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May 20, 2002, a new nation will be born, conceived in the blood
of patriots, and guided to independence by the indifferent midwifery
of the U.N. The new nation is East Timor, and its story of independence
has much in common with America's own struggle — with one ominous
difference.
Slightly larger than the state of Maryland, the island of Timor
lies in Southeast Asia, 400 miles northwest of Australia. The Portuguese
first visited the island in the early 1500s. Beginning in the 18th
century, the Dutch competed with the Portuguese for control of Timor.
In the middle of the 19th century, they divided the island between
them. When the Dutch East Indies gained independence in 1949 as
the nation of Indonesia, West Timor was absorbed into Indonesia,
and Portugal retained the eastern part of the island as its colony.
Portuguese occupation of Timor was characterized by the exploitation
of its people through oppressive taxation, forced labor, and other
human-rights abuses. Portugal's harsh treatment of the Timorese
led to widespread resentment, and eventually, violent rebellion.
Although Portugal was able to suppress the rebellions, resistance
continued.
Portugal's fascist government was toppled on April 25, 1974 by the
Carnation Revolution, a relatively nonviolent military coup. The
new government in Lisbon was dedicated to democracy and to the decolonization
of Portugal's overseas territories. Thirsting for freedom, the Timorese
leadership began preparing for liberation. As soon-to-be-president
Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao wrote of those days, from his Jakarta cell
as a political prisoner in 1994, "Our only ideology was ukun
rasik an, self-determination." From Gusmao's perspective,
the only choice the Timorese had was between freedom and "total
extermination."
When Portugal abandoned its colonies in 1975, East Timor (heretofore
known as "Portuguese Timor") declared independence. But
independence was to be short-lived, as Indonesia annexed East Timor
nine days later.
Indonesia did so with the tacit approval of President Gerald Ford
and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. According to secret
documents made public on December 6, 2001 by the National Security
Archive at Georgetown University, former Indonesian President General
Suharto told Ford and Kissinger: "We want your understanding
if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action [in East
Timor]." Ford replied, "We will understand and will not
press you on the issue."
The next day, December 7, Indonesia invaded. Within six months,
there were 35,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor, and 10,000 more
were standing by in West Timor.
The armed occupation lasted 24 years. In an attempt to bring East
Timor to its knees, Indonesia resorted to forced sterilization (paid
by for the World Bank), mass starvation, rape, murder, torture,
and conventional and napalm bombing directed at isolated villages,
most of which were leveled to the ground. (For details see John
G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom, 1999). Between
1975 and mid-1999, more than 200,000 East Timorese — a third
of its pre-invasion population of 700,000 — had been killed.
The overwhelming majority of casualties were civilians. It is estimated
that 100,000 East Timorese were killed by Indonesian troops just
in the first year of the invasion.
United Nations resolutions quickly demanded that Indonesia withdraw
all its forces from East Timor. The resolutions were consistently
ignored by Indonesia, and East Timorese civilians continued to be
murdered.
Even so, Timorese resistance stiffened. In spite of the resources
expended by Indonesia to prosecute the war — a cost of up to
$1 million (U.S.)/day — the Armed Forces for the National Liberation
of East Timor (Falintil) waged a successful guerrilla campaign,
using weapons left over from the days of Portuguese rule, or stolen
from Indonesian troops.
In the eyes of the U.N., however, once those arms fell into the
hands of Falintil, they crossed the line from what the U.N. defines
as "licit" guns, into "illicit" guns.
It is here that the hypocrisy and inconsistency of U.N. policy shines
through. The U.N. equates "licit gun" with "government
gun", and "illicit gun" with "anti-government
gun". As Charles Scheiner, National Coordinator for the (ETAN),
correctly pointed
out, however: "The guns used by the Indonesian military
to kill 200,000 East Timorese civilians were almost all 'legal'
…[but] the line between legality and illegality is irrelevant
to the victims…"
That line in
the sand — distinguishing "licit" from "illicit"
— legitimizes possession of firearms owned by governments and
people approved by those governments, rendering firearm possession
by all others "illegitimate." The implication is that
all other weapons will be used in a criminal fashion; U.N. policy
is premised on "a collective belief that states should only
transfer…weapons to other governments," not to "non-state
actors."
It was "illegitimate" transfers that armed Falintil. Measured
against U.N. standards, the Falintil guerrillas — as "non-State
actors" — were in unlawful possession of the firearms
they used to defend their country and their people when there was
no one else to do so. Likewise illegitimate by United Nation standards
was the French Underground which resisted the Nazis, almost every
anti-colonial movement in the world, and the American Revolution.
