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 hen the Los Angeles
Times reported details of the classified version of the Nuclear
Posture Review (ironically, NPR) that had been reported to Congress
at a closed briefing January 8, I figured it would be a one-day
story. There wasn't much new in the report, at least not new to
those who follow these issues. The unclassified version and other
public statements by the administration contained most of the framing
logic, such as the new deterrence framework, the capabilities-based
approach, and so forth. This story added some sensational details,
but nothing that one could not figure out using open sources and
common sense.
Now, a week
later, the issue has reached something of a hysterical tone (at
least on the part of the NPR's critics) and Bush administration
officials and spokesmen have been at pains to point out the disproportionate
level of response to what is a hardly unanticipated policy framework.
NRO has done its bit to bring reason to the debate. Frank
Gaffney commented last January on the initial spasm of discontent
from the myrmidons of arms control. Mackubin Owens covered the
deterrence angle very ably yesterday.
One leaked
detail that is drawing particular attention is the list of seven
states that might be candidates for nuclear retaliation under extraordinary
circumstances. Now, seriously, is anybody really shocked by the
list? Are some countries missing, or some placed there by mistake?
If so, which? In fact the list contains only potential adversary
states that are pursuing (or possess) both WMD and advanced-missile
capabilities, i.e., those states that might, under plausible circumstances,
have the capability (if not the intent) to inflict catastrophic
damage on the United States. Russia and China are obvious candidates
for inclusion — but what of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya,
and Syria? Is it fair to list them? Is it surprising? Well, they
are the first five countries noted in the CIA's required semiannual
"Unclassified
Report to Congress the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions."
This was alluded to by Sen. James M. Inhofe (R., Ok.) at the Senate
Armed Services Committee hearings in February: "...it's disturbing
to me when we have evidence that is not even classified evidence
that China, Russia, and North Korea are trading systems and trading
technologies with countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya...."
They are the same states mentioned last July by Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz in testimony
before Congress on the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the seven largest
potential adversary states measured by military expenditures are
— you guessed it — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria.
I can't add
too much more to what has already been said by others about the
strategic issues. But I am interested in the leak. Who did it, and
why? And why isn't the press more engaged on that topic? Mac Owens
speculated that maybe it was the administration, enhancing deterrence
by giving warning that the U.S. is willing to take forceful action
should the need arise. I doubt it was the Bush team, for several
reasons. First, it was done sloppily, which is not quite their style.
Second, the administration response to the leak does not have the
tone of a planned campaign, it seems too reactive. Most importantly,
a leak of this type gains them nothing. Why bother with skullduggery?
If they wanted the information to get out they could simply state
it (and in fact have over the past year in various venues). This
is an administration that prides itself on plain speaking, on straight
shooting, on telling it like it is. Hiding behind leaks would make
them look weak. Besides, if the president wanted to threaten Saddam
or anyone else, he would probably use the daily press briefing,
not a months-old report to Congress.
If I had to
bet I would look to the Hill. The Democrats had opposed the NPR
since was first suggested in the summer of 2000 as part of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001. Sen. John Warner
(R., Va.) proposed it as amendment 3184 to amendment 3183 by Sen.
Bob Kerrey (D., Neb.). The Kerrey amendment gave the president the
power to unilaterally reduce the number of strategic nuclear-delivery
systems in the U.S. arsenal. The Warner amendment enjoined this
action until the completion of the pending Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) and the submission of a new Nuclear Posture Review due by
December 2001 (the previous one having been completed in 1994).
The Republicans argued that before the president made any drastic
and irreversible decisions on an issue of such importance he should
be supplied with the most up to date assessment of the strategic
situation. Democrats — who voted 98 percent against the NPR
— charged that this was a political move geared towards taking
the decision out of the hands of president Clinton and leaving it
to his successor, which the Republicans hoped would be Bush. Republicans
responded that the risky decision could as easily fall to Al Gore,
but whoever the president was in 2001, he would still need the most
current information. The amendment passed 51-47.
Congressional
guidance on the content of the NPR was very specific, and mandated
details on the role of nuclear forces in U.S. strategy, the relationship
among deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms-control objectives,
and a number of other such requirements.
The NPR was reported to Congress during a recess and the top-secret
briefing was allegedly attended mainly by staffers. Presumably,
those members of Congress who were most interested were filled in
later. A detailed
unclassified special briefing was presented the next day by
J. D. Crouch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Policy. Some members of the arms-control establishment
were alarmed by the NPR, despite the fact that it called for a two-thirds
reduction in the number of deployed nuclear warheads (a salient
fact not frequently noted in the current hysteria). Sen. Carl Levin
(D., Mich.) criticized the NPR for not actually destroying the warheads
but storing them, or as he called it, "warehoused terror."
As noted above, the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by
Sen. Levin, held hearings on the report on February 14. A very interesting
exchange developed between Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith,
chairman Levin, and Sen. Warner:
LEVIN: So
let me ask you this question. Does the Department of Defense have
any requirement for a low-yield nuclear weapon for hardened deeply
buried targets?
FEITH: I
do not believe that we have a requirement for low-yield nuclear
weapon.
LEVIN: And
the capabilities... Did you want more time (inaudible)?
WARNER (?):
Chairman, they want to consult among themselves there. It could
be we could explore that question in closed session in greater
detail.
(CROSSTALK)
WARNER (?):
... explore that question in greater detail in closed session...
FEITH: Certainly,
sir. I'd be delighted to do that.
WARNER (?):
... if you won't reply on open.
LEVIN: Apparently
he submitted a study to us last August saying that there was no
such requirement — that was not a classified study. Is there
a change from that?
FEITH: I
don't believe so.
Of course,
the leaked document — if it is genuine — indicates that
there are plans for the employment of low-yield nuclear weapons
in cases where conventional weapons are insufficient to meet objectives.
So why ask the undersecretary to discuss publicly a classified change
from an unclassified study? The issue was raised earlier by Sen.
Jeff Bingaman (D., N.M.), who stated with respect to low-yield weapons
that "we should concern ourselves if there are going to be
new weapons, new nuclear weapons designs pursued that's been contrary
to the policy of previous administration's. And, if there's a change
in that policy, I think we need to have a discussion about it and
a chance to express our views." Undersecretary Feith assured
the senator that they would be fully engaged. But why press the
topic? Why did that particular secret have to be made public? To
embarrass the administration? Was the revelation a month later a
preemptive strike, an attempt to set the agenda on the nuclear issue?
Or to create an election issue now that the recession is over? Or
to find a way to erode the high levels of public support for the
president? Or just a way for arms-control advocates to have something
to talk about given that the ABM Treaty will soon be history?
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