 ark
Bowden, a writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer, is author of
Black
Hawk Down, recently released as a motion picture. His latest
book is Killing
Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw, about the
Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar.
Kathryn
Jean Lopez: To what extent do official policies on rules
of engagement in Washington trickle down to affect the actual fighting
on the ground once the firing starts?
Mark
Bowden: I can only comment with any knowledge about what
happened in Mogadishu on October 3-4, 1993. Rules of engagement
defined the conduct of American soldiers until they came under attack,
which was pretty much the minute they hit the ground. They had been
instructed to shoot only at Somalis who discharged weapons at them.
Once they came under fire, common sense took over.
Lopez:
How are helicopter-supported missions different in Afghanistan from
Somalia?
Bowden:
The biggest difference I can see is that the soldiers in Afghanistan
have a much broader range of air support options than those in Mogadishu.
Task Force Ranger, for instance, was denied the use of an AC-130
gunship, which is the most formidable weapon for close air support
in the American arsenal, and one that many Mogadishu vets felt would
have quickly dispatched of the threat on October 3, 1993.
Lopez:
Why were Somalis hostile to American soldiers in the major cities
in a way we have not yet seen from the Afghans?
Bowden:
The only place we know large numbers of Somalis were hostile to
U.S. soldiers was in the Aidid-controlled areas of central and southern
Mogadishu. The U.N. had declared Aidid an outlaw in June, 1993,
and various U.N./U.S. efforts to target him and his top lieutenants
had resulted in substantial Somali casualties. One raid in particular,
the July 12th attack on the "Abdi House," in which Cobra
helicopters stood off from the target and pumped TOW missiles into
it, killed off many of the elders and leaders of the Habr Gidr clan,
including moderates opposed to Aidid's hostile posture toward the
international effort. That attack in particular had the effect of
uniting the entire clan against the U.N. effort, and making all
American forces targets. Here's another way of looking at it: Suppose
helicopter forces from a foreign country began swooping into Dallas
on a regular basis, apprehending local leaders and killing numbers
of Texans on each raid. How long do you think it would be before
every Texan with a weapon would be out in the streets to greet the
next raiding party?
In Afghanistan,
U.S. troops were used to organize and facilitate a popular uprising
against a religious totalitarian regime that evidently had little
popularity with the masses. It's a completely different circumstance.
Lopez:
Are there universal messages from the so-called Muslim streets we
can gleam from Black Hawk Down?
Bowden:
Yes. The Abdi House attack highlights the need for good intelligence.
We oversimplified the politics in Mogadishu. There were forces within
Aidid's own clan who were opposed to his belligerence. If they had
been nurtured, it's quite possible that they would have forced him
to back down. Even if they failed in that effort, it's doubtful
that resistance to Task Force Ranger's missions would have been
as extensive. And one cannot overemphasize the importance (both
tactically and morally) of avoiding "collateral damage."
Often the people on the receiving end of American military action
are ill-educated and ill-informed about its intentions. One dead,
innocent family member, friend, or countryman is enough to turn
scores of otherwise disinterested bystanders into vigorous opponents.
Lopez:
In what ways were the lessons of Somalia incorporated into the tactics
and strategy of the present war? Are there lessons that still need
to be heeded?
Bowden:
The special-forces mission to Somalia in the summer of 1993 was
a classically tentative half measure. Task Force Ranger was denied
use of a key weapons system, and the political support for their
mission was timid and ill-formed. So when the force encountered
serious resistance, they lacked the means to deal with it swiftly
and effectively, and the nation's political leadership immediately
abandoned the mission — advertising the reluctance of U.S.
forces to accept even minimal casualties (remember, roughly 50 Somalis
died for every American soldier killed on October 3rd). The special
forces in Afghanistan were given the support of every weapon in
the U.S. arsenal, and have the resolute, informed backing of the
American people and its leadership. On a tactical level, I'm sure
there are many small but critically important lessons our soldiers
learned from Mogadishu. For one thing, I'll bet every Delta Force
operator going into battle was wearing a Kevlar helmet, as opposed
to the little plastic hockey helmets they were wearing on October
3, 1993.
Lopez:
Has anything about the depth of the special-forces involvement in
Afghanistan surprised you?
