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bombings of the last two weeks have raised a number of analogies with
wars of the past nearly all of them false and, in fact, dangerous.
Afghanistan
We are hectored ad nauseam about the horror of a dreaded landlocked
and rugged Afghanistan, the quagmire that has swallowed Alexander the
Great, the 19th-century British colonialists, and Soviet Communists alike.
Yet Alexander, in fact, did overrun Afghanistan and with fewer
than 30,000 troops, despite factional rivalry in his army and his self-destructive
murders of his own top lieutenants. Britain withdrew because of the errors
of arrogance, logistics, and tactical incompetence, the Soviets largely
on account of the gift of billions of U.S. aid and weapons to their enemies,
and their own foolhardy and evil attempt to wipe out Islam. The Russian
army, in the last decade of Communism, was not the force that stopped
Hitler in the far more difficult street-fighting at Stalingrad.
Also unlike the prior invaders, Americans are prepared to strike with
no illusions about the ease of their task and with no wish for conquest,
lucre, or obeisance. We are not arrogant or naive as past armies were;
and we have no interest in occupying the country or in turning the people
from medieval Islam to the benefits of popular American culture. Our mission
is simply to destroy the Taliban; the tragic chaos that follows will be
no worse than what exists now. The destruction of the Taliban can be accomplished
through concerted air attacks against their conventional military installations
and terrorist camps, as counterinsurgency teams and commandos target their
leadership, and mobile ground forces, perhaps with indigenous forces,
advance on the major cities.
Vietnam
The chimaeras of Vietnam are often raised. Few conflicts are more misunderstood.
Then we were fighting a distant war against foes supplied on their borders
by our two chief nuclear rivals, China and the Soviets. Our target list
against the North was small and it often shrank. We defined victory as
creating a democratic, enlightened culture where none had existed before.
The draft ensured that our elite youth in universities would take to the
streets. Even with all that, our military forces fought superbly. At the
so-called bloodbath at Hue, the U.S. Marines lost 147, killed over 5,000
of the enemy, and freed the city, in the worst street-fighting since the
Korean War. The siege of Khe Sahn was an enemy failure and resulted in
50 communist dead for each American lost. In the horrific Tet offensive,
a surprised American military inflicted 40, 000 fatalities upon the attackers
while losing fewer than 2,000.
Vietnam itself was a defeat, but this was largely due to politics. Yet
the political landscape of contemporary America is hardly comparable.
Our home soil has now been attacked; we have lost nearly as many civilians
as we did soldiers at Shiloh and Pearl Harbor combined. Nor is the country
likely to see an American war as the nexus of racial, sexual, and cultural
unrest. Instead, most Americans are slowly accepting the grim reality
that our enemies, far from apologizing for the slaughter, wish to kill
even thousands more of us at work, in our streets, and in our beds.
Israel
Other choruses have chanted, "Israel could not wipe out terrorism,
so how could we?'" Again, the analogy is false and should
be apparent immediately in the grim reality of the post-September 11 world:
It is safer to fly on El Al than on United, and the towers of Tel Aviv
are apparently more secure than those in lower Manhattan. Israel's collective
losses from the much-feared Palestinian uprising are far less than those
inflicted against the terrorists. Indeed, Middle Eastern fundamentalists
have now killed more Americans than all the Israelis lost to terrorism
in the last three decades, and perhaps from the inception of the Jewish
state. But far more important, in the past a tiny Israel has been isolated
with no financial, cultural, or economic assistance in its struggle
from Europe or others in the eastern Mediterranean, states that at least
could have ostracized terrorist hosts and supporters. In contrast, we
have the power to shutdown or, better yet, physically destroy
banks, communications, and corporations that facilitate, encourage, or
tolerate the terrorism of our enemies.
