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verything
that can be done through words in this war has now been done. President
Bush said everything that needed to be said in his speech to Congress.
He honored our victims and our heroes some of them, as we
have learned, the same people. He expressed gratitude to our friends
and presented an ultimatum to our foes. He made it clear that we
were at war, not in court; that we seek victory over an enemy, not
just punishment for a criminal. He explained who the enemy was not.
America is not at war with Muslims who practice their religion in
peace. While not defining the enemy too broadly, he took care not
to define him too narrowly either: Osama bin Laden got one mention
in Bush's speech, almost in passing. Our enemy is "every terrorist
group of global reach." Which is to say, anti-American terrorists.
The logic of
a "war on terrorism" points beyond itself. Terrorism is,
after all, a (particularly immoral) tactic of war, not an ideology
or group or goal. A war on terrorism, literally speaking, would
be like a war on bombing. The phrase is meant to suggest that our
hostility is not confined to those people who can be proved to have
materially aided the attacks of September 11. It encompasses all
those who mean to do our people harm. Not just bin Laden, then,
but his al Qaeda network; not just his network, but the states that
abet it and other networks.
Small wonder,
then, that President Bush warned us that this war would be long.
Bombing bin Laden, if we find him, will not end it. Nor will overthrowing
the Taliban. Victory requires either changing the regimes of Iraq,
Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan, or frightening them enough to change
their behavior toward us.
If this long-term
project is to have any chance of success, however, the administration
must pursue what it has called the "first phase" of the
war against bin Laden and his Taliban sponsors with
vigor. Yet just days after Bush's speech, the secretary of state
was balking at a war on the Taliban. In his post-speech statements,
Colin Powell ap peared to be trying to make al Qaeda our only target,
and these statements were part of a confusing welter of administration
talk about what we actually seek in Afghanistan.
No doubt Powell's
caution reflects both a military man's reluctance to risk the lives
of American soldiers and a diplomat's desire to gather as many countries
as possible in coalition (especially Pakistan, which has objected
strongly to the idea of removing the Taliban). The former impulse
would be praiseworthy were it not, in this instance, self-defeating.
Capturing or killing bin Laden and his men will not deter like-minded
terrorists; the supply of would-be martyrs is too large. What will
save American lives, in the long run, is to make sure that no one
in power is tempted to cooperate with such men.
Assembling
a coalition to prosecute the war is fine in principle so
long as it is remembered that the war is the purpose of the coalition
rather than vice versa. We can do without the dubious aid of countries
that demand, as the price of their cooperation, that we betray our
true friends or abandon our purpose. And no doubt the size of the
coalition will vary with the phase of the war. The Saudis are welcome
in our coalition now that we have forced them to cut off their ties
to the Taliban. It is very hard, on the other hand, to see what
the Syrians have to offer. Rather than keeping our mission foremost
in mind, Powell is acting as though our most important consideration
is to position President Bush to win the next election in Pakistan.
For over a
generation, Arab terrorists both Islamist and secular
have pledged to fight America to the death. They do it on principle.
So should we.
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