“Freedom Eagle”
The mission in the Philippines.

By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
January 18, 2002 8:45 a.m.

ince 1984, U.S. and Philippine servicemen have participated in an annual joint-service exercise called Balikatan or "shoulder to shoulder." Such bilateral maneuvers are fairly common worldwide, and they give our troops the opportunity to train in tactical operations and render humanitarian assistance in the areas in which the exercises are held. Last year 1,700 U.S. troops participated in BK01, which makes our recent deployment of around 650 troops look somewhat paltry. But this time there are some major differences. Instead of one to two months, the exercise may last as long as six. It has been renamed Kalayaan-Aguila or "Freedom Eagle," and has been moved from the northern island of Luzon south to the Zamboanga and Basilon provinces in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, where the Philippine armed forces have been engaged in a fierce struggle with several guerrilla armies. Prominent among them is the radical Islamic Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), one of the 29 designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, international in scope and identified by the Bush administration as tied to al Qaeda. Besides allegedly being part of bin Laden's network, since last May the ASG has held prisoner Martin and Gracia Burnham, two American missionaries from Wichita, Kansas. A third American, Guillermo Sobero of Corona, California, was beheaded along with four Filipino captives as a gesture of intimidation. They were obviously messing with the wrong people — in June 2001, on the occasion of the death of ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani in a fire fight with Philippine troops, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo told potential successors, "it is best that you free your hostages and surrender. Isang bala ka lang." The mellifluous phrase translates as, "You are only worth one bullet."

It is no coincidence that Freedom Eagle is taking place in a war zone. "It's more practical to be nearer the battleground," Ms. Arroyo stated. Philippine Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes has dubbed it "realistic training" and, lest anyone miss the point, noted that in the course of the exercise "we expect the Abu Sayyaf to be neutralized and the hostages recovered." But the Philippine government has stressed that American troops will not be employed as combatants, and will act only in observation and support roles. And if they come under attack? "It doesn't mean they were engaged in battle because they were just defending themselves," Arroyo reasoned.

The hair-splitting may seem strange — both countries are at war with terrorists after all, and no one has made a point of calling the conflict in Afghanistan a training mission, or insisted on rules of engagement that allow only defensive fire. But the problem is that the Philippine Constitution (Article 15 section 25) provides that after the closure of U.S. bases in 1991, "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate" unless a national referendum is held. By justifying the U.S. deployment under terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that provides for combined training, Arroyo is gambling that success on the battlefield will overcome the legal arguments already being raised by her political opponents. This is particularly important since Arroyo ascended to power from the vice presidency a year ago under questionable circumstances (the military and the people elevated her after a collapsed impeachment of her predecessor; her position was subsequently affirmed by the supreme court) and she needs to live up to her inaugural presidential promise to "crush" all "enemies of the state."

The situation is particularly sensitive given the history of the two countries. This would not be the first time the U.S. fought a Philippine counterinsurgency. A century ago around 150,000 American troops were engaged in the Philippine-American War, the first American war of the 20th century. The troops were under the command of General Arthur MacArthur, and while they managed to subdue the rebels after three years, the excesses of some of the field commanders lead to needless deaths, sensational headlines, and congressional hearings. Sen. George F. Hoar (R., Mass.) said that the United States "inculcated a hatred which centuries cannot eradicate." Of course, a lot has happened since then, particularly the occupation of the country by Japan in World War II and the American commitment to the liberation of the Philippines pursued doggedly by General MacArthur's son Douglas. Nevertheless, some politicians have voiced concerns that Freedom Eagle might be the first step in a renewed permanent U.S. presence.

Such fears are unfounded. The United States is clearly extending the successful experience of the Afghan conflict to the Philippines. U.S. troops, mainly logistics, communications and elite forces, will provide specialized support to the Philippine army and marines as they prosecute operations against the guerrillas, in the same way allied special forces supported the Northern Alliance and other Afghan groups against the Taliban. It would not be surprising to see air power play an important role, and, given the littoral terrain, naval assets may also have a prominent place. The American forces are not the leading cadres of a massive Vietnam-style buildup (as was insinuated yesterday on one of the cable talk shows) but force multipliers for the indigenous warriors, who after all are defending their own country and hence are highly motivated. This is the genius of the Rumsfeld model, which endeavors to attain maximum leverage from diverse and sophisticated military capabilities; it seeks the employment of precisely the right amount and, importantly, right type of force, exploiting American technological dominance, and applying it with surgical skill. So far, it works.

The ASG is not the only guerrilla group active in the Philippines. Our troops might also encounter members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, currently in a state of jihad with the government), the communist New People's Army (NPA), and an Islamic splinter group specializing in kidnapping improbably called the Pentagon. Whether any of these groups will be targeted by the Filipinos may depend on their level of cooperation with Abu Sayyef. The MILF has operated in the past with the ASG, and has threatened U.S. forces to stay out of their areas of control, so they may be good candidates for inclusion.

It is hard to say if the American hostages will be freed or rescued. They are in frail health, and one report indicated that the captives were being moved from the island of Basilan to Mindinao, where they would be much harder to find. Or the guerrillas might kill them out of spite. On the other hand, the Taliban released their missionary hostages, so there is always hope. But Freedom Eagle is not simply or even primarily a rescue mission. Its purpose is to prevent the southern Philippines from becoming another staging area for international terror. Radical Muslim groups are also active in neighboring Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Al Qaeda operatives have set up passport forgery centers there to aid the flight of mujaheds from Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Freedom Eagle is the type of operation the United States will have to engage in to keep the terrorists on the run and prevent them from coalescing in new nerve centers to pursue their war against civilization. It promises to be a low-cost, low-casualty, high-impact operation of relatively brief duration. And when it is completed, our troops will depart, taking with them (one hopes) the gratitude of our Filipino allies, and two newly liberated citizens of Wichita.