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But, first, the story so far.
Every six months or so France or Germany — or in the latest case, both — announce some policy hostile to the U.S. either explicitly or implicitly-or in the latest case, both — and this elicits a vast torrent of indignant abuse from Americans. Donald Rumsfeld dismisses it as the vaporings of "Old Europe;" op-ed pages denounce "the Europeans" as anti-Semites, oil-hungry appeasers, and elderly socialists; the blogosphere seconds these attacks, adding that they are also "cheese-eating surrender monkeys" or some such; and White House leaks suggest that the president has finally had it up to keister with these unreliable allies. After which — nothing happens. In particular, the U.S. State Department continues its 50-year-old policy of encouraging all European nations, large and small, to integrate economically and politically into a European Union structure that is dominated by France and Germany and inspired by an anti-American vision of creating a rival European superpower to check U.S. hegemony. Worse than that, in order to soothe European feelings hurt by the White House leaks, the president is persuaded to give a strong endorsement of European "integration" on his next speech in Paris, Berlin, Rome, or London. After which France or Germany — or both — repeats the offense. And the process begins again. Last week saw an especially dramatic round of this harlequinade. France and Germany made three joint announcements in quick succession. First, they called for the European Union to have two presidents in a plan that looked likely to benefit the larger EU members over the smaller. Second, they announced a plan for joint Franco-German citizenship with hints that a full Franco-German federal union might follow. And, third, they jointly declared that they were opposed to any U.S. military liberation of Iraq except under highly unlikely conditions (the French) or under any conditions at all (the Germans.) Taken together these moves look like a power grab. A permanent Franco-German bloc — with a total population over 140 million people — is telling the rest of Europe that it intends to dominate the EU indefinitely. And it wants to make this a fait accompli now. This new Leviathan is in a hurry because its actual voting power in an enlarged EU will be quite modest — only 58 votes out of a total of 321 in the most powerful collective EU institution, namely the Council of Ministers. If it is to establish its legitimacy as the central "motor" of European integration, it needs to generate momentum by winning over a significant number of smaller EU members to its essentially anti-American vision of "Europe." It has chosen to do so by exploiting the popular surge of anti-American feeling across the continent over Iraq. And its first step has been preempt the so-called Common European Foreign Policy by openly opposing U.S. intervention in advance of any collective discussions on a common line and despite the fact that other major European nations support U.S. policy. If these tactics succeed, as they well might, then the EU will be headed towards becoming a rival superpower with an anti-American agenda. For the first time in EU politics, however, the Franco-German steamroller has been seriously challenged and perhaps halted. Thursday morning eight European leaders — the heads of government of Britain, Italy, Spain, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Portugal, and the Czech Republic-issued a statement of support for the U.S. over Iraq and, more broadly, for the role of America as the leading power in the Atlantic alliance. The next few months are likely to see a long-drawn-out battle between these two alliances for control of the expanding EU. And the victory of the Franco-Germany entity cannot be ruled out — if only because it will have the support of the Brussels bureaucracy, the European social democratic Left, and those nations such as Sweden that want the EU to be a "counterweight" to American power in world politics. What should the U.S. do? Nothing is ceasing to be a sensible option. State Department inertia — i.e. European "integration" at all costs-would foster the rise of a power hostile to American values and purposes. Modest steps in the right direction would be a useful start. Washington might, for instance, encourage pro-American EU members, including new members such as Poland, to block the implementation of those forms of integration, such as a common foreign policy or the European rapid reaction force, that are damaging to U.S. interests and to alliance cohesion. France, Germany and the Brussels bureaucracy fear just such a change in U.S. policy — which is why they regularly petition the White House to endorse integration on his trips to Europe. Alas, these "central powers" could probably frustrate any such move. They can offer new members in central and eastern Europe powerful incentives for cooperation, such as subsidies and market access, that Washington cannot match as long as it backs the EU status quo. To be sure, the check-in the form of a higher regulatory burden and loss of economic sovereignty-would be high. But it would not be presented until much later. By then Washington would have lost a series of battles — and might be facing an EU gradually coalescing around the Franco-German bloc and an anti-American agenda. If this is to be permanently avoided, there must be changes in the structure of a uniting Europe as well as in the opinions of temporary political leaders. So something very dramatic is required — something that drowns the EU in an ocean of Atlanticism. Try this thought-experiment. Suppose, for instance, that at their meeting on Friday, Mr. Bush were to seek to persuade British Prime Minister Tony Blair to lead the Atlanticist cause in Europe rather than the European cause in Britain — not just on Iraq but on the whole transatlantic relationship. He might then take the PM away from their advisers for a quiet walk around the garden and say something on the following lines:
Or words to that effect. I may not have caught the president's tone of voice precisely in the above paragraphs. What of the substance? We can imagine Mr. Blair being both tempted by — and fearful of — such an ambitious reversal of policy. And, to be sure, it might not work — the Franco-German entity has a strong hand. But it would surely be more hopeful than our present approach of helping our rivals to build an anti-American fortress and then complaining that they keep firing arrows at us from its battlements. And after the last week Colin Powell may even favor it. — This was first published by UPI. It is reprinted with permission. |
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week in Europe there was a dramatic development in the transatlantic relations
— greatly helping President Bush on Iraq and potentially transforming
the Atlantic alliance into a stable dominant world power under American
leadership. 
