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re: for the record


Jonah — I disagree with you on this one point:  By 2001, after most of a decade without anytime/anywhere inspections and no dismantled plutonium program, and meaningful cooperation with the IAEA, the situation was such that the nuclear tests were almost inevitable.  Without claiming first-hand knowledge, I can pretty much assure folks that the president was told by intelligence estimates from the start that DPRK was headed towards a full nuclear breakout and it was too late to stop them.  We no longer knew where their facilities were , and we thought they already had several devices.  Hence there was already by 2001 a theoretical chance that they could incinerate Tokyo, so we were already paralyzed.   When you can no longer destroy the capability, that’s the last possible moment for effective self-defense — at least against the uncontainable and undeterrable threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.  In North Korea it came and went in 1994.  There is nothing we can do about it now — absolutely nothing.  The Agreed Framework buried any chance for fixing this problem, just as it helped to bury the 3 million North Koreans who starved because Kim Jong-Il wasn’t interested in a real deal.  In Iran that moment of truth has not yet come — but it is approaching very fast. 


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