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EDITOR'S
NOTE: This is the third of a five-part
analysis that scrutinizes Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents,
the international context, and the covert and overt methods that
could be used to bring about its downfall. (Part
I. Part
II.)
 ne of the most important
victories of the campaign in Afghanistan was diplomatic — the
separation of Pakistan from the Taliban. The Afghan regime could
not survive without that pillar of support, and after that, its
downfall was only a matter of time. But last fall the wound was
fresh, momentum was high, and the links to the September 11 attacks
were clear. America's allies were falling over themselves in pledges
of support. Now the war's momentum has slowed, emotions have cooled.
The links between Saddam and 9/11 are, for the moment, tenuous.
The allies are at best skeptical, at worst dismissive, of an attack
on Iraq. Other, less-friendly states have sent signals that unfortunate
consequences would result from moving forcefully against Saddam.
These developments point to an even greater need for skilled diplomacy,
to make the case against Iraq unaided by passion, calmly, confidently,
and firmly. What used to be called "unilateralism" is
now recognized as leadership, the ability to visualize an objective,
explain the means of attaining it, and wrap the entire venture in
a cloak of inevitability.
The United
States has a strong team in place, respected in the Middle East
for their decisive actions a decade ago. Vice President Cheney,
who is headed to the region, was the secretary of defense during
Desert Storm, and secured Saudi King Fahd's permission to base U.S.
forces in his country for the counterattack against Saddam. Colin
Powell, now secretary of state, was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in 1991 when he uttered the memorable phrase in regards
Saddam's army, "First we are going to cut it off. Then we are
going to kill it." And, of course, the president had a front
row seat as his father prosecuted the first Iraqi war. (Rumor has
it that Saddam views this as a tribal struggle, his own against
the Bush clan.) Their argument: Iraq has a lot to answer for. It
has not met its obligations under the United Nations resolutions
that ended the war, it has banned the mandated weapons inspections
since 1998, and it has engaged in illegal trade outside of the humanitarian
"oil for food" framework. Beyond that, Saddam Hussein
is still in power — a man who has invaded two of the six countries
bordering his own, and whose weapons-of-mass-destruction programs
make him probably the greatest threat to the region in its history.
So why the
reticence in the region to resolve the Iraq issue? Is it Arab or
Muslim solidarity? Doubtful — actual examples of this purported
togetherness are less common than sightings of the Loch Ness Monster.
Some countries in the region may feel that a weak, contained Iraq
is not a threat, and if it monopolizes American attention, it is
a useful diversion from their own misdeeds. Furthermore, some countries,
such as Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon, reportedly profit from illegal
oil imports that the Iraqis offer at a discount to evade U.N.-mandated
limits. And beyond that, how many countries in the region would
like to see a revitalized democratic Iraq? How many kingdoms,
sultanates, emirates, theocracies, and autocracies look forward
to an experiment in the internationally mandated democratization
of an Arab state — especially if it succeeds?
The Iranians
have been extremely critical of the use of force in Iraq, especially
after being tied rhetorically to Baghdad in the State of the Union
address. Saddam optimistically pledged that he would give military
support to Iran should the Great Satan attack, a promise that has
been acknowledged but not reciprocated by the Iranians. The Iranian
leaders may also be feeling hemmed by the recent pro-American tilt
in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and in Central Asia. But there is still
no love lost between Baghdad and Teheran after their decade-long
war, and the Iranians may be more tempted to press their influence
among the Shiite majority in a post-Saddam Iraq, much as they are
doing currently in Afghanistan, than rush to Saddam's aid.
Turkey is concerned
with the aspirations of the Kurds of northern Iraq. Turkey has fought
a long and fierce counterinsurgency against the Worker's Party of
Kurdistan (PKK) and strongly opposes the establishment of an independent
Kurdistan. The Turks are also wary of the refugee populations that
might set up camp in southeast Turkey should a humanitarian crisis
develop during the war. Yet, Turkey is also a member of NATO and
before 9/11 had suggested it would play a role in rapid-response
operations in the Middle East. Turkey would be an indispensable
base for air strikes and special operations forces. Its best move
could be to occupy northern Iraq temporarily to ensure that the
Iraqi Kurds live up to their recent promises of seeking a federal
solution within the established borders of their country.
