Gunning for Powell
New York Times behind the secretary of state.

November 29, 2001 8:40 a.m.

ome years ago the BBC's satirical political sitcom, Yes, Prime Minister, was built around a defense-ministry document of the highest secrecy. "It would be disastrous if this were to fall into the hands of the enemy," the Machiavellian bureaucrat, Sir Humphrey, told his boss.

"You mean — the Russians?" asked the prime minister innocently.

"No, No, the treasury!" replied an impatient Sir Humphrey.

Only three months ago, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in the doldrums. He was believed by the media to have lost the respect of the military by pushing a military-reform program that alienated the services by threatening their favorite weapons systems. One webzine even instituted a Rumsfeld deathwatch forecasting his resignation.

Today, in the aftermath of 11th September, Rumsfeld bestrides this petty world of Washington like a colossus.

He is the Bush administration's man in charge of the war now sweeping the Taliban into oblivion. He is generally credited with having championed inside the administration the bold military strategy that has achieved such a rapid and thorough victory. And he has proved an impressive public spokesman for administration strategy during both the early "slow" period of sustained bombing and the recent blitzkrieg.

It was a rout. Something had to be done.

By the Taliban? No, no, by the U.S. State Department!

So a bold counterattack on the Pentagon chief was promptly launched last Sunday by the New York Times Magazine in the form of a long favorable profile of Secretary of State Colin Powell as the man in charge of winning the war.

As a member of the National Security Council and a close adviser to the president, Mr. Powell naturally deserves his share of credit for the success of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan. But the NYT profile, by the distinguished correspondent Bill Keller with extraordinary cooperation from Mr. Powell and a cast of eminent persons that includes former President George Bush, goes well beyond recognizing this contribution. It portrays the secretary of state as the organizing genius behind the strategy — a wise and prudent figure who ensured that the U.S. has the necessary support of a vast multi-national coalition; who prevailed over the hotter heads that wanted to target Iraq (but who also says just enough about the Iraqi threat to be able to claim he supported an attack if that should turn out to be the policy adopted); and who is generally battling other Cabinet members and aides like Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice who supposedly fail to realize that the U.S. needs allies and alliances to gain its international objectives.

Indeed, except for a handful of references to the rout of the Taliban, it reads exactly like an article conceived and largely written when the Northern Alliance was bogged down, the bombing campaign seemed to be failing, the Pentagon was accused of blundering into a "quagmire," and the secretary of state was urging the admission of "moderate" Taliban elements into a broad-based Afghan coalition.

The problem with Colin Powell's emphasis on alliances, of course, is that as the war against terrorism continues, it will be progressively harder to keep allies on board. Some countries which were ready to join in overthrowing the Taliban (an almost uniquely unpopular regime internationally) will be less ready to invade or bomb Iraq. Or Somalia. Or Iran. Or Syria. The political Left in countries like France and Germany will become increasingly critical of the "hyper-power," Uncle Sam, if the U.S. presses on with its campaign. And there will be demands from the U.N. that America subordinate its war aims (and other foreign policies) to the wishes of the "international community." Indeed, the desire in Europe to forge its own superpower identity, with its own defense force and foreign policy, will probably push most of the European allies into a position where they strive to emphasize their differences with the U.S. — and thus to gradually withdraw from the common antiterrorist effort.

If that happens, some U.S. strategists may urge that the U.S. simply push ahead with policies based on our own national interest regardless of whether or not any allies are on board. That might be necessary, but it would not be ideal. Americans like to have allies — it helps them to feel their cause is just and thus to press on with foreign interventions through early difficulties. But if Europe is no longer on board, where will America get dependable allies?

As it happens, one of the less-noticed realities of the modern world is the growth of a multi-ethnic English-speaking world culture. This new informal multinational structure is composed mainly of nations in the old British Commonwealth but it is dominated in almost every respect by the U.S. It brings together nations as different as Jamaica, Canada, India, and Australia through the informal links of language, business investment, immigration, films, books, and democratic legal and political institutions rooted in Magna Carta. It has been given a powerful boost by the information revolution and the internet which, between them, increase the importance of cultural similarity and decrease the value of geographical proximity. And whenever an international crisis occurs, it becomes immediately clear that this so-called Anglosphere shares a common sense of strategic interests.

Americans have noticed that Britain's Tony Blair has been forward in offering military assistance and in pleading the American case against Osama bin Laden. Fewer people have noticed that Australia was actually the first nation to offer the U.S. military help. India was being wooed by the U.S. as an Asian counterweight to China even before September 11. And, of course, Canada is no longer second to Mexico as Mr. Bush's favorite good neighbor. Mr. Powell is almost uniquely qualified in personal terms to put together an enduring international coalition based on the English-speaking world. He is the son of West Indian immigrants. He is the recipient of an honorary British knighthood (bestowed for his role in the Gulf War.) He could articulate the case for the English-speaking world as the basis of a new American world alliance structure as few since Churchill. And if Europe continues to seek its own rival superpower status independent of the U.S., that may suddenly become the diplomatic thing to do.

If, however, Mr. Powell's cautious preference for the conventional wisdom prevails, well, maybe the queen could give Donald Rumsfeld a knighthood.