March
12, 2002 10:00 a.m. Birth
of a Nation
What
East Timor and the U.S. have in common. And what they don’t.
his
year, Congress must reauthorize the welfare reforms that President Clinton
so reluctantly signed in 1996. Disaffected liberals are using this as
an opportunity for a dramatic overhaul of that dramatic overhaul, while
conservatives hope to push for tougher reforms on top of those tough reforms.
President Bush's national victory lap with Sen. Ted Kennedy to celebrate
their collaboration on education reform prompted nervous conservatives
to wonder whether there will be a similar duet extolling bipartisan welfare
reform.
Slightly
larger than the state of Maryland, the island of Timor lies in Southeast
Asia, 400 miles northwest of Australia. The Portuguese first visited the
island in the early 1500s. Beginning in the 18th century, the Dutch competed
with the Portuguese for control of Timor. In the middle of the 19th century,
they divided the island between them. When the Dutch East Indies gained
independence in 1949 as the nation of Indonesia, West Timor was absorbed
into Indonesia, and Portugal retained the eastern part of the island as
its colony.
Portuguese occupation of Timor was characterized by the exploitation of
its people through oppressive taxation, forced labor, and other human-rights
abuses. Portugal's harsh treatment of the Timorese led to widespread resentment,
and eventually, violent rebellion. Although Portugal was able to suppress
the rebellions, resistance continued.
Portugal's fascist government was toppled on April 25, 1974 by the Carnation
Revolution, a relatively nonviolent military coup. The new government
in Lisbon was dedicated to democracy and to the decolonization of Portugal's
overseas territories. Thirsting for freedom, the Timorese leadership began
preparing for liberation. As soon-to-be-president Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao
wrote of those days, from his Jakarta cell as a political prisoner in
1994, "Our only ideology was ukun
rasik an, self-determination." From Gusmao's perspective,
the only choice the Timorese had was between freedom and "total extermination."
When Portugal abandoned its colonies in 1975, East Timor (heretofore known
as "Portuguese Timor") declared independence. But independence
was to be short-lived, as Indonesia annexed East Timor nine days later.
Indonesia did so with the tacit approval of President Gerald Ford and
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. According to secret
documents made public on December 6, 2001 by the National Security
Archive at Georgetown University, former Indonesian President General
Suharto told Ford and Kissinger: "We want your understanding if we
deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East Timor]."
Ford replied, "We will understand and will not press you on the issue."
The next day, December 7, Indonesia invaded. Within six months, there
were 35,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor, and 10,000 more were standing
by in West Timor.
The armed occupation lasted 24 years. In an attempt to bring East Timor
to its knees, Indonesia resorted to forced sterilization (paid by for
the World Bank), mass starvation, rape, murder, torture,
and conventional and napalm bombing directed at isolated villages, most
of which were leveled to the ground. (For details see John G. Taylor,
East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 1999). Between 1975 and mid-1999,
more than 200,000 East Timorese — a third of its pre-invasion population
of 700,000 — had been killed. The overwhelming majority of casualties
were civilians. It is estimated that 100,000 East Timorese were killed
by Indonesian troops just in the first year of the invasion.
United Nations resolutions quickly demanded that Indonesia withdraw all
its forces from East Timor. The resolutions were consistently ignored
by Indonesia, and East Timorese civilians continued to be murdered.
Even so, Timorese resistance stiffened. In spite of the resources expended
by Indonesia to prosecute the war — a cost of up to $1 million (U.S.)/day
— the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor (Falintil)
waged a successful guerrilla campaign, using weapons left over from the
days of Portuguese rule, or stolen from Indonesian troops.
In the eyes of the U.N., however, once those arms fell into the hands
of Falintil, they crossed the line from what the U.N. defines as "licit"
guns, into "illicit" guns.
It is here that the hypocrisy and inconsistency of U.N. policy shines
through. The U.N. equates "licit gun" with "government
gun", and "illicit gun" with "anti-government gun".
As Charles Scheiner, National Coordinator for the (ETAN), correctly pointed
out, however: "The guns used by the Indonesian military to kill
200,000 East Timorese civilians were almost all 'legal' …[but] the
line between legality and illegality is irrelevant to the victims…"
That line in the
sand — distinguishing "licit" from "illicit"
— legitimizes possession of firearms owned by governments and people
approved by those governments, rendering firearm possession by all others
"illegitimate." The implication is that all other weapons will
be used in a criminal fashion; U.N. policy is premised on "a collective
belief that states should only transfer…weapons to other governments,"
not to "non-state actors."
It was "illegitimate" transfers that armed Falintil. Measured
against U.N. standards, the Falintil guerrillas — as "non-State
actors" — were in unlawful possession of the firearms they used
to defend their country and their people when there was no one else to
do so. Likewise illegitimate by United Nation standards was the French
Underground which resisted the Nazis, almost every anti-colonial movement
in the world, and the American Revolution.
