to it that they do not succeed.
Internal opposition
elements will play the decisive role in bringing about the downfall
of Saddam Hussein. Yet, many organized resistance groups do not
trust the members of the antiterror alliance. They remember the
period in 1991 following Operation Desert Storm when the allies
encouraged Shiite resistance groups in southern Iraq and Kurdish
fighters in the north to make their respective bids for freedom,
only to be left in the lurch when Iraqi forces counterattacked.
They recall the abortive northern uprising of 1995-6, backed by
the CIA and fronted by the Iraqi National Congress, which ended
when Iraqi troops rolled into Kurdistan, drove the INC into exile,
displaced the pro-western Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and
put in place the more Baghdad-friendly Kurds of the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP). Millions spent on covert operations during the Clinton
years yielded little, and the 1998 expulsion of U.N. weapons inspectors
was met with a spasmodic and ultimately ineffective bombing campaign.
However, the
campaign in Afghanistan has shown what can be accomplished using
a combination of special forces, advanced air power and indigenous
ground troops working in concert. Moreover, the opposition groups
now know that they are dealing with an American administration that
is committed to finishing the job. Finally, shared interests and
a common enemy will bring the opposition together at least long
enough to reach the mutual objective.
Saddam's opponents
may be broken down into three broad groups: the ethnic opposition;
the opposition abroad; and the nascent internal opposition. The
ethnic opponents represent (or claim to represent) the vast majority
of Iraqis. Saddam's Sunni Arab ethnic base is at most 20 percent
of the population. The Kurds number 15-20 percent, the Shiites as
much as 60 percent. There are also some Turkoman groups, small and
poorly organized, but whose participation may bring the support
of ethnically related states in Central Asia. Yet, numbers alone
will not decide the issue (a fact demonstrated in 1991). The Kurds
for example are riven by internal strife, and spend as much energy
fighting each other as opposing the regime. Masud Barzani, leader
of the Kurdish Democratic
Party has stated that he favors a federal solution to the Kurdish
issue, and believes that this can be attained through negotiation
with Baghdad. His chief rival Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) recently stated that overthrowing Saddam's
regime from within is "impossible."
The Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK, formerly led by Abdullah
Ocalan until his capture by the Turks) operates primarily against
Turkey from havens in Iraq and cannot be counted on to participate
in a campaign to the south. There are a variety of other Kurdish
groups each with their own agenda. Many seek the establishment
of an independent Kurdish state, an objective the anti-terror alliance
cannot be counted on to support.
The Iraqi Shiite
majority is a double-edged sword. One reason the allies failed to
support their uprising in 1991 was fear of increased Iranian influence
in Iraq, perhaps of Iranian intervention in support of their coreligionists.
There are a number of Shiite resistance groups, the most prominent
being the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI was
founded in 1982 by Ayatollah Sayed Mohamad Baqir al-Hakim, the son
of the late Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, the chief spiritual
leader of the Shia from 1955 to 1970. SCIRI claims to have a 10,000-strong
militia, the "Badr Brigade," armed by Iran and operating
inside Iraq. Al-Hakin has called a U.S.-backed assault on Saddam's
regime "a bad idea" but is in favor of a mass uprising
without Western involvement.
The ethnic
opposition groups may be interested in fighting a separatist war,
but they must be disabused of this notion from the beginning. The
antiterror alliance is not interested in national self-determination
except within the current boundaries of Iraq. However, the allies
will help liberate them from the regime that has shown no compunction
about torturing, killing, and using chemical weapons against them
— and they can learn to live in a federal system.
The leading
umbrella organization for the opposition abroad is the Iraqi
National Congress (INC). The INC represents, at least nominally,
most of the Iraqi resistance groups of various ethnicities and political
stripes. It received tens of millions of dollars in the 1990s with
little to show for the investment. The INC was ejected from Iraq
after the failed 1995 Kurdish uprising, with a loss of many supporters.
