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EDITOR'S
NOTE: This is the fourth of a five-part analysis that scrutinizes
Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents, the international context,
and the covert and overt methods that could be used to bring about
its downfall. (Part
I. Part
II. Part
III.)
 n the decade after
the Vietnam War, covert operations bore an indelible stain, a taint
born of an era in which a string of geostrategic defeats bred a
sense of American weakness and indecision. Even during the Reagan
years, the covert-operations issue became a cudgel in the hands
of self-interested politicians pursuing partisan agendas. The result
was unilateral disarmament against enemies less prone to this kind
of critical self-exploration.
But recently
covert ops have gained prominence and even acceptance. Politicians
like them because they are low casualty and (being secret) low commitment.
Bean counters prefer them because they are low cost. But serious
strategic planners have found that they are increasingly effective.
New technologies, new methods, and a decade of practical experience
have established the American special-operations forces and CIA
operators as important players in the global-security arena.
One of the
significant innovations in Operation Enduring Freedom was the initial
employment of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) as the principal
operational command rather than the pertinent geographic CINCdom,
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). By using a functional, rather than
a geographic command to plan the Afghan campaign, the president
and secretary of defense engaged in a radical and highly successful
test of the "capabilities-based" concept that is central
to the current DOD transformation. SOCOM is likely to play as important
a role in a campaign against Iraq, bringing with it the practical
experience of special warfare in Afghanistan.
The Iraqi Opposition
may play a considerable part in this early phase of the campaign,
particularly the members of the foreign-based opposition groups
such as the Iraqi National Congress (INC). They would not be particularly
useful organized in battalions, armed, trained, and sent into Iraq
to fight conventionally. There aren't enough of them, for one thing,
and it is doubtful they would be able to achieve the necessary level
of combat effectiveness to be worth the investment of time, money,
and manpower. These men are much more valuable as infiltrators,
agitators, and underground organizers. The oppositionists speak
the language, know the terrain, and know the people and the way
they think. They can do the political work on the ground, make contact
with sympathetic kinsmen, probe to find out who is ripe for rebellion
— in essence undertake the same types of missions as Hamid
Karzai and the ill-starred Abdul Haq did in Afghanistan. Not only
is this useful militarily, but it allows the opposition to establish
bona fides by taking serious risks, and thereby being transformed
from "silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London" to respected
national leaders. In so doing they will earn the right to
lead their country. The true test of the merit of the opposition
leaders will not be their adherence to a set of auditing guidelines
established by the state department, but their willingness to "pledge
their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor" to achieve
the freedom of Iraq.
Special-operations
forces would meanwhile be engaging in information and psychological
operations (PSYOPS) in support of these missions. Recent press reports
to the contrary notwithstanding, PSYOPS disseminate truthful
information to target populations in support of U.S. objectives.
The alliance does not need to lie anyway; it has a good product
to sell. In a country with a regime-controlled press, in which cell
phones and even direct-dial long-distance calls are illegal, and
the nearest Internet access is in Jordan, people will welcome an
alternative source of information. To help insure that Iraqi homes
receive only approved transmissions the regime relies on Al Hadi
Project 858, which controls Iraqi signals, communications, and electronic
intelligence. Project 858 monitors the entire country for illegal
communications, and reportedly can triangulate in 30 seconds. But
the regime will not be able to prevent transmissions from abroad
(such as the existing Radio Free Iraq), and Saddam is already planning
a response. In a December 2001 speech the Iraqi president cautioned
tribal leaders not to believe everything they might hear: "You
may hear certain things here and there. A certain media agency or
newspaper may write some piece of analysis, or this of that person
may make a statement or write a piece of analysis, and this or that
person may say something. Do not pay any attention to this. Do not
pay attention to this. Your country is great, God willing, and is
big."
Big or not,
the Iraqi regime will have a hard time plugging the information
dike. Leaflets, posters, spray painted walls, clandestine newspapers,
video and audio tapes, illegal radios and televisions, satellite
phones, uplinked computers — the means of obtaining information
are too many to stop. An important target will be the Iraqi armed
forces. It will be important to inculcate in them the conviction
that by turning against Saddam and his regime they are not engaging
in an act of betrayal but one of patriotism on behalf of the Iraqi
people. Stress the theme of liberation, and their role in achieving
it. Give the troops something more honorable to do than simply surrender,
let them participate in ridding their country of the parasite Saddam
and his minions. Drop leaflets encouraging officers and men to renew
their military oaths, but to pledge loyalty not to Saddam and his
criminal regime, but to Iraq and its suffering people. Overall,
let the troops, the tribes, and the in-country opposition know that
events are moving and that relief is coming.