According to the U.N. Institute
for Disarmament Research, "the ready availability of weapons
makes it far too easy for substate groups to seek remedy for grievances
through the application of violence." In other words, the U.N.
is upset that it was "far too easy" for Falintil to resist
Indonesia's genocide. Although the United Nations did offer "resolutions"
telling Indonesia to get out of East Timor, those words were meaningless
without the force supplied by Falintil's "illicit" arms.
James F. Dunnigan,
editor of StrategyPage.com,
pointed out why Falintil — a guerrilla army comprised of both
men and women, equipped with only small arms and support from the
civilian populace — prevailed against the might of Indonesia:
"The basic idea behind guerilla war is to keep your force intact,
not to fight the enemy. Guerillas who keep those priorities straight
are successful. The East Timor separatists used a sound strategy,
and eventually, the situation became intolerable for the occupying
power…That was how the American Revolution was fought. Washington
didn't have to win, or even fight, battles, he just had to keep
the Continental army intact until the British parliament got tired
of paying for the North American war."
The Price of the Referendum
In 1999, the Indonesian government, headed by B.
J. Habibie, finally agreed to an East Timorese vote on self-determination:
autonomy under Indonesian rule, or complete independence.
Indonesia, though, had merely changed tactics. The Sydney Herald
(April 29, 1999) detailed Indonesia's "three-pronged attempt"
to sabotage the referendum process: "to first destabilize the
situation in East Timor sufficiently to prevent a referendum; second,
to terrorise the population sufficiently to ensure a pro-integration
outcome in case a referendum takes place; and third, to 'Timorise'
the conflict by presenting to the world a picture of 'warring Timorese
factions.'"
So the Indonesian military set about training "militias"
in East Timor. These bore no resemblance to the American model our
Founding Fathers had in mind, our well-armed citizenry which provides
homeland security. Indonesia's militias consisted of armed gangs
of thugs, perpetrating
mayhem and rape, and intimidating anyone believed to be in support
of independence. These militias were quite similar to the British
and Hessian standing armies which America's founders so greatly
loathed: the dregs of society, empowered by government to terrorize
the population. While Jakarta tried to cast Falintil as the cause
of continued violence in East Timor, it was evident that the violence
was orchestrated by the Indonesian army and its "militia"
thugs.
In April 1999, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas demanded that
the East Timorese give
up their arms as a pre-condition for peace. East Timor resistance
leader Xanana Gusmao refused. He reiterated that Falintil guerrillas
were never involved in acts of terrorism but had always acted in
self-defense. They should therefore be treated as "an army
of liberation and not as a band of bandits." He did, however,
agree to a U.N.-brokered
compromise between East Timor and Jakarta: Falintil and the
Indonesian militias were to refrain from carrying weapons except
in designated areas called "cantonments."
While Falintil remained passive in accordance with the truce, the
Indonesian military continued to encourage militia misbehavior,
leaving the undefended East Timorese populace easy
prey. Because independence depended on the referendum, which
in turn depended on the cantonment of Falintil, East Timorese leaders
had no choice.
On May 5, 1999, agreements were signed allowing the referendum to
go forward, and on June 11, U.N.
Resolution 1246 formally established the United Nations Mission
in East Timor (UNAMET) for the purpose of organizing and supervising
the referendum process. The "responsibility…to maintain
peace and security in East Timor…in order to ensure that
the popular consultation [the vote] is carried out in a fair and
peaceful way and in an atmosphere free of intimidation" was
placed on the Indonesian government.
The Indonesian army and its militias, with a long record of broken
promises of non-aggression, now had a monopoly of power in East
Timor, and their terror campaign persisted. One knowledgeable Western
security expert predicted, "If independence wins, these autonomy
guys will go berserk."
On August 30, 1999, the referendum was held. The turnout was huge,
and the vote was 78.5% for independence. Falintil remained in cantonment,
muzzled.
The Price of Independence
Until the eve of the referendum, the Indonesian military and police
continued to promise to curb the violence and to honor a free vote.
And as predicted, once East Timor voted to cut its ties with Indonesia,
the Indonesian military set loose their vengeful militias on a defenseless
populace. They hunted down independence supporters and their families,
and torched villages.
According to the New York Times (October 24, 1999), one militiaman
told the reporter that his orders were "to kill anyone on the
street who stood for independence." And, he added, "if
they could not hold onto East Timor, they would leave behind a wasteland
devoid of schools, society, structure or a population."
Still, Falintil remained passive.
The extraordinary restraint exhibited by Falintil during the ensuing
chaos earned high praise from U.N. officials: "Throughout all
this emergency they have not moved. The Indonesians want them to
come out and attack so they can blame the chaos on Falintil."