Bowden:
To me, the most surprising thing was its amazing success. The evident
effectiveness of U.S. air power speaks for itself, although the
need to further reduce accidents and "collateral damage"
cannot be overstated. The special-forces soldiers who quietly slipped
into that country and began living alongside tribal leaders early
in the effort were able to persuade, assist, organize, and advise
a crushing popular uprising. They succeeded in large part because
of the evident unpopularity of the Taliban, but also because their
efforts were subtle, intelligent, and sensitive to local concerns.
This is some kind of classic military operation.
Lopez:
Should we have any hesitation in going back into Somalia should
the war on terror lead us there?
Bowden:
None. There is no military force in Somalia that ought to pose a
threat to American forces. The battle of October 3 resulted because
a small, lightly armed U.S. force was trying to execute a dangerous
snatch-and-grab in a heavily armed, hostile neighborhood. The idea
there was to apprehend two men without hurting anybody. Even if
an identical mission were performed today in Mogadishu, it is doubtful
American forces would be so vulnerable — there would be an
AC-130 overhead, for one thing. The more important difference is
political. Somalis are Islamist, but the vast majority are not extremists
and are no more sympathetic to the "Arabs" of al Qaeda
than were the Afghans. The Somali warlords, in particular, are natural
enemies of the religious extremists, and, if the situation was handled
correctly, would likely be our allies.
Lopez:
Has the face of warfare permanently changed with our operations
in Afghanistan?
Bowden:
Yes and no. The U.S. has demonstrated once again its unprecedented
air power. There is now little question that the U.S. military can
dismantle, disorient, demoralize, and nearly destroy an opposing
force from the air alone, and from an altitude that renders our
planes invulnerable. Our special-forces capability — particularly
the ability to exploit local differences on the ground with minimal
use of U.S. forces — suggests a broad strategy that can be
applied in many situations. But the nature of warfare is such that
whenever an overwhelmingly effective advantage, weapon, or strategy
is attained, enemies will devise ways to counter and defeat it.
We can expect to be challenged again in ways that frustrate us.
Lopez:
What was it that made you originally start work on Black Hawk
Down?
Bowden:
I was horrified, angered, and confused by the images of dead American
soldiers being dragged through the streets by people whom we, as
a nation, were supposedly trying to help. The Philadelphia Inquirer
backed my pursuit of answers.
Lopez:
Did you write the screenplay to the new movie? Is the final product
what you envisioned?
Bowden:
Ken Nolan wrote the screenplay. I did the original adaptation (my
first attempt at a screenplay), which had an influence on Ken and
Ridley, and a few of my scenes and lines are actually in the movie,
but the script is overwhelmingly Ken's work. The final script is
much better than mine was, and the movie a whole lot better than
I expected. It is also strikingly faithful to the book in both content
and tone. I think it is one of Ridley Scott's best movies, and was
a big Ridley Scott fan already.
Lopez:
How did Ridley Scott become interested in your book?
Bowden:
I've heard him say it's because he found it to be a powerful, important
story. Beyond that, you'd have to ask him.
Lopez:
How much cooperation did you get from the military — in working
on the book and movie?
Bowden:
The Department of Defense loaned us helicopters, Black Hawks and
Little Birds, Rangers, pilots, crews, etc. The military "stunts"
in the movies are performed by real soldiers, in some cases by men
who actually fought in the Battle of Mogadishu. Without their help,
the movie would probably be called Huey Down, and would have
lacked its impressive authenticity. We are all grateful for their
help.
Lopez:
How does the process of screenplay writing differ from bookwriting?
Would you want to do it again?
Bowden:
For me, a nonfiction book is an opportunity to tell a story definitively,
something that ideally is both serious history and literature. Books
convey more information than films, and enable the expression of
ideas of far greater complexity, subtlety, and exactitude. Film
is a more accessible narrative form, and reaches a much wider audience.
What it lacks in complexity and length, it makes up for with the
powerful immediacy of sound and image. Writing for film is more
impressionistic. You have to focus much more tightly on a story
line, select a few central characters, select or construct scenes
that always move the story forward. I enjoyed working on Black
Hawk Down, and learned a great deal. I am now adapting my book
Killing Pablo for screen, and look forward to doing more
screenwriting, although books will always be my primary career.
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