Another important
mission for special forces and oppositionists alike will be collecting
information on potential future targets for air or ground forces.
Saddam, having studied Western air campaigns in his own country
and in Serbia, is relocating weapons-storage sites, communications
centers, military and security headquarters, and similar high-value
targets to schools, mosques, clinics and other types of structures
normally excluded from target lists. This will make targeting more
difficult and politically dangerous. Hitting the wrong mosque —
or even the right one — would allow Saddam to score propaganda
points in the Muslim world and with the Western press. Saddam would
benefit from an event similar to the bombing of the al Amiriyah
Shelter during Operation Desert Storm, in which many civilians were
killed. Ironically, in these days of precision-guided munitions,
noncombatants are probably safer staying away from shelters that
have dual-use military capabilities like al Amiriyah did. Their
odds of being hit are greater there than if they stayed home. And
it is well worth noting that during the 1991 air campaign Saddam
Hussein's son Udayy did not go to a bomb shelter but hid out at
a friend's house. (He later got this same friend drunk and killed
him — perhaps inadvertently — in a merry-go-round mishap.)
It will probably be relatively easy to tell where Saddam has moved
his various headquarters — just find the elementary schools
ringed with Republican Guards. But we need eyes on the ground to
be certain.
Targets of
opportunity may present themselves during this cataloguing process.
They may be WMD sites, fuel dumps, perhaps leading Baathists, high-ranking
officers, or even Saddam himself. The Iraqi leader reportedly uses
at least two doubles that have been surgically altered to resemble
him exactly. Certainly other doubles will be dispatched around the
country to divert attention — perhaps not with cosmetic surgery
but made up well enough to fool a high-flying drone. In any case,
it would be useful to have platforms on call to respond to these
fortuitous circumstances quickly. Armed opposition groups may request
their own fire support missions, particularly in the Kurdish areas
where there are greater numbers of active guerrillas. Here the Afghan
experience is very apropos. The spotter teams sent to fight with
Northern Alliance units were not trusted at first. They frequently
could not speak the local dialects, and the NA troops did not understand
their assignment. However, after calling in a few fire missions,
after seeing some Taliban ridgeline defensive positions obliterated
by B-52 strikes, the Afghans got the message. This tactical employment
of special forces had strategic consequences. It shifted not only
the terms of battle but also the perspective of the anti-Taliban
opposition. They understood what it meant to be partners with the
most lethal military force in the world. They discovered that our
spotters did speak their language — the only tongue with currency
in that part of the world — the annihilation of the enemy.
This preliminary
phase could also see the initiation of a comprehensive destabilization
operation. The difference between this program and the above-mentioned
PSYOPs is that it would be aimed at the Iraqi regime, not the people
— and it may involve significant amounts of deception. As I
argued in part one of this series, the Iraqi regime is built on
suspicion. Its members, particularly the leadership and those responsible
for internal security, are predisposed to believe in conspiracies.
So, give them something to believe in. Harness their anxieties.
The internal security apparatus is an information gathering and
sifting machine founded on the premise that enemies of the state
exist — so give the system what it wants. Create conspiracies
where none exist. Implicate loyal members of the regime with false
messages and bogus intelligence, while diverting attention from
Saddam's known or potential opponents. Sow doubt about the loyalty
of Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units, provincial
governors, and the leaders of important tribes. If done properly
Saddam will target the best, and the rest will live in mortal fear.
Convince the regime to get the executions rolling, and help the
organism consume itself. Play both sides of the equation by leaking
information about impending purges to the people who are their intended
victims. The counterintelligence organs will be so busy they won't
be able to keep tabs on the real rebels. Even if there was no campaign,
the Iraqis would assume that the silence was in fact proof
of a conspiracy, a very dangerous one at that, and would go to extreme
measures trying to root it out.
All these measures
are preparatory. They are not meant to bring about Saddam's collapse
but to lay the groundwork for the final phase, to set a tone, to
build expectations in important segments of the population, and
to front-load the inevitability of change. The message, the theme,
from every radio, on every leaflet and in every furtive conversation
— get ready. It is coming. Praise Allah, freedom is at hand.
Friday:
Liberation.
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