Why did Japan attack us 70 years ago today, other than the usually cited existential reasons and the fact that they thought they could and get away with it?
We sometimes forget that their expansionism in Manchuria quickly put them in collision with the Soviet Union, and for much of the summer of 1939 they waged a vicious and costly border war against the Soviets — one that they eventually lost and which led to their signing a non-aggression pact with Russia by spring 1941.
The Japanese had bitterly complained that, in the midst of their ordeal, their supposedly anti-Communist ally Nazi Germany had without warning agreed to a duplicitous non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Ribbentrop-Molotov deal was signed on August 23, 1939, amid some of the worst fighting for the Japanese on the Russian eastern front. If Hitler thought that he had a green light to go into Poland, Stalin was equally relieved that he too had only a one-front war and no worries about the Japanese as he gobbled up his share of Poland.
The irony was, of course, that when Hitler invaded Russia the next year in June 1941, Stalin was freed up by Japanese neutrality to send critical divisions from the east; in tit-for-tat fashion, the Japanese had done to Germany what Germany had just earlier done to it. After the stall at Moscow, it is strange to read of growing Germany exasperation with the Japanese, given prior Nazi unconcern with Japan’s war with Russia.
As for the Japanese in spring 1941, with their own rear largely freed from worries over the Soviets and the army somewhat in disrepute after the costly and losing conventional border war and the humiliation of being loud proponents of the now dubious alliance with Hitler, the navy was able to make the argument that a one-front, primarily carrier war against the Americans made some sense, and a simultaneous one against the naturally rich colonies of the weaker European Pacific powers even more sense given their losses in Europe to Hitler.
Indeed, until August 1945, it was the United States, not Japan, that had a traditional two-front war. We rarely talk of Stalin’s duplicity in this regard: While we were suffering terrible casualties from the Japanese, supplying Russia, conducting bloody campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and over the skies of Europe, and being hectored by the Soviets to open a second front in Europe, the Soviets honored their non-aggression pact with Japan, freeing up hundreds of thousands of veteran troops to be used against us on the islands. I never understood why history books focus on Stalin’s exasperation with our supposedly tardy invasion of Normandy, when he was completely unwilling to open a second front against Japan — until it was utterly wrecked in August 1945 and there were easy pickings to be had in the region.
It is often said that Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of Pearl Harbor, was a sort of liberal (at least in the militaristic Japan of the times) and a visionary who opposed the Tripartite Pact, who did not support the Manchuria occupation, and who had deep reservations about attacking the U.S. The famous quotes about awakening a “sleeping giant” and running wild for (only) six months are often, and dubiously, attributed to him. He is also held to have been a brilliant strategist in his emphases on carriers instead of battleships.
Perhaps. But it may be just as likely that Yamamoto’s earlier years in the United States, at Harvard in particular, rather than convincing him of the futility of attacking such an industrial colossus had encouraged his prejudices that Western society, especially in its Roaring Twenties excesses, was decadent and lacked the martial steel for an eventual war with the Japanese. Yamamoto’s failure to plan for a follow-up after Pearl Harbor, whose fuel depots and shipyards could have been neutralized for several months, and the idiotic plan to divide his Midway forces by sending valuable assets up to Alaska, don’t support the image of either a brilliant thinker or a classical liberal surrounded by closed military minds.
One final thought. The growth of Japan in the 1920s and 1930s and the alarm that it caused in the Pacific, its increasingly illiberality and nationalism, the enormous industrial and military progress that it had made in emulating European economies and Western armed forces, the concurrent impressions that a Depression-era America was a sinking rather than a rising power, and a general sense that the Japanese model was superior to the alternatives offer some general parallels to the current comparative status of China and America in the Pacific. Let us hope that we learn the lessons of Pearl Harbor, namely that anything is possible at any time, that deterrence ultimately keeps the peace, and that deterrence is a combination of known superior military strength and a certainty among concerned parties that such overwhelming power will be used in defense, and thereby will assure the aggressor that its attack will prove suicidal.
Dr. Hanson:
So much ink, when there is an easier explanation?
Ron Paul would tell us that Japan attacked us simply because our policies made them angry with us.
We were as isolationist then as he wishes us to be today. But the only reason he can give as to why Americans have enemies is to blame ourselves.
So, it must be our fault that the Japanese attacked us.
I think that would be the explanation of Michael Moore, too, if I am not mistaken.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseProfessor Hanson:
I have to give Yamamoto a pass for his planning of the Midway campaign. I strongly recommend that anyone interested in the period read "Fleet Tactics", by Wayne Hughes. At this time, there was considerable debate about the real effectiveness of carrier airpower. The airpower advocates believed that a single carrier air wing would be able to knock out two enemy carriers...and the airpower doubters were figuring that it would take two air wings to knock out one enemy capital ship. Combat experience in the Second World War was about 1:1.
