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Part
III: No Attempt to Distinguish between Disfranchisement and Problems
Caused by Bureaucratic Inefficiencies and Voter Error
Other witnesses did offer testimony suggesting numerous problems
on election day. But the Commission, in discussing these problems,
failed to distinguish between mere inconvenience, difficulties caused
by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and incidents of potential discrimination.
In its report, the complaint from the voter whose shoes were muddied
on the path to his polling place is accorded the same degree of
seriousness as the case of the seeing-impaired voter who required
help in reading the ballot, or the African American voter who claimed
she was turned away from the polls at closing time while a white
man was not.
There were certainly jammed phone lines, some moved polling places,
and other problems, but none added up to widespread discrimination.
Many of the difficulties, like those associated with the "butterfly
ballot," were the product of good intentions gone awry or the presence
of many first-time voters. The most compelling testimony came from
disabled voters who faced a range of problems, including insufficient
parking and inadequate provision for wheelchair access.
Other than the "quantitative evidence" of its statistical analysis,
the report claims that, "the only evidence that exists is the testimony
of those who have stated publicly that they were denied the right
to vote and the credibility of their testimony." However, while
the first-hand accounts of witnesses were helpful in describing
election-day problems, they did not point to what the majority report
calls a "disturbing trend of disenfranchisement."
The majority of those witnesses who experienced problems and who
came before the Commission testified that they were ultimately able
to cast their vote, despite the problems they described; a few were
not. A chief flaw in the majority report, however, is that it generally
fails to distinguish between problems of mere inconvenience, difficulties
caused by bureaucratic inefficiencies, and incidents of potential
discrimination. In this way, the complaint from the white male voter
whose shoes were muddied on the path to his polling place is accorded
the same degree of seriousness as the case of the seeing-impaired
voter who required — but was denied — assistance in reading
the ballot, or the African American voter who claimed she was turned
away from the polls at closing time while a white man was not.
For the most part, those who testified before the Commission told
of problems in voting, not of being prevented from voting. The most
frequent problems mentioned included the following:
1. Inability of some poll workers to confirm eligibility status
The report argues that in the last election, "many people arrived
at their polling places expecting to cast their ballots for the
candidates of their choice, but many left frustrated after being
denied this right." To support this charge, the report points to
"consistent, uncontroverted testimony regarding the persistent and
pervasive inability of election poll workers to verify voter eligibility
during the November 7 presidential election."
It is true that the Commission heard several complaints about jammed
phone lines that, in many cases, prevented poll workers from getting
through to headquarters to confirm the eligibility of voters whose
names did not appear on the rolls. Some voters found that their
names had been left off the voting lists because of bureaucratic
error and through no fault of their own. In other cases, however,
many voters failed to verify the location of their assigned precinct
or polling place before going to vote on election day. Others failed
to notify their elections board of a change in address. Some neglected
to bring the necessary proof of eligibility to vote, and still others
did not correctly fill out their mail-in applications through "motor
voter" registration. The high turnout of voters, many of them first-time
voters, only exacerbated the difficulties that arose on election
day.
Neither voters nor poll workers testified that the problems they
experienced amounted to widespread disfranchisement in Florida.
In fact, according to researchers at the Miami Herald, some
poll workers who struggled with insufficient phone lines admitted
that they erred on the side of including, rather than excluding
voters. In other words, when they were unable to get through to
headquarters, they found it easier to go ahead and let people vote,
rather than challenge their credentials.
What we learned in Florida was that all of these factors can contribute
to an overloaded communications system on election day, and that
there is no substitute for greater voter awareness and better trained
elections staff to handle inquiries.
2. Polling places closed early or moved without notice
The Commission received no evidence that this was more than an insignificant
problem. There is absolutely no evidence upon which to conclude,
or even suggest, that there was a pattern of closings or movement
designed to disenfranchise voters. One county supervisor testified
that in some cases there are urgent reasons for moving a polling
facility — i.e., there was one facility that had burned down
on the Saturday before election day — but that the public is
notified of the change. The Palm Beach County supervisor testified
that, "Nobody has come to me to give me specifics on which precinct
they were turned away from so that I could do the investigation
to see what exactly happened."
The Commission did hear testimony from one poll worker about a gated
community where the gates had shut automatically at 6:15 p.m. and
had to be reopened by police officers. The Palm Beach supervisor
asserted that this incident was "never reported" to her but that
it did not seem likely given that the facility in question was located
at a water works facility that would have had a government staff
person there to open the gates. As the supervisor explained, "I've
heard many people tell me things and then I asked them whether they
themselves experienced it and they said, no, they heard it from
somebody else. And I wonder if this person [the witness about the
gated community] actually experienced that themselves."
In a letter to the General Counsel during the affected agency review,
David Leahy, the Supervisor of Elections for Miami-Dade refutes
the testimony of several witnesses, including one (Felix Boyle)
who insisted that his voting place had been changed without prior
notice. After investigating this matter, Mr. Leahy affirms in his
letter that: "Felix Boyle stated that the polling place for Precinct
#36 was in a different building than was used in the 2000 primary
election. The same building was used for both elections." Ignoring
this rebuttal altogether, the report continues to include Mr. Boyle's
testimony as an example of "polling places moved without notice."
If the Commission had been truly interested in the important issue
of uniform polling-place hours, it might have made more than a single,
passing mention of one of the more widely-publicized problems that
emerged during the last election: the announcement by all five television
networks at 7:00 p.m. Eastern time that the polls in Florida had
closed, when the polls in the Panhandle counties were still open
for another hour. There is no way of knowing exactly how many voters
were discouraged from going to the polls because of this misinformation,
but testimony before Congress from a number of poll workers and
inspectors indicates that the network poll-closing announcement
did have a sizeable impact on voter turnout in the panhandle. The
majority's willingness to overlook such issues is consistent with
its objective of reaching a predetermined conclusion. Any evidence
that might tend to support a different conclusion or support the
legitimacy of the election outcome is to be excluded or given only
the most perfunctory treatment.
3. Accessibility issues
Some of the most compelling and direct testimony in Florida were
those accounts regarding the problems of accessibility for disabled
voters. Although the disabled voters who testified before the Commission
claimed that they themselves ultimately voted, they described a
range of problems facing the disabled on election day, including
insufficient parking, inadequate provision for wheelchair access,
and other difficulties involving ballots and voting technology.
