Why the Leak?
More nuclear posturing.

By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
March 15, 2002 8:20 a.m.

hen the Los Angeles Times reported details of the classified version of the Nuclear Posture Review (ironically, NPR) that had been reported to Congress at a closed briefing January 8, I figured it would be a one-day story. There wasn't much new in the report, at least not new to those who follow these issues. The unclassified version and other public statements by the administration contained most of the framing logic, such as the new deterrence framework, the capabilities-based approach, and so forth. This story added some sensational details, but nothing that one could not figure out using open sources and common sense.

Now, a week later, the issue has reached something of a hysterical tone (at least on the part of the NPR's critics) and Bush administration officials and spokesmen have been at pains to point out the disproportionate level of response to what is a hardly unanticipated policy framework. NRO has done its bit to bring reason to the debate. Frank Gaffney commented last January on the initial spasm of discontent from the myrmidons of arms control. Mackubin Owens covered the deterrence angle very ably yesterday.

One leaked detail that is drawing particular attention is the list of seven states that might be candidates for nuclear retaliation under extraordinary circumstances. Now, seriously, is anybody really shocked by the list? Are some countries missing, or some placed there by mistake? If so, which? In fact the list contains only potential adversary states that are pursuing (or possess) both WMD and advanced-missile capabilities, i.e., those states that might, under plausible circumstances, have the capability (if not the intent) to inflict catastrophic damage on the United States. Russia and China are obvious candidates for inclusion — but what of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria? Is it fair to list them? Is it surprising? Well, they are the first five countries noted in the CIA's required semiannual "Unclassified Report to Congress the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions." This was alluded to by Sen. James M. Inhofe (R., Ok.) at the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings in February: "...it's disturbing to me when we have evidence that is not even classified evidence that China, Russia, and North Korea are trading systems and trading technologies with countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya...." They are the same states mentioned last July by Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz in testimony before Congress on the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the seven largest potential adversary states measured by military expenditures are — you guessed it — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.

I can't add too much more to what has already been said by others about the strategic issues. But I am interested in the leak. Who did it, and why? And why isn't the press more engaged on that topic? Mac Owens speculated that maybe it was the administration, enhancing deterrence by giving warning that the U.S. is willing to take forceful action should the need arise. I doubt it was the Bush team, for several reasons. First, it was done sloppily, which is not quite their style. Second, the administration response to the leak does not have the tone of a planned campaign, it seems too reactive. Most importantly, a leak of this type gains them nothing. Why bother with skullduggery? If they wanted the information to get out they could simply state it (and in fact have over the past year in various venues). This is an administration that prides itself on plain speaking, on straight shooting, on telling it like it is. Hiding behind leaks would make them look weak. Besides, if the president wanted to threaten Saddam or anyone else, he would probably use the daily press briefing, not a months-old report to Congress.

If I had to bet I would look to the Hill. The Democrats had opposed the NPR since was first suggested in the summer of 2000 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2001. Sen. John Warner (R., Va.) proposed it as amendment 3184 to amendment 3183 by Sen. Bob Kerrey (D., Neb.). The Kerrey amendment gave the president the power to unilaterally reduce the number of strategic nuclear-delivery systems in the U.S. arsenal. The Warner amendment enjoined this action until the completion of the pending Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the submission of a new Nuclear Posture Review due by December 2001 (the previous one having been completed in 1994). The Republicans argued that before the president made any drastic and irreversible decisions on an issue of such importance he should be supplied with the most up to date assessment of the strategic situation. Democrats — who voted 98 percent against the NPR — charged that this was a political move geared towards taking the decision out of the hands of president Clinton and leaving it to his successor, which the Republicans hoped would be Bush. Republicans responded that the risky decision could as easily fall to Al Gore, but whoever the president was in 2001, he would still need the most current information. The amendment passed 51-47.

Congressional guidance on the content of the NPR was very specific, and mandated details on the role of nuclear forces in U.S. strategy, the relationship among deterrence policy, targeting strategy, and arms-control objectives, and a number of other such requirements. The NPR was reported to Congress during a recess and the top-secret briefing was allegedly attended mainly by staffers. Presumably, those members of Congress who were most interested were filled in later. A detailed unclassified special briefing was presented the next day by J. D. Crouch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. Some members of the arms-control establishment were alarmed by the NPR, despite the fact that it called for a two-thirds reduction in the number of deployed nuclear warheads (a salient fact not frequently noted in the current hysteria). Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.) criticized the NPR for not actually destroying the warheads but storing them, or as he called it, "warehoused terror." As noted above, the Senate Armed Services Committee, chaired by Sen. Levin, held hearings on the report on February 14. A very interesting exchange developed between Undersecretary of Defense Doug Feith, chairman Levin, and Sen. Warner:

LEVIN: So let me ask you this question. Does the Department of Defense have any requirement for a low-yield nuclear weapon for hardened deeply buried targets?

FEITH: I do not believe that we have a requirement for low-yield nuclear weapon.

LEVIN: And the capabilities... Did you want more time (inaudible)?

WARNER (?): Chairman, they want to consult among themselves there. It could be we could explore that question in closed session in greater detail.

(CROSSTALK)

WARNER (?): ... explore that question in greater detail in closed session...

FEITH: Certainly, sir. I'd be delighted to do that.

WARNER (?): ... if you won't reply on open.

LEVIN: Apparently he submitted a study to us last August saying that there was no such requirement — that was not a classified study. Is there a change from that?

FEITH: I don't believe so.
[Click here for complete transcript.]

Of course, the leaked document — if it is genuine — indicates that there are plans for the employment of low-yield nuclear weapons in cases where conventional weapons are insufficient to meet objectives. So why ask the undersecretary to discuss publicly a classified change from an unclassified study? The issue was raised earlier by Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D., N.M.), who stated with respect to low-yield weapons that "we should concern ourselves if there are going to be new weapons, new nuclear weapons designs pursued that's been contrary to the policy of previous administration's. And, if there's a change in that policy, I think we need to have a discussion about it and a chance to express our views." Undersecretary Feith assured the senator that they would be fully engaged. But why press the topic? Why did that particular secret have to be made public? To embarrass the administration? Was the revelation a month later a preemptive strike, an attempt to set the agenda on the nuclear issue? Or to create an election issue now that the recession is over? Or to find a way to erode the high levels of public support for the president? Or just a way for arms-control advocates to have something to talk about given that the ABM Treaty will soon be history?