On the Road to Baghdad
The international dimension.

By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
February 20, 2002 9:10 a.m.

EDITOR'S NOTE: This is the third of a five-part analysis that scrutinizes Saddam Hussein's regime, its opponents, the international context, and the covert and overt methods that could be used to bring about its downfall. (Part I. Part II.)

ne of the most important victories of the campaign in Afghanistan was diplomatic — the separation of Pakistan from the Taliban. The Afghan regime could not survive without that pillar of support, and after that, its downfall was only a matter of time. But last fall the wound was fresh, momentum was high, and the links to the September 11 attacks were clear. America's allies were falling over themselves in pledges of support. Now the war's momentum has slowed, emotions have cooled. The links between Saddam and 9/11 are, for the moment, tenuous. The allies are at best skeptical, at worst dismissive, of an attack on Iraq. Other, less-friendly states have sent signals that unfortunate consequences would result from moving forcefully against Saddam. These developments point to an even greater need for skilled diplomacy, to make the case against Iraq unaided by passion, calmly, confidently, and firmly. What used to be called "unilateralism" is now recognized as leadership, the ability to visualize an objective, explain the means of attaining it, and wrap the entire venture in a cloak of inevitability.

The United States has a strong team in place, respected in the Middle East for their decisive actions a decade ago. Vice President Cheney, who is headed to the region, was the secretary of defense during Desert Storm, and secured Saudi King Fahd's permission to base U.S. forces in his country for the counterattack against Saddam. Colin Powell, now secretary of state, was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1991 when he uttered the memorable phrase in regards Saddam's army, "First we are going to cut it off. Then we are going to kill it." And, of course, the president had a front row seat as his father prosecuted the first Iraqi war. (Rumor has it that Saddam views this as a tribal struggle, his own against the Bush clan.) Their argument: Iraq has a lot to answer for. It has not met its obligations under the United Nations resolutions that ended the war, it has banned the mandated weapons inspections since 1998, and it has engaged in illegal trade outside of the humanitarian "oil for food" framework. Beyond that, Saddam Hussein is still in power — a man who has invaded two of the six countries bordering his own, and whose weapons-of-mass-destruction programs make him probably the greatest threat to the region in its history.

So why the reticence in the region to resolve the Iraq issue? Is it Arab or Muslim solidarity? Doubtful — actual examples of this purported togetherness are less common than sightings of the Loch Ness Monster. Some countries in the region may feel that a weak, contained Iraq is not a threat, and if it monopolizes American attention, it is a useful diversion from their own misdeeds. Furthermore, some countries, such as Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon, reportedly profit from illegal oil imports that the Iraqis offer at a discount to evade U.N.-mandated limits. And beyond that, how many countries in the region would like to see a revitalized democratic Iraq? How many kingdoms, sultanates, emirates, theocracies, and autocracies look forward to an experiment in the internationally mandated democratization of an Arab state — especially if it succeeds?

The Iranians have been extremely critical of the use of force in Iraq, especially after being tied rhetorically to Baghdad in the State of the Union address. Saddam optimistically pledged that he would give military support to Iran should the Great Satan attack, a promise that has been acknowledged but not reciprocated by the Iranians. The Iranian leaders may also be feeling hemmed by the recent pro-American tilt in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and in Central Asia. But there is still no love lost between Baghdad and Teheran after their decade-long war, and the Iranians may be more tempted to press their influence among the Shiite majority in a post-Saddam Iraq, much as they are doing currently in Afghanistan, than rush to Saddam's aid.

Turkey is concerned with the aspirations of the Kurds of northern Iraq. Turkey has fought a long and fierce counterinsurgency against the Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK) and strongly opposes the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. The Turks are also wary of the refugee populations that might set up camp in southeast Turkey should a humanitarian crisis develop during the war. Yet, Turkey is also a member of NATO and before 9/11 had suggested it would play a role in rapid-response operations in the Middle East. Turkey would be an indispensable base for air strikes and special operations forces. Its best move could be to occupy northern Iraq temporarily to ensure that the Iraqi Kurds live up to their recent promises of seeking a federal solution within the established borders of their country.

