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Any government organization will have bad actors who cheat the system; the real test is how the agency responds. To call State toothless in its handling of visa-fraud cases might be generous. In the decade between 1989-1999, federal authorities prosecuted only one U.S. diplomat for visa fraud, and that case resulted in a 1997 acquittal. An L.A. Times report three years ago found that visa-fraud cases routinely resulted in transfers or retirements, not prosecutions. To State, making a problem go away means just that — moving the "problem" somewhere else. Although an egregious example, the case of Charles Parish is symptomatic of problems that still plague State. In the mid-1990's, Parish was a first secretary and consul at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China, one of the busiest consulates in the world. Parish frequently overturned refusals of junior consular officers, and by his own admission, he received at least sizeable gifts. According to an investigation of the U.S. House Government Reform Committee, evidence shows that Parish also took in cash bribes and sex in exchange for the sale of visas in Communist China. But even before his alleged shenanigans in China, Parish had been under suspicion for visa fraud during stints as a consular officer in Bangladesh and Nepal in the early 1990's. Starting in early 1995, consular officers in Beijing complained of suspected ethical violations of their superior. It wasn't until April 1996 that any action was finally taken. By that point, Parish had become so infamous that people were directed to seek him out by the Chinese media. In a Beijing Chronicle article that month, readers were told that in order to get a visa, "The 'black' one is easier" — and Parish was the only African-American visa officer at the embassy. After 16 months of their increasingly loud protests being ignored, "junior consular officers complained en masse at a dinner held by the Embassy's number two officer," the congressional investigation found. When action was belatedly taken, it was a one-man task by the Regional Security Officer (RSO), whose request for assistance from Diplomatic Security in Washington was denied. The RSO found Parish's office contained everything from duplicate visa applications (which was a no-no) to files on Chinese companies to statements for Parish's own Hong Kong bank account. When other consular officers wanted to use Parish's office, however, the RSO destroyed most of the evidence, not even conducting an inventory or taking photographs before doing so. What was State's reaction? Parish was shipped back to Washington, and given a promotion. But the bump in stature and money is not the disturbing part. Parish, in the words of a May 1997 performance review, was responsible for "handling the most sensitive visa applications, those from persons suspected of terrorism, espionage, or other serious threats to U.S. national interests" in the Middle East. A man who should have at least been thoroughly investigated, if not prosecuted, was charged with safeguarding us from terrorists in countries such as Iran. Within this historical context, it should come as no surprise that 71 people, mostly Jordanians and Pakistanis, obtained illegal visas in Qatar over an 11-month period — and fraud was not even suspected until six months after the last illegal visa had been issued. Sadly, the delay in detection in Qatar is not a singular aberration. Over a period of several years, consular officer Thomas Carroll sold up to 800 visas for $10,000-$15,000 each in Guyana, raking in over $4 million profit. At least 26 people to whom he sold visas committed crimes in America, ranging from disorderly conduct to gang rape. The only reason Carroll got caught was that he was dumb enough to tell his successor about the scheme in a pathetic recruitment attempt. Carroll's case is not old news, either. He was convicted just last month. Consular Affairs (CA), the agency within the State Department that oversees consulates and visa issuance, is unlikely to change any of this under the auspices of State. State has allowed an auditing process where current or former CA employees head up State's audits of CA. That's right — CA audits itself. That State finds this appropriate goes right to the heart of why it cannot be entrusted with United States border security in a time of war. Even though CA chief Mary Ryan was "forced out" (in her own words in a conference call to the heads of the passport agencies yesterday), nothing is likely to change at CA. Because of Mary Ryan's unusually long tenure of nine years at the helm of CA, the agency that gave all 19 of the 9/11 terrorists legal visas is stocked full of her cronies. Most likely, whoever replaces Mary Ryan will carry on the tradition of the "courtesy culture" and lax oversight that have provided an open door for terrorists. The only hope for reform comes with congressional action to strip the visa-issuance powers from State and place them within the new Department of Homeland Security. Secretary of State Colin Powell is fighting this proposal to the bitter end, but the measure could still pass if enough there is enough public pressure to override Powell's furious lobbying efforts. The fate of U.S. border security hangs in the balance. — Joel Mowbray is an NRO contributor and a Townhall.com columnist. |
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ith
the visa-selling scandal in Doha, Qatar heating up just as Congress is
looking into removing the visa-issuance powers from the State Department,
the logical question is: Does the current mess show why State should not
have visa authority? In and of itself, the answer is no — but the
answer changes when you consider the long pattern of fraud in consulates,
and how State responded, or more accurately, didn't. 
