|
 ell it's about time.
Opponents of
the ABM Treaty had long been focused on the escape clause, Article
15, the right to unilaterally pull out of the treaty with six month's
notice. No say by Congress, the courts, or anybody else: The decision
is up to the president alone. But that the clause has caused a standing
exercise in frustration. Eight years of the Reagan presidency passed,
then four of Bush the Elder, and ABM persisted. The Berlin Wall
came down, one of the two signatories to the agreement disintegrated,
and it was still there. It seemed as though no one had the political
will to make the necessary step. But it took a Texan in the White
House to look at this sacred cow and see hamburger. To modify a
fairly creepy quote from Paul Begala, "Stroke of the pen, no
law of the land." Pretty cool.
The ABM Treaty
codified an unsound nuclear strategy. I won't repeat how or why
it was flawed, that is a topic
I have written on previously in NRO. But the treaty had grown
into something more than an element of strategy, it became a symbol
of a mentality and an approach to arms control that dominated the
strategic debate and derailed any innovative or advanced thinking
about missiles or missile defense. It tied all discussion of missile
defense to the nuclear issue, which was very damaging because not
all missiles are nuclear, for example the medium-range anti-ship
missiles that constitute a growing threat to U.S. naval supremacy.
And the treaty was not just a relic (as the president noted in his
December 13 pullout announcement) but a dangerous, backward, and
harmful relic. It gave instant and impenetrable cover to those who
did not want to face the increasing strategic and technological
complexities of the global arena. An enduring paradox was the fact
that supporters of the treaty claimed consistently — from the
1970s on — that missile defense was technologically unworkable;
yet they would not consent to any modifications to the R&D restrictions
in the treaty that made technical progress virtually impossible.
These and other 30-year-old notions were preserved by the treaty
like insect in amber, perfect specimens of the extinct. Any attempt
to widen the debate met with long-scripted responses, all rooted
in the notion that the ABM Treaty was the "cornerstone"
of all arms control and strategic stability, a premise that could
not be questioned.
The pervasiveness
of this mode of thought came home over the weekend when I was discussing
the ABM pullout with a physicist. He maintained with downright certainty
that our action would force the Russians to go to a menacing "launch
on warning" posture because they could not be certain that
an incoming missile was not American. If the U.S. had a missile-defense
system their only chance of mounting a successful counterattack
would be to launch everything they had and overwhelm our defenses.
Thus Bush was taking us down an intolerably risky path. This was
an old standard line, the "ragged second strike" argument,
the details of which need not be repeated. The thing that got my
attention was the contention that the Russians would be "forced"
to adopt a particular strategy. It was the same mechanistic, value-neutral
form of argument the pro-ABM Treaty thinkers had been making since
day one. The weapons themselves mandated a logic of power. The objective
nature of the game dictated a precise and unvarying response. The
fact that the two countries involved are enjoying the best relations
in their history is not relevant. In the old days I might have responded
with suggestions like letting the Russians beef up second-strike
capability by hardening silos, allowing reloading, having mobile
launchers, etc., and thereby increasing their MAD comfort zone.
But instead I simply said, "Vladimir Putin announced Russia
will not change its nuclear strategy." The physicist had no
comeback. Reality trumped theory.
President Putin
has been refreshingly businesslike in his approach to this issue.
He termed the pullout a "mistake," but has not warned
of desperate consequences, or put his forces on alert, or made any
bellicose statements whatsoever. This is partly because Putin doesn't
buy the "arms are destiny" argument. "The improvement
of relations between the largest countries of the world, Russia
and the United States," he said, "is the chief factor
that can give Russians and Americans, and people throughout the
world, the feeling of security." Furthermore, Putin displays
a type of honesty that ABM Treaty defenders never did. He too doubts
the technical feasibility of an anti-missile system, but that is
one reason why he doesn't see the abrogation of the treaty as being
very significant. If we can figure out how to do it, he'll worry
about it then, but for now he is not concerned. And as for the arms
race that would "necessarily" attend an ABM abrogation?
Don't look for it any time soon. At the same time the Russians were
informed of the U.S. intention to withdraw from ABM, Secretary of
State Powell reached an agreement in principle to reduce Russian
strategic nuclear arms to U.S. levels — a downward trend the
old strategic model would never have predicted.
While Russia
has responded calmly to President Bush's bold move, other countries
have not, and the list of objectors is revealing. China, Iraq, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea all met the announcement with dire predictions
for the future of peace. These are also the principal countries
actively pursuing missile programs. This illustrates an important
point that the defenders of the ABM Treaty tried very hard to avoid,
namely that the treaty created not stability but instability
by making the development of IRBMs and ICBMs a good investment.
If we cannot defend against missiles, any country possessing them
would have instant bargaining power with the United States, power
it could not achieve in any other way. Facing the possible launch
of even one nuclear tipped missile could give a president pause
when responding to a crisis. A functioning missile-defense system
takes this coercive tool out of the hands of potential adversaries.
No wonder they are upset.
When the ABM
Treaty becomes non-binding six months from now there will be an
opening for a new debate over missiles and nuclear weapons, a rich
exchange of ideas without the inevitable policy roadblock the treaty
represented. New ideas will be put forward, a new Russo-American
dialogue will commence (in fact it has already), and countries looking
to missile systems as their tickets to the big time will have to
reformulate their cost-benefit models. President Bush's decisive
and timely move will not only help guarantee the future safety of
the American homeland, but it will direct our intellectual energies
towards a true understanding of the new global strategic environment.
It is a great time to be involved in the national-security debate,
unless you are one of those people who stayed relevant by changing
the dates on decades-old talking points.
|
