What Now?
The preferred course of action in Afghanistan.

By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor
December 7, 2001 8:15 a.m.

o much for the fight to the death in Kandahar. The Taliban surrender of their spiritual home marks their defeat both as a military and as a moral force. The surrender terms, which are still emerging, appear generous. Rank-and-file Talibs will be amnestied. The fate of more senior members is unclear. Hamid Karzai, the newly chosen interim prime minister of Afghanistan who negotiated the surrender, made it clear that the foreigners in their midst must be dealt with: "They have brutalized our society. They have destroyed our country. ... They must face justice. They must face international justice. There is no doubt on that." But he is more circumspect about the fate of Mullah Mohammed Omar and other members of the Taliban leadership. He has not ruled out Talibs serving in the new government — he says that it is up to the loya jirga, the council of elders. With respect to Omar, the only condition Karzai has laid down is that the mullah must "distance himself from foreign terrorists who have turned Afghanistan into their base and caused numerous calamities to the people of Afghanistan," otherwise "we will not be responsible for any action against him."

Karzai is walking a fine line. When Secretary Rumsfeld said, "We would prefer to have Omar," the simplicity, the lack of embellishment of the statement spoke volumes. When he noted that U.S. "cooperation and assistance with those people would clearly take a turn south" if actions were taken inconsistent with the president's wishes, one can only imagine what "turning south" would entail. The fact that Karzai narrowly missed being killed by U.S. friendly fire on his first day as interim prime minister will no doubt have the Afghan conspiracy buffs — which is probably all of them — going for some time. It may be that Karzai is engaging in some face saving of his own. The Afghan leader may not wish to hand over a countryman, Muslim, Mujahed, and fellow Pushtu, even if Omar may have been behind Karzai's father's assassination in 1999. This could be a way of establishing plausible deniability. After all, sending Omar home is not exactly spiriting him away to safety. The United States no doubt has the GPS coordinates of every room in that house, and unless that lawyer who scotched the hellfire missile launch when the bombing first began is still hanging around, Omar's homecoming would be a brief one.

Meanwhile, the north-south schism is widening. Uzbek leader Abdul Dostum has stated that he will boycott the new Afghan government. Having been snubbed at the Bonn process, the warlord seeks to reconsolidate power in the areas of northern Afghanistan he recently liberated from the Taliban. Dostum has a long history in the area. He had been a tribal militia leader and supporter of the Soviet Union during the invasion, and then supported Soviet-backed ruler Najibullah until he switched sides in 1992. Before the Taliban took over the northern region in 1998 Dostum ruled as a virtual pasha. He issued his own currency, flew his own flag, and even had his own airline ("Balkh Air," following in the startup tradition of "Taliban Airways" and probably used mainly for smuggling). He was a secular ruler who allowed women to work and study as they wished, and to not wear the veil if they so chose. He also developed a potent cult of personality and dealt brutally with any internal dissent.

The pattern is repeating today. Dostum is rearranging the personnel setup in the northern provinces, placing trusted cadres in positions of power. He is also coalition building, meeting recently with intellectuals and women's groups. This week Dostum stated in an interview with a Turkish newspaper, "I do not want to head the nation. I want to head the Turks in the north. I have to fulfill my duties until a government which supports the Turks' legal rights comes to power." Presumably that would be when he comes to power, an unlikely event, but Afghanistan is an unlikely country.

What do these events mean? They point to the increasing complexity the antiterror alliance will face in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. With the common adversary defeated, other lines of cleavage are beginning to emerge, and not all of them are favorable for the United States. The U.S. will retain its ability to influence events, but they will become more nuanced, more intricate, and their consequences harder to predict. It was much easier to have a single, diplomatically isolated, and easily despised foe. But with the fall of Kandahar, the Taliban are no longer a threat to the Afghans. The only common interest left to Karzai, the remnants of the Northern Alliance, Dostum, and the antiterror alliance, is opposition to the foreigners still in the country. One rumor has it that with the fall of Tora Bora bin Laden has fled to Pakistan — which, if true, leaves little left to do in Afghanistan on the antiterror front from the Afghan perspective. It would mean that the most significant armed group of foreigners in the country would be the U.S. Marines, whom the Afghans would just as soon see leave, and quickly.

One wonders what the obligations of the antiterror alliance are in this developing situation. If Dostum won't recognize the interim government and begins to rebuild his personal empire but otherwise behaves himself and doesn't allow terror networks to operate from the areas he controls, is that at variance with our interests? Would Kabul call upon the Americans to use force against Dostum or other independent-minded warlords simply to impose unity in Afghanistan? Would the U.S. comply? One would hope not, at least not directly. U.S. aid already plays a substantial role in Afghanistan — not only humanitarian aid but also military assistance. This aid could be redirected towards more helpful factions to help them sort out their problems in the time-honored way. The resulting conflict could interfere with creating a stable Afghanistan, yet fixing Afghanistan is not and was never the major objective of the current operation. The rehabilitation of Afghanistan will be a long and difficult project. The World Bank estimates it will cost half a billion dollars just to clear land mines.

The U.S. should play a role in this international political and humanitarian effort — but not a military role, not once the terrorists have been dealt with. There are other campaigns to be fought before this war is over, and we should not lose focus. The United States was forced into the war and brought to Afghanistan in pursuit of the terrorists and their protectors, and the president has laid down a marker. The evildoers must come to justice. That is our objective. In this case justice cannot mean simply retiring from public life to reflect on the good old days, write memoirs, and "live in dignity," if it can be called that. Prime Minister Karzai should do the right thing and hand over Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders who aided and abetted al Qaeda. Call it the preferred course of action.