But this was a fallout from Coral Sea and Midway. Before those battles, Yamamoto was figuring that a strong deception operation would be a wise investment of resources. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the Americans had better cryptography and tactical scouting...and therefore got off a devastating first strike at Midway.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseIs there any reason to think Russia had even 10% of what was needed to open up a front against Japan before Germany was crushed?
It seems to me they were rather busy in the West at the time.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseThe US and the British didn't have anywhere near what was needed to invade France until 1944, but that didn't stop the Soviets from yammering incessantly about a "second front" from June 1941 onwards.
And the Soviets *certainly* had enough in the Far East to hold what they had, which we could have used for airbases against Japan.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseAnd to think that the Obamas decided to dine on Japanese food today, according to Drudge. How dare they. It's like they are spitting on the graves of our boys in the Pacific, or painting graffiti onto the USS Arizona Memorial.
Reply to this commentLinkReport Abuseconcern troll
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseI agree that the parallels drawn between the situation in the 1930's vis-a-vis Japan and the US and the situation now between China and the US are strikingly similar.
I think you're 100% correct, Victor. We must ensure the Chinese know that the price for challenging US military supremacy will be one they will not want to pay.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseI'll pick a nit: the two-front war ended for the US on VE day, May 8, 1945, not in August.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseI'll pick further:
We did not win WW II until the Berlin Wall fell.
We merely replaced one totalitarian force governing half of Europe -- fascism, with another one -- communism.
We gained nothing real, until the wall came down and the Soviet satellites were free to breathe.
We got the cold war because we didn't listen to Patten. Imagine all the cold war money that egos cost us to spend!
Reply to this commentLinkReport Abuse"We did not win WW II until the Berlin Wall fell."
In some legal respects, that's actually true, because the formal treaty with Germany was not (and could not be) signed and ratified until Germany was united. WWII legally ended in 1990.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseVictor,
In all the WWII simulation games I've ever played in (that numbers in the thousands), any scenario where the Japanese player attacking Pearl Harbor where they don't either #1) capture Hawaii outright by land invasion to use the islands as a base for further exploitation/threat against the West Coast forcing a massive US reserve buildup in California or #2) the sinking of every US Pacific fleet Aircraft Carrier at Hawaii, means the Japanese lose. Every. Single. Time. I am not shocked that the Japanese attacked Pearl in a sneak attack. I am amazed that they attacked when the carriers were not in port or (failing that) following up the attack with a transport led invasion of Oahu. They already had a window air superiority. They missed their window.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseFrom Obama’s point of view, Pearl Harbor was just “workplace violence,” and a police problem. Dr. Hanson is always worth reading. I will link to this from my Old Jarhead blog.
Robert A. Hall
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseAuthor: The Coming Collapse of the American Republic
(All royalties go to a charity to help wounded veterans)
For a free PDF of my book, write tartanmarine(at)gmail.com
I disagree about the soundness of the Midway plan. Dividing his forces with a feint to Alaska was intended to draw American forces away from the main effort at Midway and there was substantial pressure on Nimitz to do just that. At the same time, Midway was lightly defended and the forces Yamamoto assigned to its invasion and occupation were more than needed for the task. This was a conventional, but sound approach based on what he knew at the time.
What he did NOT know was that we had broken their codes and positioned our carriers to intercept the invasion fleet. This gave us a distinct tactical advantage. Without the additional forces we positioned at Midway, there is no possibility that the garrison there could have held off the Japanese invasion.
Reply to this commentLinkReport Abuse"Without the additional forces we positioned at Midway, there is no possibility that the garrison there could have held off the Japanese invasion."
Uhhhhh... with all do respect, the forces "garrisoned" at Midway holding off Japanese invasion had nothing do with victory or defeat for the Americans in that battle. The Americans could have LOST control of the island of Midway (for a short duration, the way they lost the Phillipenes) and had a total victory in that battle if the outcome at sea remained the same, that being the sinking of all 4 Japanese aircraft carriers.
That was all that mattered since the Japanese carriers were entirely irreplaceable.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseCouple of quick points:
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseFirst, the Alaska campaign. It was not, as has been surmised by most historians, a feint to draw out the American carriers; it was in fact a completely separate campaign. Look at the dates. Once the Alaska campaign was concluded (two to three days at most) the ships involved were to regroup with the Midway force.
And as far as taking Midway; sure the Japanese could have taken it, but they could never have held it. Remember the logistics line they would have to hold open, and what American submarines did to them: 75% of all Japanese shipping sunk (warships included) was by US submarines.
not to carry water for Stalin, but Hitler's Germany was by far the larger threat, so Stalin was right to concentrate all his force against Hitler, Japan was a very small threat to an empty wasteland border land easily retaken later. And while the experiance of the marines who fought in the pacific was nightmarish, the US didn't take large losses there relative either to the losses taken by the Russians on the european front, or the Japanese losses themselves...we mowed them down like wheat. Our main difficulties were time and space, not manpower and fighting in the pacific, unlike the Russo-German war.
