What About Missile Defense?
Missile-defense critics have already jumped right in.

September 14, 2001 3:30 p.m.

 

wanted to wait to write about how Tuesday's attacks will affect the debate over missile defense, but missile-defense critics have already jumped right in — on Wednesday, the New York Times apparently thought scoring points against the idea of missile defense was one of the most important things to say immediately in the wake of the most catastrophic attack on American land ever.

Others have followed suit, on TV, and in the case of our old friend Robert Wright, in the pages of Slate.

The most obvious answer to the criticism that missile defense wouldn't have stopped these attacks is that most weapons technologies that the U.S. military deploys didn't stop these attacks, but that they are still worth having. Should we stop investing in the aircraft carrier, the M-1 tank, the cruise missile, because they were worthless on Tuesday?

Those are specific technologies with specific purposes that happened not to have any application in this case. So, too, missile defense has a specific purpose — shooting down ICBMs — that wouldn't have helped on Tuesday, but that obviously doesn't mean that for all time the U.S. will never face that threat.

In fact, as we move toward what may be war with Afghanistan and Iraq, we had better hope that Saddam Hussein doesn't have a more sophisticated missile-capacity than we know (he’s been flight-testing short-range missiles and working on his longer-range missiles), or things will get more complicated very quickly.

In previous attacks on missile defense, Robert Wright (I’ll let him stand in for all missile-defense critics at the moment) has shrugged off the additional power that a nuclear-missile threat would give dictators such as Saddam Hussein: "I don't deny that the possession of nukes would probably give a dictator more leeway in world affairs, or that, specifically, great powers might be less inclined to confront such a dictator."

So, in a future crisis such as the one that confronts the United States today, Wright would blithely accept the diminution of U.S. power and influence that would come with having no defensive capacity against possible missile attacks.

If this isn't bad enough, Wright seemed in his previous columns to welcome this possibility: "This may be the scariest thing about missile defense . . .: It could give some American political leaders the illusion of insulation from world problems."

By this logic, the more attacks to which we are vulnerable, the better, since it increases our engagement in world affairs. Besides being outlandish on its face — we should try to protect ourselves against every attack imaginable — it’s really quite the opposite. The more vulnerable we are, the less likely we are to act in the world, as Wright admits when he talks of the possession of nukes increasing the power of our enemies.

But Wright has reconsidered one important point.

During our exchange earlier this year, he was adamant that every world leader would be a totally rational actor--deterrence apparently worked against the Soviets, therefore it would work against everyone else as well.

When I suggested that this wasn't the case, that the U.S. would confront enemies who would by our standards be totally unreasonable, he scoffed: "Is he indeed saying that European people can be counted on to comply with Western notions of rationality, but people from Asian or Islamic cultures can't be?"

Well, yesterday, he wrote: "Islamic radicalism . . . at the grass-roots level, is simply not susceptible to normal deterrence." Just so: this is the real world, after all, one in which hyper-rational considerations don’t dictate everyone's every move, one in which people are sometimes murderously, suicidally unreasonable.

Wright tries to save his original position by stipulating that it is at the grassroots that Islamic radicalism isn't deterrable, because he apparently still thinks that all leaders of states are disciples of John Nash, the creator of game theory.

His worldview has no room for those voices in the Japanese cabinet, who in the wake of our atomic attacks supported the idea of leading Japan into total destruction; no room for Hitler near the end essentially ordering the utter annihilation of his own nation; no room for Castro welcoming the idea of a nuclear strike on Cuba during the missile crisis, so that Cuba might be destroyed but socialism might triumph.

The world will see such leaders again, and we had best prepare.

Finally, Wright argues essentially that it is a zero-sum game between missile-defense spending and counter-terrorism spending, that we would have to have "infinite" resources to pursue both. But the idea that the richest nation in the world can't try to protect itself from all possible threats is nonsense. Missile-defense spending would have been 3 percent of the Bush defense budget — hardly breaking the bank.

We spend massively on counter-terrorism now, and should spend more in the future. This should be all the more possible now that everyone will finally admit what Jonathan Chait of The New Republic has been saying for weeks: that the various "lockboxes" in Washington are just "artificial devices" meant to prevent more spending on things like defense.

Anyway, this debate feels a little unseemly in the circumstances. Amid the couple of "I told you so's" here, let me stipulate that, although NR has always supported spending on both missile defense and counter-terrorism, I never would have predicted such an awful thing would have been possible.

 
 

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