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all the world knows, on April 1 an American surveillance plane and
a Chinese fighter collided near Hainan,
and both went
down. For ten days, the government of China refused to release the
24 downed American servicemen and demanded an apology, for both
the alleged spying and its lost pilot. On April 11, the Bush administration
secured the release of the crew by issuing a letter that 1) apologized
for our plane's breach of Chinese airspace, 2) expressed appreciation
for "China's efforts to see to the well-being of our crew,"
and 3) agreed to a meeting to discuss when the plane will be returned
and how future collisions can be avoided.
In judging
this settlement, it is important to keep in mind what China's real
goal during this episode has been. What China wants is to push America
out of the South China Sea. When Beijing says that the planes collided
in Chinese airspace, and Washington responds that they were over
international waters, they are not disputing a location. They are
disputing a jurisdiction. The Chinese claim that the sea and the
sky above it are theirs. They are therefore justified in harassing
our planes to try to drive us out — even if that harassment
increases the risk of a deadly accident. Such as the one the Chinese
caused on April 1.
Beijing's demand
for an apology was a provocation dressed up as a protest. To apologize
for our surveillance would have been to concede China's territorial
claim. And with America out of the South China Sea, Taiwan would
be even more vulnerable to Beijing. The Chinese were holding Americans
hostage so that they might be able to hold Taiwan hostage later.
The administration
should be commended for avoiding this concession. The letter it
released is ambiguous about when our plane entered Chinese airspace
— before the collision or during the emergency landing. Less
commendable were the administration's concessions on the intangible
dimensions of security to which we refer as "face." To
express regret over the Chinese pilot's death is unobjectionable.
But to apologize for a landing forced by Chinese recklessness and
preceded by several unanswered Mayday calls, and to thank the Chinese
for treating American hostages well, veers near kowtow territory.
No doubt the
administration considered these concessions necessary to get the
crew back safely and quickly. But their return, though obviously
welcome, should never have been the principal concern of American
policy. Our servicemen are not more important than the objective
they serve: America's security, which includes our standing in the
world. Our adversaries and allies alike now have further reason
to believe that we are a sentimental superpower, and thus a vulnerable
one.
The damage
would have been worse had the administration given in to the Chinese
demand entirely and apologized for our plane's being over the South
China Sea. Moreover, the damage need not be lasting. In its talks
with the Chinese, the administration can still hold firm on our
right to conduct surveillance there. If we sent surveillance planes
to the area in the week following the crew's release, and accompanied
those planes with fighters, that would underscore our resolve. Gathering
intelligence in the South China Sea is also a way of demonstrating
our commitment to keeping the peace between China and Taiwan. The
case for defensive arms sales to Taiwan was strong before this latest
incident, and has been made stronger still by it.
During the
Clinton years, American policy toward China was marked by wishful
thinking. Officials clung to the fantasy that China was our "strategic
partner," or that commercial engagement alone would make it
so. But China's hostage-taking has gone a long way toward wiping
away any remaining American illusions about this ambitious, ruthless,
and therefore dangerous dictatorship. Stripped of illusions, we
will have many advantages over China in the conflicts to come. China
may, for one thing, be making miscalculations of its own. Beijing
is underestimating its neighbors' desire to see America retain its
presence in the region. And it is overestimating America's willingness
to be pushed around.
Speaking of
which: The administration's defense review cannot proceed quickly
enough.
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