The Mistake of Appeasement
Ignore much of elite opinion.

September 17, 2001 8:15 a.m.

here is a stubborn school of thought in international relations that believes you always have to be cautious lest any action you take galvanize your enemies, tip those who hate you into hating you even more, make a bad situation worse.

In the current crisis, the New York Times and columnist Anthony Lewis seem set to be the prime bullhorns for this way of thinking, for the latest iteration of the long-running Western mistake of appeasement.

They worry, among other things, that any unduly harsh action on the part of the U.S. might undermine our Middle Eastern allies, by, in Lewis's words, "arous[ing] anti-Western sentiments across the Middle East." The Times thinks the behavior of terrorist states can be changed by pressure from the international community, and blanches at Paul Wolfowitz's threat to "end" states that sponsor terrorism — so belligerent, so disproportionate, so impolite!

Now, there is much to be said for maintaining a large international coalition on our side in this matter, and for retaining the moral authority this terrible event has given us in everyone's eyes.

But what appeasers never realize is that it is the application of American force that makes the world amenable to our demands, and that the more powerful we seem — and the more willing to use that power — the more allies we will have.

Syria, for instance, at the moment appears to be begging to be part of our antiterrorist coalition. Is this because Syria's leaders suddenly realize the value of innocent life? Because since Tuesday they have read the U.N. charter and brushed up on international law?

No. Syria wants at least to appear to be forthcoming because its leaders go to bed every night with visions of its capital city in smoldering ruins. This vision, held in the heads of leaders throughout the Middle East, will be America's chief asset in getting its way in coming weeks and months.

So, if the U.S. flattens parts of Afghanistan and Baghdad, it may well inflame the "Arab street," but it is also likely to bring wavering governments to America's side all the more firmly. Ending a few recalcitrant terrorist-friendly regimes in the Middle East — or at least setting them back economically and militarily three or four decades — is the necessary adjunct to American diplomacy, if we are not to appear blustery and weak.

Before the Gulf War, the voices of appeasement raised similar warnings about the disastrous effects American military action would have on its standing in the Arab world. But smashing the Iraqi military turned out to be the best possible way to recruit new and eager allies in the region.

This is what, in international-relations argot, is called "the bandwagon effect."

Michael Lind has a lucid description of the theory in his Vietnam: The Necessary War. As Lind explains, the bandwagon effect nicely jibes with the course of the Cold War:

In the mid-1950s and late 1980s, when the Soviet Union was relatively weak, the Soviets had few allies. In the mid-seventies, when Soviet military power reached its peak relative to that of the United States, the Soviet alliance system attained its greatest extent. This pattern . . . accords perfectly with the predictions of bandwagoning theory. So does the fact that United States had the greatest number of allies at the beginning of the Cold War (when the Soviet Union still was devastated by World War II) and at the end of Cold War (when the Soviet Union's former satellites as well as former allies and neutrals were deserting Moscow to seek the favor of Washington).

Liberals have always had trouble understanding this dynamic, or been unwilling to accept it even if they did grasp it — for reasons that involve liberalism's deepest well-springs as a worldview (I try to delve into some of them in my piece in the new NR attacking "peace-process liberalism").

This is why the unity that now characterizes our political leaders and opinion-makers will inevitably founder, as the Left loses its enthusiasm for all the war talk. The Times is just the first indication of this. It obviously isn't because liberals are disloyal or stupid, but because they are in the grips of a profound intellectual mistake in how they view the world, a persistent mistake that won't go away in the wake of this catastrophe.

It behooves Bush, then, to be prepared to ignore much of elite opinion, and send a clear message to the world: the bandwagon is leaving the station, time to climb aboard.