But Xanana Gusmao resisted the temptation to fight back in justifiable
self-defense. In a broadcast aired shortly after the vote, he said:
"I appeal to all the guerrillas…to maintain your positions
and not to react…."
As the world took notice, international pressure was brought to
bear on Jakarta. Three weeks after the referendum, the first wave
of Australian, New Zealand and British troops — the core of
the U.N. peacekeeping force — arrived in Dili, the capitol
of East Timor. Within a week, 3,000 troops had arrived, with a final
target of 8,000.
Finally, the balance of power favored security for the people of
East Timor.
Freedom, at Last?
Once again, the U.N. ordered Falintil to disarm. Again, they refused.
Recognizing the high cost of confiscating Falintil's weapons, U.N.
peacekeepers backed off; on October 5, 1999, Australian Army Col.
Mark Kelly, spokesman for the international peacekeeping-force Interfet,
made a face-saving statement: "The ongoing discussions we will
have with the Falintil leadership will look towards the eventual
disarming. We have got a requirement to disarm those people under
our [U.N.] mandate."
By December, it was decided that Falintil would be transformed into
East Timor's "legally constituted police force." If the
U.N. could not disarm Falintil, then group could be legitimized
in U.N. eyes by morphing it into the East Timor Defence Force.
On Feb. 1, 2001, the Falintil guerrilla force became the world's
newest internationally
recognized army. Its mission was declared by its new commander,
Brigadier-General Taur Matan Ruak: "to guarantee the defence
of our homeland, of the new sovereign state of Timor, fully respecting
the new democratic institutions and the political representatives
democratically elected by our people."
Can East Timor remain a viable country upon independence? From a
financial perspective, the answer is "yes", when one considers
the hardworking and self-sacrificing spirit of its people —
and the immense offshore oil deposits. In
1989, a huge share of that oil was given to Australia by Indonesia
"in return for Australia's support for, and formal recognition
of, the 1975-1976 Indonesian annexation of East Timor." By
international law, that offshore oil belongs to the East Timorese,
and on July 5, 2001, a new treaty was signed between East Timor
and Australia, giving the soon-to-be nation a 90 percent share of
the gas and oil revenue.
Yet the answer to East Timor's long-term survival might well be
"no", because when U.N. peacekeepers pull out three years
after independence, the balance of power will shift again, and it
might not tilt in favor of the East Timorese populace. There are
strong indications that pro-Indonesia militias are still intent
on thwarting
an independent East Timor. Is a military force
of 1,500 active soldiers enough to ensure the safety of its
citizens against hit-and-run terrorism from the huge country next
door?
Indonesia's current president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri, who assumed office in July 2001, inherited both
the political acumen of her father (Indonesia's founding president
Sukarno) and the gravitas of his name. But even this may not be
enough to control her country's military. Developments in East Timor
have served only to increase the thirst for independence of Indonesia's
minority provinces. She knows that if Indonesia loses control of
its resource-rich provinces where there is strongest separatist
sentiment — Aceh
and West Papua (Irian Jaya) — Indonesia's own political
stability will be in jeopardy.
A strong indication that the Indonesian military is beyond civilian
control can be inferred from the current status
of the refugees remaining in West Timor. Numbering up to 100,000
mostly women and children, these people fled
into West Timor after the violence in 1999. As a gesture of
good will, Megawati should take measures to ensure that the remaining
refugees are repatriated enthusiastically and without incident.
Further clouding the future of the new nation is Regulation
NO 2001/5, "On Firearms, Ammunition Explosives and Other
Offensive Weapons in East Timor", enacted into law on April
23, 2001 by the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).
The U.N.'s determination to disarm civilians finally prevailed.
Herein lies the fundamental difference between America's guarantee
for the perpetuation of its newly-won liberty, and that of the East
Timorese. Incorporated in this document, which reads like an Indonesian
army wish-list, is the codification of U.N. disarmament policy.
If the regulation stands, it will ensure that Timorese civilians
are forced to sit and wait for protection from a thinly spread national
defense force.
Commander Taur Matan Ruak, who has already lived through his country's
hell, recognized the great potential for continuing violence. Three
months before the new firearm regulations were enacted, Ruak expressed
the belief that East Timor's "population should defend itself."
Knowing firsthand how the balance of power can so easily and so
quickly be changed by the presence of firearms, will the fledgling
government revoke the U.N.-imposed de facto prohibition of a true
citizen militia, once independence becomes a reality?
Asked soon-to-be-president Xanana Gusmao: "Is it the law that
the small and the weak can be totally subjugated by the strong and
the powerful?" The history of our species tells us that, sadly,
the answer is "yes." But as the East Timorese know, guns
sure help to even the odds.
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