The barriers they described appear to constitute a long-standing
problem that was not just confined to Florida or to this presidential
election. It is unfortunate that the report does not examine the
ongoing efforts of Florida state officials Governor Bush's ADA working
group and a task force working under the Secretary of State to address
these concerns.
In the same chapter on "accessibility issues," the report addresses
allegations that an "overwhelming number" of Haitian-American voters,
"many Latino voters," and "many persons who were not literate" were
"denied adequate assistance" in casting their ballots. Here, the
discussion of accessibility problems is much less clear. Much of
the testimony from advocacy groups was speculative and based on
second-hand, anecdotal information.
For instance, the Commission heard from a representative of a Haitian-American
advocacy organization in Miami-Dade that, in addition to the problems
of long lines and understaffed polling facilities, there were problems
regarding a lack of bilingual ballots. However, few details were
presented to help gauge the extent of this problem, and no attempt
was made to properly investigate the seriousness of these alleged
problems.
When the Miami-Dade County supervisor was questioned about the allegations
of the earlier witness, he referred to a county commission ordinance
that requires the supervisor to determine which precincts have a
significant Haitian American voter population and to provide bilingual
ballots in those precincts. He testified that, for purposes of the
November 2000 election, he determined there were 60 precincts with
a significant Creole population. In addition to providing bilingual
ballots, Miami-Dade also did sample ballots in English and Creole
and publicized those in Haitian-American newspapers. The Miami Dade
supervisor maintained that the earlier witness might be in a precinct
that did not have a significant Haitian American population. The
report makes no attempt to clear up this confusion.
4. "Motor Voter" Problems
The report asserts that "[m]any Floridians alleged that they registered
to vote through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and learned
later that they were not registered. Many of these disappointed
citizens filed complaints with the attorney general's office and/or
the Democratic Party." The allegation here appears to be that Republicans
in Florida somehow engineered a "motor voter" conspiracy, even though
there is no evidence to support that claim. The report itself points
out that, according to the testimony of the director of the Division
of Driver Licenses, problems often arose because voters failed to
complete their motor/voter applications correctly and/or in a timely
manner. References to one such individual were stricken from the
report when the affected agency's responses determined that this
individual had submitted an incomplete registration form. The report
does not explore the concerns of "motor voter" critics that, instead
of excluding voters, the "motor voter" system frequently tends to
err on the side of letting voters vote when in fact they may not
be eligible.
5. Confusing Ballots
Although some witnesses testified about the confusion caused by
the "butterfly ballot" in Palm Beach County, no evidence was presented
that the butterfly ballot was targeted to particular groups, as
the Commission originally suggested in its "preliminary" report
of March 9. During the hearings, the Commission heard varying accounts
regarding "defective" ballots. A rabbi from Palm Beach County testified
that when he spoke with a group of 500 people within his congregation
in Palm Beach County, about 20 percent complained that they had
problems with the butterfly ballot ("their arrows did not line up
with the holes"); the rest of the group experienced no such problems
and "simply laughed."
The supervisor of elections for Palm Beach County supervisor later
testified that, in some cases, it appeared that voters using the
butterfly ballot failed to properly line up the ballot in the voting
machine. The supervisor also explained that certain community groups
may have mistakenly instructed voters to "punch the second hole"
for Gore "when he was not the second hole; he was the third hole."
Others had been told to "vote for Lieberman," but "[i]f they followed
the line where Lieberman's name was, it punched another hole down
because the President and Vice President are grouped together."
The supervisor also testified that, "In Palm Beach, sample ballots
were sent out to all registered voters," and she contested earlier
charges regarding defective ballots. She explained that she herself
had never been alerted to or received any complaints about the actual
card not fitting into the machine: "The ballot cards are all purchased
from the same company and they're all printed at the same time.
They all come off the same press. They're all printed on the exact
same size paper. You've got the candidate's name, the arrow pointing
to the number and then the hole if you follow straight across then
you'll hit the hole."
Appearing before the Senate Rules Committee on March 14, Dr. Stephen
Knack, testified that many of the problems affecting the largest
numbers of voters in Florida were the product of good intentions
gone awry and were not inherently related to questions of technology.
In Palm Beach County, the major problem was a ballot designed to
be printed in large type for the benefit of older voters. In Duval
County, a major problem was faulty instructions to voters by party
workers, which were provided with the intention of reducing roll-off
in contests farther down on the ballot. The biggest problem for
all kinds of ballots was the fact that, as the report explains,
there were ten candidates on the ballot for President, compared
with only three or four in previous years.
Another significant issue, which the report virtually ignores, concerns
the problems that occurred as a result of the high turnout of first-time
voters, many of whom received faulty how-to instructions from the
very groups that urged them to vote in the first place. As Isiah
Rumlin, head of the NAACP in Duval County, recently stated: "We
didn't do any voter education. We didn't know we needed to. In retrospect,
we should have done a better job."
As a result of the election-day confusion in Florida and many other
states, there is a new emphasis on voter education initiatives and
the role that can be played by advocacy groups and community organizations.
In Broward County, for example, the supervisor of elections, Miriam
Oliphant, has launched a program to involve local churches in the
efforts to better educate voters, recruit new ones, and prevent
many of the difficulties that occurred during the 2000 election.
By stressing litigation rather than education, the majority report
is heading in the wrong direction.
Part IV: The Majority Report's
Warped Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act
The report comes close to concluding that election procedures
in Florida were in violation of the Voting Rights Act, but the Commission
cannot reach such a conclusion and has bent the 1965 statute totally
out of shape.
The question of a Section 2 violation can only be settled in
a federal court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must prevail
in a trial in which the state has a full opportunity to challenge
the evidence. To prevail, plaintiffs must show that "racial politics
dominate the electoral process," as the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee
Report stated in explaining the newly amended Section 2.
The majority's report implies that Section 2 aimed to correct
all possible inequalities in the electoral process. Had that been
the goal, racially disparate registration and turnout rates —
found nearly everywhere in the country — would constitute a
Voting Rights Act violation. Less affluent, less educated citizens
tend to register and vote at lower rates, and, for the same reasons,
are likely to make more errors in casting ballots, especially if
they are first time voters. Neither the failure to register nor
the failure to cast a ballot properly — as regrettable as they
are — are Section 2 violations.
