 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||
|
Many years later I visited the U.N. and discovered that Simple's description was not wholly false — though he had omitted the crucial detail that the crooks and lowlifes all had diplomatic immunity. Of the "world opinion" that had given the bar its name, however, there was no sign. What substituted for it was diplomatic horse-trading of a very old-fashioned and un-idealistic kind. That should not surprise anyone. World opinion is a misnomer. The world cannot have an opinion because it is not single cultural or political entity but the combination of different peoples and different cultures. Each nation has its own culture and political identity — and though composed of many individuals, may therefore be loosely said to have its own opinion. And large cultural groupings of nations — the Islamic world, the West, Confucian Asia — will tend view the world through a particular set of cultural spectacles and thus to share a broad general outlook. But that is about as far as collective "opinion" can go. What is miscalled "world opinion" is all these different opinions added together. For it is worth, these different attitudes can be seen in the remarkable findings of the Pew Global Attitudes Project, conducted in two parts in May 2003 and March 2004, that surveyed opinion in 44 countries and the Palestinian Authority. Even interpreted with a proper skepticism, they contain a great deal of important, surprising and sometimes information. For instance: 1. Muslim countries differ from almost all others in doubting that the state of Israel can coexist with "the rights and needs of the Palestinians." 2. Most nations, both those that supported and those that opposed the Iraq war, think that the United Nations has fallen in importance. 3. Large majorities in the Muslim world think that U.S.-style democracy could work well in their own countries. 4. And about four-fifths of Americans, Brits, Frenchmen and others think that their nations should admit fewer immigrants. Pew's conclusions were immediately highlighted in the media — or at least some of them were. Those that did not fit neatly into the politically correct mindset of political elites — for instance, point #4 above — were relegated to footnotes and inside pages when they were mentioned at all, while those findings that described a worldwide rise in anti-Americanism were reported without important qualifications and with something like glee. Americans worried about "what do they think of us" are likely to swallow them uncritically. Yet this anti-Americanism, though real enough, is not spread evenly throughout the world. It is most general and passionate in Muslim countries — only one percent of Jordanians are friendly towards the U.S. — and it is spreading to countries with large Muslim minorities such as Nigeria. It is now the majority opinion — though barely — in the nations of Western Europe such as France and Germany. And it is still growing there. But it remains the view of the minority, albeit sometimes a large minority, in the English-speaking world. America is viewed positively in Britain (70 percent), Canada (63 percent — and higher if French-speaking Quebec is excluded), and in Australia (60 percent.) And this divergence can be seen on issue after issue — English-speaking countries, for instance, all agree by large majorities that the Coalition sought to avoid civilian casualties in Iraq; most continental European nations are more doubtful. Significantly, however, only one commentator noticed it, namely Iain Murray of the Competitive Enterprise Institute writing for United Press International. He went on to point out that these diverging opinions might be explained by a deeper civilizational divide: "This is perhaps the clearest indication that the world is divided between what some are terming the "Anglosphere" . . . and a group of failed empires — France, Germany, Russia, Islam — that resent American military and economic dominance." In other words, anti-Americanism is not simply the indignant reaction of other countries to George W. Bush's supposed "unilateralism" as many in America's own political elites would dearly like to believe. It is an expression of more fundamental political rivalry between different civilizations — Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," indeed, but with the twist that "Europe" and "the Anglosphere" are ceasing to be merely regions within the West and becoming rival blocs. This has profound implications for geopolitics. With the Muslim world sunk in hostility to the U.S. and Western Europe close to declaring its neutrality, Washington is in a dilemma. Undoubtedly, its first reaction will be to seek to change opinion in Muslim countries and to reestablish a closer alliance with "Europe." U.S. liberal opinion, citing Pew, is already arguing that "multilateralism" is way to achieve these goals. But if the present divisions are rooted in deeper cultural differences — such as the English-speaking world's greater commitment to economic and political liberty — then the U.S. may find itself increasingly forced to rely its Anglosphere allies. It is curious and irritating, therefore, that the Pew survey does not include the largest English-speaking country in the world, namely India. (Yes, I know that English is one of several languages spoken in India, yet with something like 300 million English speakers, India clearly has at least one foot in the Anglosphere.) And even as France and Germany are moving away from a close relationship with the U.S., India is establishing a new strategic alliance with Washington. As my colleagues in UPI, Martin Walker and Derk Kinnane-Roelofsma, have revealed in the last few weeks, Indian officials have been meeting with senior Pentagon figures to discuss the establishment of an "Asian Nato" that might eventually expand to include Singapore, Australia, and Japan. India's deputy prime minister, Lal Krishna Advani, was recently in Washington where he met virtually every senior Administration figure to carry these discussions further. And even if the large prize of an "Asian Nato" is some way off, it is plain that a de facto U.S.-India strategic partnership already exists. That partnership will be carried on in the English language. And if the Aussies or Singapore join in due course, they speak the lingo too. In today's post-Cold War world, marked as it is by new divisions and new alliances, the U.S. is linked to its main allies in both Europe and Asia by cultural ties that underpin a common strategic interest. A new, and unexpected, world order is taking shape — and world opinion will just have to adapt to it. — John O'Sullivan is editor-at-large of National Review. This is adapted from a column that appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times. |
|
|
|
|||||||||||||||||
<% dim printurl
printurl = Request.ServerVariables("URL")%>
n
the early halcyon days of the United Nations, politicians used to make
frequent and respectful references to a mysterious place called "the
bar of world opinion." Peter Simple, the London Daily Telegraph's
resident satirist, used to depict it as a cheap dive on the lower East
Side of New York where every sort of crook and lowlife gathered to carouse,
fight, and plot his next caper. 