Also, God bless our boys at Normandy, but we have to realize that the Soviets, dirty commies all, did the vast bulk of the fighting and dying and defeating of Hitler. And thank heaven there, that result of the US entering the war late was a triumph of statesmanship, unless you think we had some Victorian duelist honor code obligation to kill more Americans to save Russians. Like in the Iran Iraq war, if only they both could have lost.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseI wholeheartedly agree with those who denigrate Admiral Yammamoto's strategic planning abilities. For those not aware of the most up-to-date scholarship on Midway, read Parshall and Tully's "Shattered Sword". The Aleutians attack was not a diversion - it was a long-planned separate operation, and Yammamoto was convinced he had sufficient forces to carry out both the Aleutians and Midway attacks at the same time. Yammamoto was steeped in the Royal Navy/Mahan tradition of seeking a "decisive battle" and he drove Japan's Combined Fleet to destruction in pursuit of this goal. The 6-carrier Striking Force was Japan's trump card at the start of the war - we had nothing to match it. But it was only a trump when used in the all-together. After Coral Sea, the force was temporarily reduced to 4 carriers, and should have been held back until it could be re-constituted. That is to say, if a target was not considered important enough to require all six fleet carriers, then the target was not important enough for the Combined Fleet to attack at all.
Also, there was no need for the very risky attack at Pearl Harbor - Japan knew as well as we did that the U.S. Navy did not at that time have the logistic infrastructure to enable the US fleet to substantially interfere with her attacks in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Yammamoto was an inveterate gambler and saw the PH attack as an opportunity to repeat the success he had taken part in (as a junior officer) at Tsushima. But the idea flew in the face of the Japanese Naval General Staff's long-planned Pacific strategy for war with America. The Staff, bearing in mind Japan's industrial inferiority, and relatively sanguine about the prospects for an extended war, planned for a wearing-down struggle to attrit the US Navy with Japan's light naval forces and land-based airpower in an effort to whittle down the odds before comitting the Japanese Fleet's main strength. Though Japan would almost certainly have lost the war anyway, the Staff's strategy made far more sense than Yammamoto's constant attempt to force a decisive battle immediately. All Yammamoto succeeded in doing was getting the main strength of his fleet destroyed before the Americans even started their counterattack proper.
The worst aspects of Yammamoto's strategy were continued in his post-Midway operations: the six month long struggle at Guadalcanal saw him repeatedly try to force a decisive battle, and all he was able to accomplish was a one-for-one loss ratio. Japan could not afford this kind of exchange, and avoidance of such attrition had been the basis of the General Staff's planning. As bad as our losses in the Pacific were, we are in a sense fortunate that Yammamoto's ideas held sway as long as they did - his strategy SHORTENED the war.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseIt is not clear to me that the Japanese army had abandoned interest in expansion against the Soviet Union notwithstanding the results of the border battles with the Red Army. Rather, the U.S. imposition in July 1941 of a comprehensive oil embargo (joined-in by Britain (Borneo oil) and also Netherlands East Indies) forced the Japanese to "look south" for a solution to the embargo problem. Absent the pressing need to avoid the embargo, the Japanese army could well have considered the German advances into the Soviet Union by September-October 1941 as creating an ideal situation for renewing operations against and expansion into Siberia. Why the Japanese army was so interested in Siberia and Mongolia remains a mystery to me. I have always wondered whether FDR or Hopkins or others ever noted to Stalin that the U.S. embargo against Japan with the result the Japan moved south provided enormous benefits to Russia, perhaps not quite the equivalent of a Second Front in 1942 but at least the Christmas present of substantial Red Army forces freed from Siberian commitment as Japan moved against the western powers.
Reply to this commentLinkReport AbuseThe Japanese were interested in the timber and
Reply to this commentLinkReport Abusemineral resources of Siberia. Mongolia was lacking
in resources, but I think it was seen perhaps as a
buffer zone against the Soviets..
"Why the Japanese army was so interested in Siberia and Mongolia remains a mystery to me."
The Japanese General Staff accepted, as so many did, the (IMHO false) theories of Cecil Rhodes, used to justify colonial expansion into resource rich areas in the late 19th century. That Staff was dominated by the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). Their officers desired resources in a land mass on which to expand their careers. The Imperial Japanese Navy's (IJN) "Fleet Faction" wanted to go after resources that required more naval than army resources to take and hold.
It was the bitter rivalry between these 2 services that pulled policy one way, and then another, with both in subservience to Rhodes' dogma that a government must directly control resources for its nation's industry. Once the war in China had become, "the war to continue the war" by late 1939, and Zukhov's Siberian's Tank Armies had shredded Japanese Army corps on the Manchuria/Mongolia border, the Navy's stock began to rise.
That was when Japan decided to assault the South, and military doctrine told them they could not leave a potentially hostile strong force on their flank and at their back. Those were the forces positioned by the US in the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands.
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