Thus, despite the thousands of voting rights cases on the books,
the majority report cannot cite any case law that suggests punch
card ballots, for instance, are potentially discriminatory. Or that
higher error rates among black voters suggest disfranchisement.
There is good reason why claims brought under section 2 must
be settled in a federal court. The provision requires the adjudication
of competing claims about equal electoral opportunity — an
inquiry into the complex issue of racial fairness. The Commission
is not a court and cannot arrive at verdicts that belong exclusively
to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report does admit that
the Commission cannot determine if violations of the Voting Rights
Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims to have
found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.
The majority report argues that election procedures in Florida violated
the Voting Rights Act, but that conclusion depends upon bending
the 1965 statute totally out of shape.
In 1982, as the report correctly states, Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act was amended to allow minority voters to challenge any
method of election on the ground of discriminatory "result." In
this amended provision, a method of election is said to have a discriminatory
impact when minority voters have been found to have "less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice."
The majority on the Commission does not (and cannot) find Florida
in violation of the Voting Rights Act; by law, only a court could
draw such a conclusion. But it strongly implies that it has proven
just that, claiming that the Act was violated by the use of older,
less reliable voting machinery in the poorer districts; by the disproportionately
high number of spoiled ballots in counties with substantial minority
populations; and by the use of the state's "purge list" of felons
who are ineligible to vote.
The "Less Reliable Voting Machinery"
Issue
The less-reliable machinery argument — which gained mythic
proportions in the press — has been widely disproven. It is
simply not the case that poorer counties with larger minority populations
have substantially inferior voting equipment that is significantly
more prone to error. At worst this is a minor factor in voter error
rates.
In fact, as the Commission heard in Florida, the punch-card jurisdictions
did not have the highest "spoilage" rates. The "optical central"
system had the most problems — that is, the system using optical
scanners with votes counted at some central location rather than
in the local precinct. (Thus, the county with the highest spoilage
rate, Gadsden County, used the optical central tabulation system,
not the infamous punch-card machines.) And the "touchscreen" system
has been found to have a spoilage rate as high as punch-card systems.
The Commission heard a number of complaints about punch card voting
machines, but these were used in many different locations throughout
the state, in both poor and affluent districts, from Duvall County
to Palm Beach. Testimony from expert witnesses on voting technology
did seem to point to a correlation between minority populations
and "drop off" rates ("drop off" being the difference between the
numbers of people who went to the polls and the numbers of ballots
that recorded no vote for certain offices), but not a clear or consistent
correlation between technology and minority populations.
A January 2001 study by Professor Stephen Knack of the University
of Maryland and Professor Martha Kropf of the University of Missouri
(Kansas City), like other recent, authoritative studies, also challenges
the "widespread perception that counties in Florida and elsewhere
with a greater percentage of minorities and poor people were more
likely to employ antiquated voting machinery that produces a disproportionate
number of undervotes and invalid ballots." The Knack & Kropf study
found "little support for the view that resource constraints cause
poorer counties with large minority populations to retain antiquated
or inferior voting equipment. In most states, it is whites, the
non-poor and Republican voters who are more likely to reside in
punch card counties rather than African Americans, the poor and
Democratic voters."
There is, however, a larger problem with this whole analysis. Even
if the spoilage rate data were accurate, the Commission's allegations
of Voting Rights Act violations would be close to indefensible.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965
The question of a Section 2 violation can only be settled in a federal
court. Plaintiffs who charge discrimination must prevail in a trial
in which the state has a full opportunity to challenge the evidence.
To prevail, plaintiffs must show that "racial politics dominate
the electoral process," as the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee Report
stated in explaining the newly amended Section 2. The point of the
Voting Rights Act was always to provide remedies for voters who
were "isolated within a political system… 'shut out,' i.e. denied
access… [without] the opportunity to participate in the electoral
process," as a distinguished civil rights attorney who helped draft
the amendment stated at the 1982 hearings.
Under Section 2, plaintiffs need not find a smoking gun--clear evidence
of discriminatory intent. Nevertheless, the Judiciary Committee's
list of "factors" to which courts were to refer in judging the merits
of a Section 2 suit were clearly intended to help judges identify
those situations in which either a history of discrimination or
ongoing racism had left black and Hispanic voters at a distinctive
disadvantage in the electoral process. Racism is still the issue
in a "results" test. And yet the Commission's majority report failed
to produce a shred of evidence suggesting an electoral process infected
with racial animus.
The majority's report implies that Section 2 aimed to correct all
possible inequalities in the electoral process. Had that been the
goal, racially disparate registration and turnout rates--found nearly
everywhere in the country--would constitute a Voting Rights Act
violation. Less affluent, less educated citizens tend to register
and vote at lower rates and, for the same reasons, are likely to
make more errors in casting ballots, especially if they are first
time voters. Neither the failure to register nor the failure to
cast a ballot properly--as regrettable as they are--constitute Section
2 violations.
Voters have the right to equal access to the voting booth, and to
have their ballots treated equally once they are cast, but the responsibility
for deciding to register, to go to the polls, and to cast a valid
ballot remains with the voter in America. Some countries compel
their citizens to vote, which would be the only way of creating
uniformly representative turnout rates; America, thankfully, does
not.
Thus, despite the thousands of voting rights cases on the books,
the majority report cannot cite any case law that suggests punch
card ballots, for instance, are potentially discriminatory. Or that
higher error rates among black voters suggest disfranchisement.
In fact, many of Florida's African American voters in the 2000 election
were first-time voters, so it is not implausible to assume that
many of them may have been unfamiliar with voting procedures, and
consequently were more likely to commit errors in voting that would
have "spoiled" their ballots. Such errors would not be the result
of discrimination; they would simply be errors. The true test of
discrimination is whether voters of equal ability--equally literate,
and equally experienced with voting procedures and equipment--but
of different races were equally able to exercise their right to
vote.
The Commission's report offers no evidence that middle class, educated
black voters made ballot errors at a rate higher than their white
neighbors. And if a disproportionately high number of voting errors
among low-income and poorly educated blacks constitutes "disfranchisement"--a
violation of voting rights--then most jurisdictions in the nation
with a minority population would have long ago found themselves
in court fighting charges of discrimination.
That is not what the framers of Section 2 envisioned. The concern,
the Senate Judiciary Committee informed members of Congress in 1982,
was solely with those settings in which "racial politics play[ed]
an excessive role," dominating the electoral process.