Kuwait can be counted on to facilitate a U.S. military buildup, and in fact already has quietly allowed in tens of thousands of troops. This is more than simple gratitude — the Kuwaitis have to plan for the contingency of a preemptive Iraqi strike south. The Saudis have been somewhat less forthcoming publicly, and, as seen recently in the contretemps over the U.S. military presence, could be a diplomatic challenge. Privately they are said to be on-board. Other Arab members of the 1991 coalition, most GCC states and particularly Egypt and Syria, will probably not commit troops this time around under any circumstances.

Israel will again play an unwilling role. Saddam will undoubtedly attempt to unify the Arab states by taking action against the "Zionist entity." Saddam sees the Israeli/Palestinian issue as something of a safety valve — he mentions the Palestinian cause in every speech, and it figures prominently in Iraqi news broadcasts. He hopes to unite the Arab states behind the issue (and behind Iraq), but it is unlikely he will achieve this goal. President Bush defused the issue somewhat with favorable comments about a Palestinian state. Saddam may attempt to bring matters to a head by attacking Israel, perhaps more forcefully than he did during Desert Storm, maybe even employing chemical or biological weapons. This would lead to a strong Israeli response, which of course is what Saddam wants, just as he did in 1991. But so long as Israeli actions are focused on a direct response to aggression and not used as an opportunity to take stringent action against Arafat, it is unlikely the Arab states would do much more than voice token protests. Remember, even the Syrians acquiesced in Israel's response to the 1991 SCUD attacks. Furthermore, if Saddam uses WMD's, against Israel or anywhere else, he will have lost whatever claim to victim status he had.

America's European allies have been slow to respond to the call, and the administration's tone is lately neither fawning nor threatening. When France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, accused president Bush of "simplistic" views regarding the Axis of Evil, Secretary of State Colin Powell suggested that Vedrine must be "getting the vapors." "Let's not swoon," Powell added. "We'll be in contact with you. We'll be sharing with you our ideas and vision. So for anyone who wants to put us in a state of war tomorrow, we're talking to you." The Canadians, the Germans, even the British have voiced skepticism about a move on Iraq, and the president's diplomatic team will make many stops on the road to Baghdad. If the allies cannot be convinced that Iraq is a growing threat requiring a united response, they may at least be persuaded that Iraqi intransigence on the issue of weapons inspection is a grave enough violation of international law to require some degree of concerted action.

The Russians have been working hard to find a way out for Iraq, to save Saddam from himself. Russia is Iraq's largest trading partner, and the countries have a relationship dating back to the Soviet era. When Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz visited Russia in January, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov greeted him saying, "Welcome to Moscow, where you have many friends." The Russians put forward a proposal under which the U.N. inspectors would return with a few minor conditions, and allegedly floated the notion of sending a Russian peace keeping force to secure Iraq's border with Kuwait. This very clever plan would have put the United States in something of a diplomatic quandary. But Saddam's contrariness came to the rescue again. The Iraqis rejected — even denounced — the Russian proposal for the return of the "espionage teams." They simply will not budge on the inspection issue.

Colin Powell's recent challenge to Iraq to allow the return of the U.N. inspectors was more than a rhetorical gesture. This issue has the potential to unify the allies, if not against a geostrategic threat, then behind the principle of upholding international law. The more central the United States makes inspections to the case against Iraq, the more Saddam will resist — as a matter of honor — and the less sympathy he will garner from the rest of the world. Saddam will remain recalcitrant even as international doubts grow. He will defy the world until the issue evolves into a casus belli. He may bend at what he thinks is the last minute, but experience has shown his diplomatic clock is always a few minutes slow. By then, it will be too late.

Thursday: War in the Shadows