Yet, INC leader Ahmed Chalabi proved to be an effective advocate
and lobbyist. With the help of Republican supporters (many of whom
are now high-ranking administration officials, such as Deputy Secretary
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz), he achieved passage of the 1998 Iraqi
Liberation Act, which authorized $97 million for anti-Saddam activities.
Nevertheless, the State Department suspended payments recently due
to accounting irregularities, which has caused consternation among
opposition members. Last fall the INC hired a Washington-based CPA
and their financial staff attended courses in U.S. government grant
management in order to put in place an auditing mechanism to satisfy
the U.S. State Department Inspector General. (This is the part of
revolutionary guerrilla warfare you usually don't read about in
the history books.) The INC has had both advocates and critics in
the current administration. Former Central Command CINC and Middle
East special envoy General Anthony Zinni (USMC, ret) described them
as "silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London" who would
perpetrate a "Bay of Goats" if loosed on Iraq. But the
leadership of the INC has at least displayed willingness, even enthusiasm,
to work with the United States towards the goal of regime change
in Iraq, unlike some of the oppositionists based in country.
The third major
group, the nascent internal opponents, are those Iraqi citizens
who are not organized enemies of the regime but members of that
large group of people who can be counted on to take action —
or at least be neutral — should the opportunity arise to do
so in relative safety. For now they are watching and waiting. Previous
abortive attempts by the allies to foment rebellion have not given
them a sense of confidence, and this is an impression the allies
must overcome. The nascent opponents break down into two groups.
The largest are the masses of poor Iraqis who blame Saddam for two
decades of suffering, either directly as a consequence of the brutality
of his regime, or indirectly, based on international responses to
his behavior, especially the economic sanctions which have fallen
hardest on them. The people hate the regime, but they have no choice
about it at the moment — an unsupported uprising would be suicide,
ruthlessly suppressed by the Republican Guard. It is nice to think
they will spontaneously rise some day, but even if they did, the
masses notoriously lack direction, military effectiveness, and staying
power. If Karl Marx was right about one thing, it is that the lumpenproletariat
has no revolutionary consciousness. But the masses may create a
useful temporary chaos, and perhaps beat some of Saddam's officials
to death if they catch them alone and helpless, as happened to some
unlucky Taliban in Afghanistan. They can also be counted on thoroughly
to loot Baghdad and other major cities. In a kleptocracy like Iraq
looting has a rough flavor of justice, a one-time rebate for decades
of terror. Who can blame them?
The more important
— indeed, crucial — nascent opponents are the members
of the armed forces, the tribal leaders, and other members of the
regime who will eventually have to choose whether or not to defend
Saddam, and will hopefully make the choice for change. These potential
opponents are a vital part of any planned insurrection. They are
armed, influential, and will play important roles in reconstructing
post-Saddam Iraq. The Iraqi army will be a particularly significant
center of opposition. But these groups live under the thumb of the
internal security apparatus, and are watched ceaselessly. This is
the class of people who have always posed the most serious threat
to the regime, the stratum from which plots have been hatched and
conspiracies grown. Few if any of them will join the active anti-Saddam
forces until they see results, which presents something of a chicken
and egg problem. In fact, Saddam may stage preemptive rebellions
to see who joins in, and then shoot them, a technique pioneered
by Joseph Stalin. But once they are convinced they may safely join
the opposition, the defections will become an avalanche.
Any allied
plan to overthrow Saddam must take into account these various groups,
their differing motives, capabilities, and potential for effective
action. The Afghan template is useful, but it is not a precise blueprint.
There is no Northern Alliance waiting to break out of a mountain
sanctuary, and Saddam's regime is much better established than the
Taliban was. Yet both regimes were rooted in fear, and given the
opportunity for freedom the people will make the right choice. Saddam's
former chief of staff, Nazar Khazraji, living in exile in Denmark
since 1999, believes that 95 percent of the Iraqi population oppose
Saddam, and are only waiting for a signal from the international
community. When a German interviewer asked him, "Are you, as
an Iraqi, seriously calling for U.S. bomb attacks on your own country?"
Khazraji replied, "By God, I think yes. The time is ripe."
Wednesday:
The International Dimension
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