There is a reason why, in contrast to Section 5 in the Act, Section
2 requires a trial in a federal court. Section 5 claims can be settled
in the Justice Department itself, through the process of administrative
review. That is because they pose simpler questions--namely, whether
a new election procedure or practice is clearly intentionally discriminatory,
or whether its impact is such as to leave minority voters worse
off than they had been. A typical Section 5 question would thus
be: Are newly drawn redistricting lines likely to result in fewer
black officeholders than before?
Section 2, on the other hand, demands an inquiry into the complex
issue of racial fairness. Adjudicating competing claims about equal
electoral opportunity, as the Supreme Court has noted, requires
an "intensely local appraisal"--the specific, detailed knowledge
that only a court can obtain. And it demands the chance that only
a trial can provide for the challenged jurisdiction to answer the
charges. As the Chair herself has conceded many times the Commission
is: "not a court" and cannot arrive at verdicts that belong exclusively
to the judiciary. Yet, while the majority report does admit that
the Commission cannot determine whether violations of the Voting
Rights Act have actually occurred, in fact it unequivocally claims
to have found "disenfranchisement," under the terms of the statute.
The Commission's findings are likely to inspire some people to call
for federally-mandated election procedures of one sort or another. This
would be a grievous error. The architects of the Constitution left
matters of suffrage almost entirely in state hands, although subsequent
Amendments prohibited a poll tax and denial or abridgment of the
right to vote on account of race, gender, or age (after eighteen). It
is true that in 1965 the Voting Rights Act broke with constitutional
tradition, but that was a uniquely draconian response necessitated
by the persistent and egregious infringements of basic Fifteenth
Amendment rights that pervaded the Jim Crow South.
None of the Commission's findings depict a national emergency in
any way resembling that in 1965. Florida itself (unlike the states
of the Deep South in the 1960s) has readily acknowledged the need
for reforms to its voting procedures, and has already acted to remedy
problems evident in the November election. State action is appropriate;
federal intrusion is not.
Part V: The Unfair and Politicized
Attack against Florida's Public Officials
The report holds Florida's public officials, including the governor
and secretary of state responsible for the discrimination that it
alleges. "State officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner
that would prevent this disenfranchisement," is asserts. In fact,
most of the authority over elections in Florida resides with officials
in the state's 67 counties, and many of those with the highest rates
of voter error were under Democratic control.
The report charges that the governor, the secretary of state
and other state officials should have acted differently in anticipation
of the high turnout of voters. What the Commission actually heard
from "key officials" and experts was that the increase in registration,
on average, was no different than in previous years; that since
the development of "motor voter" registration, voter registration
is more of an ongoing process and does not reach the intensity it
used to just prior to an election; and that, in any event, registration
is not always a reliable predictor for turnout.
There was a 65 percent increase in African American voters, 40
percent of whom were coming to the polls for the first time. But
this was an unanticipated event.
The majority report also faults Florida state officials with
having failed to provide the 67 supervisors of elections with "adequate
guidance or funding" for voter education and training of election
officials. But the county supervisors are independent, constitutional
officers who make their budget requests to the Boards of county
commissioners.
The majority report makes no attempt to conceal its politicized
attack against Florida state officials. The report asserts that
"State officials failed to fulfill their duties in a manner that
would prevent this disenfranchisement," and calls on the U.S. Department
of Justice to "institute formal investigations... to determine liability
and to seek appropriate remedies."
The charges the majority has directed against the Governor and the
Secretary of State and other officials in Florida are particularly
disturbing. The Commission's interrogation in Tallahassee (during
which the Governor was the only witness during the entire
set of hearings to be denied the opportunity to make an opening
statement) suggested a Catch-22: The governor and other state officials
would have been faulted if they had been too involved in the running
of the presidential election; now they are judged to be derelict
for their deference to proper local authorities.
The majority report admits that it found no "conclusive evidence"
of a state-sponsored conspiracy to keep minorities from voting.
But as several independent observers have pointed out, this is malicious
and misleading phrasing, since there was in fact no evidence
whatsoever of a conspiracy at all, conclusive or otherwise.
Contrary to what the majority has asserted, state and local officials
have clearly and forcefully refuted the serious allegations the
Commission has made against them.
The testimony in Florida clearly explained and delineated the delegation
of authority and decentralized responsibility for elections, under
Florida's constitution. Testimony from all the public witnesses
with jurisdiction over these matters provided no evidence of criminal
misconduct in connection with the Florida 2000 elections. Testimony
also revealed the seriousness accorded to the work of the Governor's
bipartisan task force on election reform. Ignoring all of this available
evidence the Commission insists that Florida state officials are
guilty of "gross neglect" in fulfilling their responsibilities regarding
election matters. By so doing, the majority again violates fundamental
concepts of due process. Not only are its conclusions not based
upon evidence contained in the record of the hearings, they are
in direct conflict with the testimony of the witnesses who were
most knowledgeable about such matters.
The report refuses to accept a key point that emerged in testimony
during the hearings--that the elections supervisors are "independent,
constitutional officers." That is why, as a recent piece in The
Economist ("Unfair, Again," June 9, 2001) points out, "laying so
much blame on the governor and secretary of state is unrealistic."
The article goes on to explain that, "Most of the key decisions
were made in Florida's 67 counties rather than in Tallahassee,"
and, "Many of the counties with the highest number of voter errors
were under Democratic control."
The majority report criticizes Governor Bush for having "apparently
delegated the responsibility" for the conduct of the election, even
though that is precisely what Florida law provides. The Secretary
of State is criticized for having taken a "limited" role in election
oversight that is in sharp contrast to the position she took before
the Supreme Court" in Bush v. Gore. The majority report fails to
explain, however, that Bush v. Gore (which addressed the issue of
"recounts" and the certification of the results of the election)
had nothing to do with the authority of county officials as to how
the elections are run on the local level in Florida. The report
glosses over the inconvenient fact that, under Florida law, Governor
Bush has virtually no authority over the voting process, and the
Secretary of State's role is mainly to provide non-binding advice
to local officials.
The report's central theme--that the governor and other officials
are to be blamed (and investigated) for not having taken full responsibility
for all of the problems that occurred during the Florida election--is
contravened by the arbitrary way in which these same officials were
treated by the Commission's own general counsel.