According to the U.N. Institute for
Disarmament Research, "the ready availability of weapons makes
it far too easy for substate groups to seek remedy for grievances through
the application of violence." In other words, the U.N. is upset that
it was "far too easy" for Falintil to resist Indonesia's genocide.
Although the United Nations did offer "resolutions" telling
Indonesia to get out of East Timor, those words were meaningless without
the force supplied by Falintil's "illicit" arms.
James F. Dunnigan,
editor of StrategyPage.com,
pointed out why Falintil — a guerrilla army comprised of both men
and women, equipped with only small arms and support from the civilian
populace — prevailed against the might of Indonesia: "The basic
idea behind guerilla war is to keep your force intact, not to fight the
enemy. Guerillas who keep those priorities straight are successful. The
East Timor separatists used a sound strategy, and eventually, the situation
became intolerable for the occupying power…That was how the American
Revolution was fought. Washington didn't have to win, or even fight, battles,
he just had to keep the Continental army intact until the British parliament
got tired of paying for the North American war."
THE
PRICE OF REFERENDUM
In 1999, the Indonesian government, headed by B.
J. Habibie, finally agreed to an East Timorese vote on self-determination:
autonomy under Indonesian rule, or complete independence.
Indonesia, though, had merely changed tactics. The Sydney Herald
(April 29, 1999) detailed Indonesia's "three-pronged attempt"
to sabotage the referendum process: "to first destabilize the situation
in East Timor sufficiently to prevent a referendum; second, to terrorise
the population sufficiently to ensure a pro-integration outcome in case
a referendum takes place; and third, to 'Timorise' the conflict by presenting
to the world a picture of 'warring Timorese factions.'"
So the Indonesian military set about training "militias" in
East Timor. These bore no resemblance to the American model our Founding
Fathers had in mind, our well-armed citizenry which provides homeland
security. Indonesia's militias consisted of armed gangs of thugs, perpetrating
mayhem and rape, and intimidating anyone believed to be in support
of independence. These militias were quite similar to the British and
Hessian standing armies which America's founders so greatly loathed: the
dregs of society, empowered by government to terrorize the population.
While Jakarta tried to cast Falintil as the cause of continued violence
in East Timor, it was evident that the violence was orchestrated by the
Indonesian army and its "militia" thugs.
In April 1999, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas demanded that the
East Timorese give
up their arms as a pre-condition for peace. East Timor resistance
leader Xanana Gusmao refused. He reiterated that Falintil guerrillas were
never involved in acts of terrorism but had always acted in self-defense.
They should therefore be treated as "an army of liberation and not
as a band of bandits." He did, however, agree to a U.N.-brokered
compromise between East Timor and Jakarta: Falintil and the Indonesian
militias were to refrain from carrying weapons except in designated areas
called "cantonments."
While Falintil remained passive in accordance with the truce, the Indonesian
military continued to encourage militia misbehavior, leaving the undefended
East Timorese populace easy
prey. Because independence depended on the referendum, which in turn
depended on the cantonment of Falintil, East Timorese leaders had no choice.
On May 5, 1999, agreements were signed allowing the referendum to go forward,
and on June 11, U.N.
Resolution 1246 formally established the United Nations Mission in
East Timor (UNAMET) for the purpose of organizing and supervising the
referendum process. The "responsibility…to maintain
peace and security in East Timor…in order to ensure that the
popular consultation [the vote] is carried out in a fair and peaceful
way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation" was placed on the
Indonesian government.
The Indonesian army and its militias, with a long record of broken promises
of non-aggression, now had a monopoly of power in East Timor, and their
terror campaign persisted. One knowledgeable Western security expert predicted,
"If independence wins, these autonomy guys will go berserk."
On August 30, 1999, the referendum was held. The turnout was huge, and
the vote was 78.5% for independence. Falintil remained in cantonment,
muzzled.
THE
PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE
Until the eve of the referendum, the Indonesian military and police continued
to promise to curb the violence and to honor a free vote. And as predicted,
once East Timor voted to cut its ties with Indonesia, the Indonesian military
set loose their vengeful militias on a defenseless populace. They hunted
down independence supporters and their families, and torched villages.
According to the New York Times (October 24, 1999), one militiaman
told the reporter that his orders were "to kill anyone on the street
who stood for independence." And, he added, "if they could not
hold onto East Timor, they would leave behind a wasteland devoid of schools,
society, structure or a population."
Still, Falintil remained passive.
The extraordinary restraint exhibited by Falintil during the ensuing chaos
earned high praise from U.N. officials: "Throughout all this emergency
they have not moved. The Indonesians want them to come out and attack
so they can blame the chaos on Falintil." But Xanana Gusmao resisted
the temptation to fight back in justifiable self-defense. In a broadcast
aired shortly after the vote, he said: "I appeal to all the guerrillas…to
maintain your positions
and not to react…."
