|
 he
New York Times reported Sunday on the Bush administration's
alleged new approach to trying to get the Chinese to acquiesce to
an American missile-defense system: dropping U.S. objections to
the Chinese missile buildup. Over the last few days the administration
has been denying and backpedaling like mad, until yesterday the
White House felt compelled to issue a statement saying that yes,
indeed, we still object to the Chinese missile buildup.
There were
a couple of misunderstandings both in the administration's now-disavowed
approach to China, and in the harsh reaction to it from Democrats
and Republicans. The chief one is the notion that it matters in
the least what we say about China's nuclear buildup. Does anyone
really think that, if we object to the Chinese modernization push,
someone will pipe up at the next Politburo meeting: "Gentlemen:
Yes, developing new missiles is key to our aspirations as a great
power, it is essential to our long-term goal of taking back Taiwan,
and it is a matter involving national honor; but Colin Powell says
he doesn't like the idea. So, hey, let's drop it and do something
else. How about modernizing the highway system instead?"
China will
build new missiles for the same reason that we oppose the Kyoto
treaty, that India agitates to take all of Kashmir, and that the
French protect their dairy farmers: It is in their interest to do
so. This brings us to the other folly inherent in the Bush administration's
maneuvering: the assumption that anything can keep the Chinese
from opposing missile defense. China will build new missiles as
a matter not just of prestige, but of cold-blooded calculation.
Missiles increase China's coercive power over Taiwan and the United
States. Anything that threatens that coercive potential — i.e.,
missile defense — works to lessen Chinese power; the Chinese
won't agree to it even if we promise to paint their new, modernized
missiles red-white-and-blue and have Colin Powell sit in the reviewing
stand when they're paraded through Tiananmen Square.
Which brings
us to another mistake commonly made in considering this issue: the
idea that it is missile defense that is prompting the Chinese to
build their missiles. Actually, their modernization campaign was
under way even back when President Clinton was swearing eternal
fealty to the ABM Treaty. So when it comes to the new arms race
in Asia, China has been out of the starting blocks for a long time
now. The highbrow arms-control explanation for the Chinese buildup
is that China needs to maintain a "survivable" force —
one that could weather a U.S. first strike and then hit back. But
this is silly. The Chinese force is not survivable now, even without
missile defense. China has about two dozen missiles, a tiny number
compared to the U.S. force. And the warheads are not kept on the
missiles, and the rockets are liquid-fueled — meaning they
would have to be readied far in advance in a crisis, equipped with
the warheads and gassed up, which would give us ample opportunity
to take them out.
The bottom
line is that we can try to soothe Chinese feelings all we like and
ditch our missile-defense plans tomorrow, but they are still going
to build new nukes and scream bloody murder about a U.S. defense
system. This is because, fundamentally, international relations
is not about feelings or talk, but about power, about the hard facts
on the ground. In this case, they clearly dictate that China should
build up. They also dictate that we should take the initial steps
to being able to protect ourselves from that and other buildups
around the world. Unless we manage to talk ourselves out of it,
in a fog of fantasy and weak thinking.
|