On June 8, when questioned as to why state officials were given
only portions of the report to review, the general counsel explained
that, "we selected the portions that are relevant... based on activities
and responsibilities." The general counsel went on to say that,
"we just thought it would be a bad idea [to send the full report]
because there are responsibilities and activities that don't pertain
to the governor's office.…" In light of the fact that the general
counsel sent the governor only about 30 pages of a 200-page report,
he himself must have considered the governor's activities and responsibilities
to be quite limited indeed.
It is also ironic that the Chair chose to berate Secretary Harris
during the Tallahassee hearing for not having assumed more responsibility
for the problems that occurred on election day. At the hearing,
the Chair explained that, even though this Commission delegates
to the staff director the authority to run the day-to-day operations
of the Commission, she herself--as Chair--must assume ultimate responsibility
for everything that happens at the Commission. That explanation
stands in stark contrast to the statements issued by the Chair in
the wake of the unauthorized leak of this report, when the Chair
asserted that she was "only one vote" on the Commission.
The report charges that the governor, the secretary of state and
other state officials should have acted differently in anticipation
of the high turnout of voters. What the Commission actually heard
from "key officials" and experts was that the increase in registration,
on average, was no different than in previous years; that since
the development of "motor voter" registration, voter registration
is more of an ongoing process and does not reach the intensity it
used to just prior to an election; and that, in any event, registration
is not always a reliable predictor for turnout.
One expert who has studied voter turnout and participation for 25
years testified that, "The Florida turnout was not particularly
high"--only 2.2 percent over 1996. Several supervisors of elections
testified that the highest turnout occurred in 1992 (which had an
80 percent turnout compared to the 64 percent turnout in 2000).
Other experts pointed to the 65 percent increase in African American
voters and the fact that 40 percent of the African American voters
who turned out were first-time voters, but characterized these as
"unanticipated events." The Palm Beach County supervisor stated,
"I don't think I was aware of how much larger the African American
community's turnout was until really at the end of the election
evening when we looked at the precincts as [the results] came in."
The majority report also faults Florida state officials with having
failed to provide the 67 supervisors of elections with "adequate
guidance or funding" for voter education and training of election
officials. It fails to mention the Commission also learned that,
under Florida's Constitution, requesting and allocating resources
is a local responsibility, one which belongs to the supervisors
of elections. The county supervisors are independent, constitutional
officers who make their budget requests to the Boards of county
commissioners. It is up to the county commissioners to approve or
reject those requests, and there is currently no process for appealing
to the Florida cabinet. The majority of the supervisors of elections
who came before the Commission testified that they themselves did
not request additional resources prior to the election but,
that even if they had, such a request would have properly been directed
to their county commissioners, not to the governor or to the Division
of Elections.
Part VI: One-Sided Examination
of the Felon List
The report asserts that the use of a convicted felons list "has
a disparate impact on African Americans. African Americans in Florida
were more likely to find their names on the list than persons of
other races." Undoubtedly that is true; a higher proportion of blacks
have been convicted of felonies. But there is no evidence that the
state targeted blacks in a discriminatory manner in constructing
a purge list, or that the state made less of an effort to notify
listed African Americans and to correct errors than it did with
whites. The Commission did not hear from a single witness who was
actually prevented from voting as a result of being erroneously
identified as a felon. Furthermore, whites are twice as likely as
blacks to be placed on the felon list erroneously not the other
way around.
The compilation of the purge list was part of an anti-fraud measure
enacted by the Florida legislature in the wake of a Miami mayoral
election in which ineligible voters cast ballots. The list was overinclusive,
and some supervisors made no use of it. (The majority report did
not bother to ask how many counties relied upon it.) On the other
hand, according to the Palm Beach Post, more than 6,500 who were
in fact ineligible would not have been found without the list.
Based on extensive research, the Miami Herald concluded that
the biggest problem with the felon list was not that it wrongly
prevented eligible voters from casting ballots, but that it ended
up allowing ineligible voters to cast a ballot. The Commission should
have looked into allegations of voter fraud, not only with respect
to ineligible felons, but involving the country in a variety of
jurisdictions, serious questions about voter fraud have been raised.
Despite the majority report's extensive examination of the so-called
"purge" list of alleged felons, there is no evidence of any discrimination
resulting from distribution of the list, nor is there any evidence
of any systematic attempt to disenfranchise black voters or any
group through the use of this list. While insisting that "countless
voters" were "deprived of their right to vote" as a result of the
list, the report contradicts its own findings: Although the Commission
record reflects that certain supervisors of elections registered
general complaints regarding the use of the exclusion lists, the
record does not reflect that the Division of Elections office "was
flooded with specific examples of Floridians erroneously identified
as felons." Indeed, as Dr. Lott report shows, whites were twice
as likely as balcks to have been placed on the list erroneously.
At the hearing in Miami, the Commission received testimony from
DBT/Choicepoint, Inc., the data-base company which provided the
state with a over-inclusive list of individuals who might be convicted
felons, registered in more than one county or even deceased. The
compilation of the list was part of an anti-fraud measure enacted
by the Florida legislature in the wake of Miami's 1997 mayoral election,
in which at least one dead voter and a number of felons cast ballots.
The Commission heard from DBT that approximately 3,000 to 4,000
non-felons (out of approximately 174,000 names) were mistakenly
listed on this so-called "purge" list provided to the state. The
list identified 74,900 potentially dead voters, 57,770 potential
felons, and 40,472 potential duplicate registrations. Under Florida
law, the supervisors of elections were required to verify the ineligible-voter
list by contacting the supposedly ineligible voters. Some supervisors
who were concerned about the unreliability of the list did not use
it to remove a single voter, but the majority report made no effort
to determine how many of the 67 supervisors of elections did or
did use the list. According to recent studies, the total number
of wrongly-purged felons was 1,104, including 996 convicted of crimes
in other states and 108 who were not felons. This number contradicts
the Commission's claim that "countless" voters were wrongly disenfranchised
because of inaccuracies in the list.
Most notably, the Commission did not hear from a single witness
who was prevented from voting as a result of being erroneously identified
as a felon. One witness did testify that he was erroneously
removed from the voter list because he had been mistaken for another
individual on the felon list whose name and birth date were practically
identical to his. However, he was able to convince precinct officials
that there had been a clerical error, and he was allowed to vote.
