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 n October 29, Saddam
Hussein launched an initiative to rid the world of the burden and
danger of weapons of mass destruction, starting with the United
States and Israel. Well, nice try. Meanwhile, in a statement last
Monday, President Bush made it clear that states such as Iraq that
are developing weapons of mass destruction with the intention of
using them to terrorize the world would be held accountable. "Terrorism
is terrorism," he stated. Nice to have a guy around who does
know the meaning of the word is.
The growing
discussion over how to engage Iraq is taking on a time-warp quality.
It seems like we've been here before. "Moving too forcefully
against Iraq may split the alliance." "Attacking an Arab
state will unite the Arab world against us." "Intervening
will require a massive and costly troop buildup." "The
Republican Guard is no pushover." Statements like these are
either identical to or variations of arguments from 1990. I have
not yet heard but expect soon to encounter the "What if the
successor is worse than Saddam?" line. I'm surprised it hasn't
yet been made with respect to Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden —
although the "we cannot afford to make them martyrs" variant
has been voiced by some death penalty foes.
These arguments
don't stand up to much scrutiny. For example the Republican Guard
fascination redux reminds one of the recent statements about the
unbeatable Taliban fighters — or about the whole Iraqi army
("4th largest in the world!") in the fall of 1990. Remember,
this was a force that did not allow its troops to be issued white
underwear for fear they would make surrender flags, and whose men
gave up en masse once the fighting started. The Republican Guard
gave better account of itself in 1991, but only by comparison —
objectively they were no match for the allied armies. Why would
anyone suspect that after ten years of sanctions they would be any
stronger than they were at the peak of their power?
As for Arab
unity — it was not in evidence during Desert Storm, when Egyptian
and Syrian troops advanced into Kuwait — a former student of
mine led an Egyptian armored brigade and was very proud to recount
his experiences. Even the Israeli response to Iraqi SCUD attacks
didn't split off the Arab states — the Syrians themselves said
it was a justifiable act of self-defense. It is difficult to find
recent — or any — examples of the Arab unity the critics
claim will one day appear. Yet this myth persists.
With respect
to the solidarity of the antiterror alliance, George Bush senior
did not even have the United States Congress behind the war effort
in the beginning. In fact Congress did not sign on until the president
started the air war in January 1991 and his popularity soared. Our
allies were brought on board through patient diplomacy. This is
true today as well. It will be up to the United States to make its
case to the world that Iraq is a threat. True, the French and Russians
recently have made rumblings about American intentions in Iraq,
but they and others did in 1990 as well. Many states may oppose
allied actions against Iraq, at least rhetorically, but over time
they may be persuaded to change their minds. The best way to ensure
that is to show leadership. The United States should act strongly
— not rashly, but resolutely and with purpose, making its case
each step of the way — and others will follow.
Some have argued
that the United States requires solid evidence linking Saddam Hussein
to the 9/11 attacks before we can take action in Iraq. For them
the attacks are the functional equivalent of the invasion of Kuwait
in terms of establishing legitimacy — and without the link,
striking Iraq would be an act of aggression. (Forget that the United
States has flown sorties over Iraq for nearly a decade, and has
been bombing the country intermittently for most of that time.)
But Iraqi links to the WTC and Pentagon attacks are not a necessary
condition for allied action. Iraq fits well the definition of a
terrorist state as enunciated by the president on Monday. If it
can be proven that Saddam was complicit in the attacks on our country,
so much the better — but it doesn't make Iraq any more or less
a geostrategic threat.
A spokesman
for the French foreign ministry said President Bush's comment about
the return of the inspectors to Iraq was "an absolutely natural
statement which points in the right direction." (C.f. above
point about leadership.) So far so good. Our next steps can be taken
largely under the U.N. umbrella or U.S. laws already on the books:
1. Resuscitate
the U.N. inspection process that had been allowed to lapse in 1998.
The U.N. had called for a response to Iraqi intransigence in Security
Council Resolutions 1194 and 1205 from September and November 1998
respectively. If Saddam is unwilling to cooperate with whom he refers
to as "the dogs of the U.N. Special Commission," what
will be the consequences? In the words of the president, "he'll
find out."
2. Once Iraq
allows inspectors back into their country to fulfill their mission
under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (under which Iraq must
"unconditionally accept" the elimination of its missiles
and weapons of mass destruction, among other things), adopt a more
aggressive posture in executing the process. The inspectors should
not be forced to accept the delaying and stalling tactics the Iraqis
employed in the past, which allowed them to shuttle records and
evidence around the country one step ahead of discovery. If Iraq
denies entrance to a building, bomb it immediately upon the inspectors
reaching a safe distance. This action is provided for in paragraph
12 of the resolution which calls for the "destruction, removing
or rendering harmless as appropriate" these weapons. Bombing
them is as certain as any other method, and it may have the beneficial
effect of facilitating future inspections.
3. Enforce
other U.N. existing resolutions in creative ways. Take for example
Resolution 1360, the latest "oil for food" resolution,
which is due to be reviewed at the end of November. The United States
suspects that the Iraqis have been using the oil revenues garnered
under this and similar resolutions not for their intended purpose,
i.e., feeding and giving medical care to women and children, but
to support Saddam's regime and his military machine. Paragraph 3
of the resolution calls upon the secretary general to "take
the actions necessary" to ensure that "the goods produced
in accordance with this resolution are distributed equitably"
and that dual-use items are "utilized for the purpose for which
they have been authorized." You don't have to be a liberal
legal scholar to read all manner of penumbras and emanations therefrom
in this language. The international community could claim the power
— even the duty — to take control of both sides of the
oil for food equation, to place the Iraqi oil industry under international
supervision, and to route all profits derived from it to humanitarian
relief distributed by U.N. agencies and NGO's.
4. Pay special
attention to Iraqi money trails and their connection to the transnational
flows that intertwine with the terror networks. This effort is already
being undertaken against the al Qaeda finance system, and it would
be useful to cast the net wider. Many Iraqi accounts have already
been frozen, but there are probably others yet to be found. The
more sources that can be shut down the fewer dollars will be accessible
to support our enemies, and the less cash available to prop up the
Baghdad regime.
5. Further
support and legitimize the Iraqi resistance. The Iraq Liberation
Act has been on the books since 1998, and while some steps have
been taken, more could be done. It is not impossible to foster domestic
resistance to Saddam's rule. Difficult, yes, but certainly worth
the investment. The resistance movement may be small, scattered
and mostly powerless now, but so was the Northern Alliance a few
weeks ago. It's amazing what simple things like air supremacy and
the assistance of special-operations forces can achieve.
6. Finally,
start a psyop campaign to destabilize Saddam's regime. Engage the
natural paranoia of the dictatorship to make it begin to devour
itself. After all, Iraq is full of traitors to Saddam. Some of his
closest advisers are plotting against him — plotting while
he sleeps. Most of them, in fact. They see the writing on the wall
— they know his regime will one day be overthrown. Why should
they go down with him? Far better to help him on his way, to curry
favor with the allies. So they are poised to strike — at any
moment — even Saddam's bodyguards — especially that new
guy, the young one with the scar, who always has that odd expression
when the supreme leader walks by. Traitors. Traitors everywhere.
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