Kuwait can
be counted on to facilitate a U.S. military buildup, and in fact
already has quietly allowed in tens of thousands of troops. This
is more than simple gratitude — the Kuwaitis have to plan for
the contingency of a preemptive Iraqi strike south. The Saudis have
been somewhat less forthcoming publicly, and, as seen recently in
the contretemps over the U.S. military presence, could be a diplomatic
challenge. Privately they are said to be on-board. Other Arab members
of the 1991 coalition, most GCC states and particularly Egypt and
Syria, will probably not commit troops this time around under any
circumstances.
Israel will
again play an unwilling role. Saddam will undoubtedly attempt to
unify the Arab states by taking action against the "Zionist
entity." Saddam sees the Israeli/Palestinian issue as something
of a safety valve — he mentions the Palestinian cause in every
speech, and it figures prominently in Iraqi news broadcasts. He
hopes to unite the Arab states behind the issue (and behind Iraq),
but it is unlikely he will achieve this goal. President Bush defused
the issue somewhat with favorable comments about a Palestinian state.
Saddam may attempt to bring matters to a head by attacking Israel,
perhaps more forcefully than he did during Desert Storm, maybe even
employing chemical or biological weapons. This would lead to a strong
Israeli response, which of course is what Saddam wants, just as
he did in 1991. But so long as Israeli actions are focused on a
direct response to aggression and not used as an opportunity to
take stringent action against Arafat, it is unlikely the Arab states
would do much more than voice token protests. Remember, even the
Syrians acquiesced in Israel's response to the 1991 SCUD attacks.
Furthermore, if Saddam uses WMD's, against Israel or anywhere else,
he will have lost whatever claim to victim status he had.
America's European
allies have been slow to respond to the call, and the administration's
tone is lately neither fawning nor threatening. When France's foreign
minister, Hubert Vedrine, accused president Bush of "simplistic"
views regarding the Axis of Evil, Secretary of State Colin Powell
suggested that Vedrine must be "getting the vapors." "Let's
not swoon," Powell added. "We'll be in contact with you.
We'll be sharing with you our ideas and vision. So for anyone who
wants to put us in a state of war tomorrow, we're talking to you."
The Canadians, the Germans, even the British have voiced skepticism
about a move on Iraq, and the president's diplomatic team will make
many stops on the road to Baghdad. If the allies cannot be convinced
that Iraq is a growing threat requiring a united response, they
may at least be persuaded that Iraqi intransigence on the issue
of weapons inspection is a grave enough violation of international
law to require some degree of concerted action.
The Russians
have been working hard to find a way out for Iraq, to save Saddam
from himself. Russia is Iraq's largest trading partner, and the
countries have a relationship dating back to the Soviet era. When
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz visited Russia in January,
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov greeted him saying, "Welcome
to Moscow, where you have many friends." The Russians put forward
a proposal under which the U.N. inspectors would return with a few
minor conditions, and allegedly floated the notion of sending a
Russian peace keeping force to secure Iraq's border with Kuwait.
This very clever plan would have put the United States in something
of a diplomatic quandary. But Saddam's contrariness came to the
rescue again. The Iraqis rejected — even denounced — the
Russian proposal for the return of the "espionage teams."
They simply will not budge on the inspection issue.
Colin Powell's
recent challenge to Iraq to allow the return of the U.N. inspectors
was more than a rhetorical gesture. This issue has the potential
to unify the allies, if not against a geostrategic threat, then
behind the principle of upholding international law. The more central
the United States makes inspections to the case against Iraq, the
more Saddam will resist — as a matter of honor — and the
less sympathy he will garner from the rest of the world. Saddam
will remain recalcitrant even as international doubts grow. He will
defy the world until the issue evolves into a casus belli.
He may bend at what he thinks is the last minute, but experience
has shown his diplomatic clock is always a few minutes slow. By
then, it will be too late.
Thursday:
War in the Shadows
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