In pursuing its attack on the purge list, the Commission completely
ignored the bigger story: Approximately 5,600 felons voted illegally
in Florida on November 7, approximately 68 percent of whom were
registered Democrats. On June 8, General Counsel Hailes was asked
why the report failed to address the issue of ineligible voters
who cast ballots on election day. His response was: "That's not
part of the scope of our report."
Based on extensive research, the Miami Herald discovered
that, "[a]mong the felons who cast presidential ballots, there were
"62 robbers, 56 drug dealers, 45 killers, 16 rapists, and 7 kidnappers.
At least two who voted were pictured on the state's on-line registry
of sexual offenders." According to the Herald, the biggest problem
with the felon list was not that it wrongly prevented eligible voters
from voting, but rather that it ended up allowing ineligible voters
to cast a ballot:
Some…claim that many legitimate voters "of all ethnic and racial
groups, but particularly blacks" were illegally swept from the rolls
through the state's efforts to ban felons from voting. There is
no evidence of that. Instead, the evidence points to just the opposite,
that election officials were mostly permissive, not obstructionist,
when unregistered voters presented themselves. (Miami Herald
Report, p. 105)
The Palm Beach Post conducted its own extensive research
into the problems with the flawed exceptions list. The Post's
findings, which corroborate the major conclusions of the Herald's
investigation, include the following:
-
Controversy aside, most of the people the state prevented from
voting probably were felons.
-
Of the 19,398 voters removed from the rolls, more than 14,600
matched a felon by name, birth date, race and gender.
-
More than 6,500 were convicted in counties other than where they
voted, suggesting they would not have been found by local officials
without the DBT list.
-
Many of these felons were convicted years ago, and they had no
idea that they did not have their civil rights [to vote].
-
Many had been voting and unwittingly breaking the law for years.
(Palm Beach Post, "Felon Purge Sacrificed
Innocent Voters," May 27, 2001)
With respect to the majority report's claim that the DBT list had
a "disparate impact" on minority voters, there is no way to determine
how many of those listed, either accurately or in error, were minorities.
As DBT testified, the list was not coded by race or ethnicity. Any
assumption about the race of voters improperly Included on the "purge"
list is purely speculative.
The majority report uses Miami-Dade as a "vivid example" of the
problems with the list, but there is no clear evidence of how many
voters in Miami-Dade were wrongly prevented from voting because
of the list. The report concludes that "almost 1 out of 7 names"
on this [Miami-Dade] were there in error, and risked being disenfranchised
[emphasis added]." But this is pure speculation. The report later
adds that, "[b]ased on the experience in Miami-Dade County, "it
appears [emphasis added] as if African-Americans are more likely
than whites and Hispanics to be incorrectly placed on the convicted
felons list."
The problem with this analysis is that, in order to make the "disparate
impact" claim, the report centers on the discrepancy between the
population and the percentage of persons of color affected by the
list. But the proper comparison is not with population percentages
but rather with the percentage of convicted felons in the state.
In Florida, blacks make up approximately 11 percent of the population,
44 percent of those on the list, and 49 percent of convicted felons
in Florida. Yet after presenting its spurious analysis of "spoiled
ballots" and the speculation regarding the felon list, the report
sums up by saying "there is a strong basis for concluding that Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 has been violated."
The report's message is that nobody in authority did enough in terms
of data verification. But the Commission itself has failed to verify
key arguments it makes in this report. The letter (submitted per
the affected agency review) from Michael R. Ramage, General Counsel
for the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, provides a lengthy
clarification of the FDLE's role in verifying the felon status of
voters whose names had been forwarded by the local supervisor. (Note
that, according to Mr. Ramage's letter to Mr. Hailes, the FDLE was
allowed to review only three pages of the 200-page report,
despite the prominence the report gives to this controversial issue.)
In his letter to General Counsel Hailes, dated June 6, 2001, Mr.
Ramage maintains that the Commission's findings are "wrong and based
on erroneous assumptions," and places undue emphasis on "anecdotal
examples of problems." His letter later goes on to detail FDLE's
efforts regarding verification of the "exceptions" list:
[I]t is important to note that during the pertinent time frame,
FDLE responded effectively to nearly 5,000 voters whose names matched
those of convicted felon's in Florida's criminal history records.
(It is not unusual for criminals when arrested to use a name, date
of birth, address, social security number, etc., other than their
own.).… A number of those who believed they had been wrongfully
identified as not being able to vote were ultimately found to be
incorrect. They were, in fact, not eligible to vote. Likewise,
a number of those who raised a concern were ultimately found to
be eligible to vote. The process worked to resolve issues. Of
those voters who contacted FDLE to appeal the notice from a local
supervisor of elections that they were ineligible to vote, approximately
50 percent were confirmed to be Florida convicted felons, and 50
percent were determined not to have a conviction in Florida for
a felony.
While the General Counsel on June 8 indicated that some revisions
would be made to acknowledge the "extraordinary efforts" by the
FDLE, no revision has been made in the conclusions, which are still
wrong and based on erroneous assumptions. Certainly, no eligible
voter should be wrongly prevented from doing so, but at the same
time, election officials have a compelling interest in preventing
voter fraud by convicted felons. The Commission majority has failed
to look at all the facts regarding the felon list and, instead of
focusing on what it calls "the reality" of list maintenance, uses
anecdotes to call for an extensive and unwarranted investigation
by the U.S. Department of Justice.
There is also the additional question of voter fraud. On June 8,
the Chair explained that the report did not look at the issue of
voter fraud, since "fraud does not appear to be a major factor in
the Florida election," and that, in any event, this was "beyond
the scope" of the Commission's investigation. Thus, the report single-mindedly
pursues only one kind of vote dilution (allegations that eligible
voters were denied the tight to vote) while completely ignoring
the other (allegations that ineligible voters were allowed to vote).
Only in the report's introduction is there a brief mention of Complaints
of Voter Fraud, "listed along with the Western Florida Time Zone
Controversy and Absentee Military Ballots as "other factors" that
"could have contributed to voter disenfranchisement in Florida."
(In other words, the main concern is with voting irregularities
that could be interpreted as having a disparate impact on Democratic
voters. Factors that one could surmise might have had a disparate
impact on Republican voters are simply shoved aside.) The report
then goes on to explain that, "[w]hile recognizing that the above
factors do raise concerns of voting irregularities, the Commission
did not receive many complaints or evidence during its Tallahassee
and Miami hearings pertaining to how these issues created possible
voter disenfranchisement in Florida."