Unending
War
A decade of war is often promised. But rarely in history do
we see such lengthy fighting. The European civil conflicts of the Seven
(1756-1763), Thirty (1618-1648), or Hundred Years' Wars (1337-1453) were
marked by cyclical rather than continual battles; even the nightmares
of the Civil War, and the two world wars of the past century, lasted fewer
than five years. The tragic fact is that since classical times, war in
Western society is truly destructive when it pits Western power against
Western power. Caesar and Pompey and their followers killed more Romans
than did Hannibal; more Greeks were killed in single intramural battles
in the Peloponnesian War than in all the fighting against Persians at
Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea combined. Alexander lost fewer
than a 1,000 soldiers in three pitched battles against the Persians while
destroying an empire of 70 million. His greatest worry was not Afghani
tribesmen or Bactrian cavalry but tough Greek mercenaries.
Zealots
The much-feared Cetshwayo and his dreaded Zulu militarist state of some
200,000 were annihilated in less than a year at a cost of fewer than 2,000
British dead. The Mahdists, ensconced at Khartoum and swollen with British
blood, promised a jihad to end all jihads; instead they were annihilated
by Kitchener. Hernan Cortés, despite seeing the beating hearts
of his men ripped out at Tenochtitlan, wrecked an enraged empire of millions
with fewer than 2,500 Castilians. We should not always be proud of these
bloody accomplishments, but in military terms they remind us that, for
good or evil, the chief fear of a Western army is one like itself. Yet,
that horrific scenario seems unlikely in the present conflict. Real powers
that have elements of Westernized discipline, advanced weapons, logistics,
and training Russia, India, and China are more likely to
aid or remain neutral than to oppose us. If anything, the United States
may find itself closer to such strong states as it distances itself from
weak and "moderate" Arab regimes.
Microbes,
Nerve Gas, and Atoms
We are told that we must worry constantly about biological or nuclear
weapons. Such caution is prudent and will remain wise advice for the next
decade. Microbes and atoms are formidable threats, which, unlike conventional
arms, leave lethal, material aftershocks that ripple outward from their
points of explosion. Yet Americans must pause to digest fully the magnitude
of their own catastrophe of September 11 over 6,000 dead in our
cities, far more than what terrorists' nerve gas killed in Japan, and
more than the toll of Saddam's reported use of biological agents before
and after the Gulf War. Physicists could do us a great favor by calculating
the combined destructive power of the thousands of gallons of metal and
fuel striking the towers of the World Trade Center at high speed. Surely
the magnitude of that conflagration was equivalent to two or three kilotons
of TNT in other words comparable to the ruin left by a small, primitive
nuclear device of the type perhaps now in terrorists' hands. We should
be vigilant and angry but realize that we have endured a
horrible attack, and are still more powerful, not enfeebled, for our ordeal.
And because we know that our enemies have access to biological weapons
and perhaps nuclear bombs, and indeed wish to kill our children, it should
make our resolve stronger, not weaker.
What
Is Ahead?
An annus terribilis is upon us the most unpredictable year
since 1941, ushering in a frightening contest that we did not seek, but
now must enter and win. Yet the study of military history should offer
us more reassurance than dejection. This is the first occasion since World
War II in which we can and should use the entire arsenal of our defense.
The strategies of halting before Baghdad and lecturing Saddam Hussein
have been shown bankrupt; cruise missiles shall bring us no comfort, much
less deterrence. The world has been turned upside down; with that upheaval,
the voices of proportionality, accommodation, and consultation are discredited
and now relegated to increasingly rare appearances on late-night television.
Good and kind men like Sandy Berger, William Cohen, and Warren Christopher
have been shown not prudent as they promised, but in fact reckless through
their past inaction.
The terrorists, in their eagerness for blood, have blundered terribly,
both in their barbarity and in their timing. It is hard to arouse Americans,
especially in the last two decades of their greatest wealth, leisure,
and license. Yet they have accomplished a radical reversal in temperament
and ideology in mere days by killing innocents and striking both at the
heart of American power and prestige and at the very heartstrings of innate
American kindness. There is a new administration different in character
from the past that in turn now governs a changed citizenry. The next bloody
months will not be the easy police actions of Grenada and Panama. Perhaps
they will require more sacrifice than the fighting in the Balkans and
the Gulf War, whose combined American dead was comparable to a bloody
week on our freeways. But our war to come will not be Vietnam either.
And this time, if we choose to, we shall prevail. The terrorists and their
sympathetic hosts have no idea what they have unleashed.
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