As the world took notice, international pressure was brought to bear on
Jakarta. Three weeks after the referendum, the first wave of Australian,
New Zealand and British troops — the core of the U.N. peacekeeping
force — arrived in Dili, the capitol of East Timor. Within a week,
3,000 troops had arrived, with a final target of 8,000.
Finally, the balance of power favored security for the people of East
Timor.
FREEDOM,
AT LAST?
Once again, the U.N. ordered Falintil to disarm. Again, they refused.
Recognizing the high cost of confiscating Falintil's weapons, U.N. peacekeepers
backed off; on October 5, 1999, Australian Army Col. Mark Kelly, spokesman
for the international peacekeeping-force Interfet, made a face-saving
statement: "The ongoing discussions we will have with the Falintil
leadership will look towards the eventual disarming. We have got a requirement
to disarm those people under our [U.N.] mandate."
By December, it was decided that Falintil would be transformed into East
Timor's "legally constituted police force." If the U.N. could
not disarm Falintil, then group could be legitimized in U.N. eyes by morphing
it into the East Timor Defence Force.
On Feb. 1, 2001, the Falintil guerrilla force became the world's newest
internationally
recognized army. Its mission was declared by its new commander, Brigadier-General
Taur Matan Ruak: "to guarantee the defence of our homeland, of the
new sovereign state of Timor, fully respecting the new democratic institutions
and the political representatives democratically elected by our people."
Can East Timor remain a viable country upon independence? From a financial
perspective, the answer is "yes", when one considers the hardworking
and self-sacrificing spirit of its people — and the immense offshore
oil deposits. In
1989, a huge share of that oil was given to Australia by Indonesia
"in return for Australia's support for, and formal recognition of,
the 1975-1976 Indonesian annexation of East Timor." By international
law, that offshore oil belongs to the East Timorese, and on July 5, 2001,
a new treaty was signed between East Timor and Australia, giving the soon-to-be
nation a 90 percent share of the gas and oil revenue.
Yet the answer to East Timor's long-term survival might well be "no",
because when U.N. peacekeepers pull out three years after independence,
the balance of power will shift again, and it might not tilt in favor
of the East Timorese populace. There are strong indications that pro-Indonesia
militias are still intent on thwarting
an independent East Timor. Is a military force
of 1,500 active soldiers enough to ensure the safety of its citizens
against hit-and-run terrorism from the huge country next door?
Indonesia's current president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, who assumed office in July 2001, inherited both the
political acumen of her father (Indonesia's founding president Sukarno)
and the gravitas of his name. But even this may not be enough to control
her country's military. Developments in East Timor have served only to
increase the thirst for independence of Indonesia's minority provinces.
She knows that if Indonesia loses control of its resource-rich provinces
where there is strongest separatist sentiment — Aceh
and West Papua (Irian Jaya) — Indonesia's own political
stability will be in jeopardy.
A strong indication that the Indonesian military is beyond civilian control
can be inferred from the current status
of the refugees remaining in West Timor. Numbering up to 100,000 mostly
women and children, these people fled
into West Timor after the violence in 1999. As a gesture of good will,
Megawati should take measures to ensure that the remaining refugees are
repatriated enthusiastically and without incident.
Further clouding the future of the new nation is Regulation
NO 2001/5, "On Firearms, Ammunition Explosives and Other Offensive
Weapons in East Timor", enacted into law on April 23, 2001 by the
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The U.N.'s determination
to disarm civilians finally prevailed.
Herein lies the fundamental difference between America's guarantee for
the perpetuation of its newly-won liberty, and that of the East Timorese.
Incorporated in this document, which reads like an Indonesian army wish-list,
is the codification of U.N. disarmament policy. If the regulation stands,
it will ensure that Timorese civilians are forced to sit and wait for
protection from a thinly spread national defense force.
Commander Taur Matan Ruak, who has already lived through his country's
hell, recognized the great potential for continuing violence. Three months
before the new firearm regulations were enacted, Ruak expressed the belief
that East Timor's "population should defend itself." Knowing
firsthand how the balance of power can so easily and so quickly be changed
by the presence of firearms, will the fledgling government revoke the
U.N.-imposed de facto prohibition of a true citizen militia, once independence
becomes a reality?
Asked soon-to-be-president Xanana Gusmao: "Is it the law that the
small and the weak can be totally subjugated by the strong and the powerful?"
The history of our species tells us that, sadly, the answer is "yes."
But as the East Timorese know, guns sure help to even the odds.
- Dave
Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne Eisen,
of the Independence Institute
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his
year, Congress must reauthorize the welfare reforms that President Clinton
so reluctantly signed in 1996. Disaffected liberals are using this as
an opportunity for a dramatic overhaul of that dramatic overhaul, while
conservatives hope to push for tougher reforms on top of those tough reforms.
President Bush's national victory lap with Sen. Ted Kennedy to celebrate
their collaboration on education reform prompted nervous conservatives
to wonder whether there will be a similar duet extolling bipartisan welfare
reform. 