This explanation is disingenuous and incorrect. First of all, at
the Commission's meeting of December 8, 2000, when the Commission
reached its decision to conduct an investigation of the Florida
election, there was lengthy discussion of the Commission's statutory
responsibility to investigate "any patterns or practice of fraud."
Chair Berry herself explained that "if there are people who engaged
in fraud or violated the laws, we would hand them over for prosecution."
The Chair assured Commissioners that, "[e]very single allegation
should be systematically pursued."
Second, if the Commission "did not receive" evidence regarding fraud,
it is because, contrary to the Chair's assurances in December, it
chose not to seek any testimony on the widely-publicized allegations
of fraud. Given the report's emphasis on the so-called purge list,
this is an egregious omission.
Following the November elections, specific allegations of voter
fraud surfaced in a number of cities and states. For example:
-
A grand jury in St. Louis has been investigating 3,000 suspect
voter registration cards, including some for dead local officials
and even a pet.
-
In Philadelphia, the number of the city's registered voters almost
equals the number of eligible voters who live in the city according
to census estimates.
-
Allegations of vote fraud in Milwaukee prompted an investigation
into reports that out-of-state volunteers from one political party
supplied packages of cigarettes to homeless people in exchange
for their votes.
-
The names of more than 15,000 dead people were found on Georgia's
active voting rolls.
-
In Indiana, as many as one in five voter registrations were found
to be bogus.
In Florida, there were various reports regarding thousands of ballots
cast by ineligible felons and unregistered voters, fraudulent absentee
ballots in nursing homes, and precincts where more ballots were
cast than the number of people who voted. It is unconscionable that
the Commission has made no serious effort to look at these problems.
Part VII: Unwarranted Criticism
of Florida Law Enforcement
Despite clear and direct testimony during the hearings, as well
as additional information submitted by Florida officials after the
hearings, the majority report continues to charge the Florida Highway
Patrol with behavior that was "perceived" by a number of voters
as unusual (and thus somehow "intimidating") on election day. This
is a serious charge.
In fact, only two persons are identified in the majority report
regarding their perception of activities of the Florida Highway
Patrol on election day. One testified about a police checkpoint,
and the other testified that he found it "unusual" to see an empty
police car parked outside of a polling facility. Neither of these
witnesses' testimony indicates how their or others' ability to vote
was impaired by these events.
As the chief of the Florida Highway Patrol, Colonel Charles C. Hall,
testified in Tallahassee, there was one motor vehicle checkpoint,
in Leon County, on election day. That checkpoint was not adequately
authorized and resulted in one complaint. The equipment checkpoint
operation lasted about 90 minutes (between 10:00 a.m. and 11:30
a.m.) and occurred more than two miles away and on a different roadway
from the nearest polling facility. Of the approximately 150 cars
stopped at the checkpoint, a total of 18 citations or notices of
faulty equipment were issued to 16 different individuals, 12 of
whom were white. The citizen who lodged the complaint testified
that she had contacted the NAACP after she returned from voting,
yet refused to meet with the FHP to assist their investigation.
Despite this one, highly publicized incident, there has been no
evidence whatsoever of police intimidation of voters.
Writing in response to the affected agency review, the general counsel
for the State of Florida's Department of Highway Safety and Motor
Vehicles, Enoch J. Whitney, stands by the evidence presented by
Colonel Hall at the hearing:
Colonel Hall's testimony conclusively demonstrates that there was
no intent by members of the Florida Highway Patrol to delay or prohibit
any citizen from voting on Election Day. All pertinent evidence
shows that in fact no one was delayed or prohibited from voting
by virtue of the equipment checkpoint operation.
The Commission majority's willingness to perpetuate a gross misperception
of this issue is a disservice to the public's confidence in America's
electoral and law enforcement systems, and an insult to the dedicated
officers of Florida's law enforcement community.
Part VIII: Procedural Irregularities
on the U.S Commission on Civil Rights
Procedural irregularities have seriously marred the majority
report. In writing the report, the Commission ignored not only the
rules of evidence, but the agency's own procedures for gathering
evidence. By arguing that "every voice must be heard," while in
fact stifling the voice of the political minority on the Commission
itself, it is guilty of gross hypocrisy.
In writing this report, the Commission majority has ignored not
only the rules of evidence, but the agency's own procedures for
gathering evidence. The procedural issues are important to the extent
they relate to the policy and politics driving this report. By pretending
to investigate procedural irregularities while engaging in procedural
irregularities of its own, the Commission majority undermines its
credibility and diminishes the value of its work. By arguing that
"every voice must be heard" while in fact stifling the voice of
others, the Commission is guilty of gross hypocrisy. The majority
report claims the election was marked by "injustice, ineptitude
and inefficiency," yet it has tarred itself with its own feather
in this report.
Republican and Independent Commissioners were never asked if they
would like to call witnesses. Hearings were completely controlled
by the Chair and the General Counsel, and Commissioners did not
even know who the witnesses were to be at one Miami hearing; thus
they could not properly prepare questions.
When the hearings failed to provide any evidence of widespread voter
disfranchisement, the Chair unilaterally approved a last-minute
procurement of the services of an outside "statistician," Professor
Allan Lichtman. Commissioners were never asked to approve this contract,
nor were they contacted regarding any suggestions they might have
for additional or alternate experts. Over the objections of the
two dissenting Commissioners, the Chair now also proposes that Dr.
Lichtman be tasked with producing an analysis of their dissent.
No outside expert has ever before been asked to produce such an
analysis, let alone have that analysis attached to the final report.
1. Failure to follow statutory requirements for fair and objective
proceedings.
Under the Commission's regulations, all proceedings are to be conducted
in a fair and objective manner. During its hearings in Florida,
however, the Commission failed to ensure fair, equal and courteous
treatment of witnesses. The secretary of state was treated in an
insulting manner, and the governor was the only witness during the
proceedings who was denied the opportunity to deliver an opening
statement.
2. Conclusions issued before all of the evidence was received.
The Commission reached its verdict long before it had even completed
its review of the evidence. On March 9, the Chair introduced a "preliminary
assessment" that was not shared with Commissioners beforehand and
that did not provide Florida officials with an opportunity to respond
to the charges against them. These procedures are sadly reminiscent
of Alison in Wonderland's court of the Red Queen: "Verdict first,
trial later!"
