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administration apparently can't decide whether it wants to topple
the Taliban or not. Considering that President Bush last week warned
the Taliban that it had better cough up Osama bin Laden and the
terrorists or "share their fate," it's unclear why there
should be much uncertainty on this score. But Colin Powell was suggesting
earlier this week that al Qaeda might be our only target, and Ari
Fleischer quickly walked back from Bush's suggestion Tuesday that
we would welcome the Taliban's overthrow. So what gives?
The pessimistic
interpretation is that, even before it gets started, the administration's
drive is getting bogged down by the diplomatic inertia of the coalition,
in this case Pakistan, which hates the idea of anyone besides itself
playing in Afghani politics. How galling was this statement the
other day from the Pakistani foreign minister? "We fear that
any such decision on the part of foreign powers to give assistance
to one side or the other in Afghanistan is a recipe for great disaster
for the people of Afghanistan," he said. This from the people
who — through their money and weapons — brought us the
Taliban in the first place.
This points
out the problem with deferring too much to allies — they are
often cheats, liars, and thugs, and even if they're not, their interests
will still deviate from ours. So, Pakistan shouldn't be kowtowed
to for its own sake. Nor should we blush at the very idea of regime
change. If we can't overthrow the Taliban — which isn't even
a legitimate government and was recognized by only three countries
prior to this crisis, and only by one government now (our friend
Pakistan) — there seems little hope for dislodging any other
governments.
But Pakistan
is worth kowtowing to for our own sake. And this is where Colin
Powell's vaunted diplomacy can be useful, so long as it is tethered
to a strategic vision (reporters like Powell because they think
he actively opposes the Bush vision). Just because something
is a diplomatic nicety doesn't mean that it is useless. By all means,
let's publicly disavow any intention of toppling the Taliban. Let's
swear up and down that we now realize that, in these particular
circumstances, such an action wouldn't be prudent, wise, cautious,
productive — any of those adjectives that the "responsible"
foreign-policy community loves.
All
we are going to do, we can say, is pursue al Qaeda and its immediate
supporters, and if it just happens that in the resulting general
chaos the Taliban government falls — well then, that just couldn't
be helped. (James
Robbins has explained how this might work on NRO.) A little
diplomatic blather is worth it, both to keep Pakistan on board as
a military-staging area and to prevent it from being destabilized
(although the likelihood of this is probably exaggerated in the
press). If Pakistan fell to a more extreme Muslim element, it could
prove quite harmful to the U.S., since, among other things, it has
the fissile material we hope to keep out of the hands of Iran and
Iraq.
The administration
has also been grappling with a phenomenon that I
described in my piece in the latest National Review advocating
the invasion and occupation of Iraq — that is, "if you
break it, you've bought it." If we indirectly topple the Taliban
government, there will be some international pressure on us to shape
the post-Taliban government. I think this pressure is to be resisted
in the case of Afghanistan — chaos isn't very different from
what the country is experiencing now. But humanitarian considerations
aren't to be discounted entirely.
Sending in
the Red Cross, if feasible at some point, would be desirable,
as would dropping tents and food from American planes. Because goodness
is a crucial ingredient to American power. As the brilliant (and
new NRO columnist) Victor Davis Hanson points out in The
Soul of Battle, Sherman's drive through Georgia was so effective,
not just because he burned and destroyed all the infrastructure
in sight, but because he freed and treated humanely slaves, which
made a powerful political statement. We should look for ways to
make similar statements in our struggle with the barbarians who
don't just hate us, but repress and kill Muslims. This would be
one of the points of occupying Iraq.
In any case,
there is nothing wrong with speaking softly, as long we are still
willing to swing our stick fiercely.
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