3. Denial of "defame and degrade" review.
Section 702.18 of the Code of Federal Regulations requires the Commission
to give parties that might be defamed or degraded by its reports
a chance to respond. The majority report states that "the Commission
followed its procedures by conducting a defame and degrade review."
It fails to state that the Commission's general counsel denied the
governor's request to be given the requisite 30 days, under defame
and degrade, to review the report in its entirety (instead of select
portions) and the requisite 20 days to submit a "timely, verified
response." The general counsel's explanation on June 8 was that
there was "no statement [in the report] that would constitute defame
and degrade." In light of the Chair's statement on June 8 that the
governor, the secretary of state, and other state officials were
"grossly derelict in fulfilling their responsibilities," the general
counsel's decision appears to indicate that the Commission has been
"grossly derelict" in its treatment of those who assist its investigations.
4. Inadequate affected agency review and consideration of affected
agency comments
The report also claims that "[a]ffected agencies were afforded an
opportunity to review applicable portions." The Commission's project
management system normally requires at least 30 days for affected
agency review, yet the governor and other officials were given only
10 days to review the report, and the report was given to the press
before affected parties could respond. In an interview with the
New York Times, the general counsel claimed that anyone wishing
to respond to the Florida report would have 20 days to do so. Few
of the affected agency comments have actually been factored into
the final report.
To compound the seriousness of these procedural improprieties, the
Commission handed out copies of the draft report at the June 8 meeting
and posted the draft on its web site, thereby widely disseminating
a version of the report that included none of the affected agency
comments or any of the corrections and amendments discussed at the
June 8 meeting.
Affected agency review is an essential procedure to ensure fairness
and accuracy of Commission reports. Contrary to the Chair's statement
on June 8, it is not a mere "courtesy" that is granted or denied
at the whim of the Chair or the staff. In this case, the procedure
was mooted by the leak to the press and the public dissemination
of a preliminary, uncorrected draft.
5. No management controls for this agency in disarray:
A 1997 investigation by the GAO found the Commission to be an "agency
in disarray" and cited, in particular, the lack of communication
and effective management controls regarding the Commission's projects.
Pursuant to the GAO investigation, the Commission implemented its
management information system to specify timelines for completion
of the Commission's work product. In the case of the Florida report,
however, no clear or consistent timeline has been maintained for
this project and Commissioners' inquiries to both the Chair and
the staff director have been routinely ignored.
For example, at the March 9 meeting, instead of taking up a status
report on the project (as the agenda announced), Commissioners were
asked to approve, without any advance notice at all, the Chair's
own personal statement of preliminary findings. At the same meeting,
the Chair advised Commissioners that, "in April we expect to have
the draft of the voting rights in Florida, the actual draft, in
front of us." In April, however, Commissioners were given only an
"Outline of the Final Document" and were advised that the draft
report would be considered at the June 8 meeting. At no time were
Commissioners advised they would be given only three days to read
the report prior to the June 8 vote. The Chair dismissed any criticism
in this regard, asserting that Commissioners should have known "that
we would receive it when we did receive it."
Instead of taking responsibility for the question of agency leaks,
the Chair now proposes to legitimize the premature disclosure of
Commission reports, by suggesting a change in policy for Commission
reports. Specifically, the Chair proposes, for future reports, "that
we release the draft of the report publicly as soon as it's available
without waiting [until] even when we give it to the Commissioners."
Such a procedure would be totally unacceptable and an unconscionable
breach of the Commission's statutory obligations.
6. Selection of Allan Lichtman as the Commission's Sole Statistical
Analyst for the Florida Report
This claim is based entirely on a statistical analysis conducted
for the commission by Professor Allan Lichtman of American University.
In the pages below, we will show that a rigorous statistical analysis
of the available data clearly and convincingly contradicts Dr. Lictman's
alleged findings. Dr. Lichtman's conclusions are so unsupportable,
however, that it is first worth pausing to discuss the Commission's
selection of him as its sole statistical analyst to carry out such
crucial work.
The choice of Dr. Lichtman to carry out this work is problematic
and revealing of the Commission majority's biases. When he appeared
at the June 8, 2001, meeting of the commission to present his findings,
he took pains to present himself as a scholar above party, who had
"worked for Democratic interests... and for Republican interests."
Unfortunately, he failed to mention a highly pertinent fact that
appears on the American University website--that he worked as a
"consultant to Vice-President Albert Gore, Jr."
Furthermore, although Dr. Lichtman claimed (at the June 8 Commission
meeting) that he began his study of possible racial bias in the
Florida election with an open--indeed, even "skeptical"--mind, in
fact, evidence suggests the contrary. As early as January 11, at
the very beginning of his investigation and prior to conducting
any detailed statistical analysis of his own, Dr. Lichtman stated
publicly that he was already convinced, on the basis of what he
had read in the New York Times, that in Florida "minorities
perhaps can go to the polls unimpeded, but their votes are less
likely to count because of the disparate technology than are the
votes of whites." He concluded: "In my view, that is a classic violation
of the Voting Rights Act." Long before he examined any of the statistics,
Dr. Lichtman had already concluded that Florida had disfranchised
minority voters and violated the Voting Rights Act.
A social scientist with strong partisan leanings might conceivably
still conduct an even-handed, impartial analysis of a body of data.
Unfortunately, that is not the case in the present instance.
Conclusion
America's journey on the road to racial and ethnic equality is far
from over. We have traveled far, and still have far to go. But
the Commission's majority report positively sets us back. By crying
"disfranchisement" where there was confusion, bureaucratic mistakes,
and voter error, the report encourages public indifference. Real
civil rights problems stir the moral conscience of Americans; inflated
rhetoric depicting crimes for which there is no evidence undermines
public confidence in civil rights advocates and the causes to which
they devote themselves.
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was once the moral conscience
of the nation. Under the direction of the Chair, Mary Frances Berry,
it has become an agency dedicated to furthering a partisan agenda.
After six months of desperately searching for widespread disfranchisement
in Florida, the Commission produced a 200-page report based on faulty
analysis and echoing vague and unsubstantiated claims.
The shoddy quality of the work, its stolen-election message, and
its picture of black citizens as helpless victims in the American
political process is neither in the public interest nor in the interest
of black and other minority citizens. Do we really want black
Americans to believe there is no reason to get to the polls; elections
are always stolen; they remain disfranchised? There is important
work the Commission can do. But not if its scholarly and procedural
standards are as low as those in this Florida report.
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